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ABSTRACT

Caught Between the State, the Market, and Civil Society:
The Divergent Paths of Chinese NGOs Seeking to Make Social Change in China
by
Wenjuan Zheng
Advisor: Katherine K. Chen

Research on Chinese civil society has tended to focus on the relationship between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and the state. Such work has underestimated the complexity
of the emerging institutional environment where Chinese NGOs are often caught between the
state, the market, and a constrained civil society. How do civil society organizations and their
respective nonprofit sectors emerge, what forms do they take? More specifically, how do
organizational forms and strategies reflect political and market structures at the time? Chinese
nonprofit sectors re-emerged in the late 1990s, and their relationships with the state have
been contentious. The rapid transformation of the nonprofit sectors provides a unique opportunity
to look at the emergence of a new organizational field. Using strategic action fields (SAFs)
theory, I examine how organizations within the field of nonprofit organizations attempted to
establish and defend their positions vis-à-vis the state and market. I conducted comparative case
studies of two leading NGOs in two of China’s cities: Civil Society Center (CSC) in the city of
Guangzhou and Excellence Promoter (EP) in the city of Shanghai. I traced the histories and
current development of CSC and EP and their connected organizations and used ethnographic,
interview, and survey data to triangulate the emerging urban nonprofit sectors in the context of
an authoritarian state. I argue that, in different periods, the nonprofit organizational fields of
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Guangzhou and Shanghai reflected political and market structures at the time. In the early 2000s,
Guangzhou’s nonprofit organizations were grassroots-driven, and a State Avoidance Autonomous
field arose as large organizations decentralized into smaller organizations to decrease state
scrutiny and intervention. In contrast, in Shanghai, where the state promoted nonprofit
organizations as an extension of governmental programs, a State Alliance Social Market Field
developed. This State Alliance Social Market Field prioritized business values and practices to
guide organizational strategies rather than the ethical commitments that had been the center of
the State Avoidance Autonomous field. By partnering with government, EP was able to rapidly
expand while its Guangzhou counterpart, CSC, remained small and marginal. Powerful ecommerce companies such as Tencent, however, have been changing the rules and norms that
used to govern the field. They entered the nonprofit field through the creation of a new
fundraising platform that opened up alternative resources for Chinese NGOs. The involvement of
the market through corporate foundations and new technologies has provided alternative funding
for grassroots NGOs under the attack from the state. My study contributes to nonprofit studies
and China studies by providing insight into how NGOs interact with different state and market
players and the consequences of such interactions on organizational strategies.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Introduction
The 2018 abolition of term limits on the presidency and the potential rise of dictatorship
in China has tested scholars and public intellectuals’ faith, promoting some to shake their hopes
upon possible avenues for social change. They have placed their last hope in the emergence of
civil society and the rise of a middle class for China’s peaceful political transition from an
authoritarian regime to a democratic country. In the classical definition, civil society comprises a
wide range of voluntary, nonprofit, non-governmental associations and the public sphere,
independent of the state (Brunkhorst 2005; Xu 2018). It is also an arena where social actors
engage with the state and pursue policy and social change through persuasion, advocacy, and
social movements. 2008 marked the emergence of a unified Chinese civil society. Over the past
decade, we saw a surge of advocacy work, alternative forms of contention in various local
nonprofit sectors, and social movements. On the other hand, government agents and institutions
penetrated the sectors, co-opting and controlling many nonprofit organizations. Can we count on
civil society as the last chance to pave the road for the democratization of China a decade after
2008’s the Year of Civil Society? Will incremental social changes in everyday life accumulate
and transform society?
The collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and more recently the
Arab Spring in 2011 have created the perception among scholars that civil society is a critical
ingredient in social revolutions against authoritarian regimes (Cavatorta 2012). The Arab Spring,
a series of protests and demonstrations for democracy that swept across the Middle East and
North Africa in 2010, once gave hope for people longing to end authoritarianism, but the social
momentum receded before reaching China. With the growth of its middle class, China seemed to
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present more favorable conditions for the transformation of society (Lipset 1959; Rueschemeyer,
Stephens, and Stephens 1992). The McKinsey report showed that China is experiencing an
explosive growth in its middle class, with more than 75% of China’s urban residents expecting
annual salaries of $9,000 to $34,000 by 2022 (Barton, Chen, and Jin 2013). It is reasonable to
expect that a rising middle class in China would eventually demand more freedom from the state
after achieving material satisfaction. Nonetheless, despite most predictions, the one-party state
remains strong and stable. Large-scale social movements that challenge the current regime are a
rare find. This is not to say that social movements have not occurred in contemporary China. The
AIDS movement in the early 2000s and pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong in 2014 were
major events, and small and scattered local movements have persisted; however, most
movements failed to move beyond narrow claims and geographic boundaries. We have not seen
spillover effect of social movements in China.
It is a puzzle for most outsiders: how does civil society emerge in an authoritarian state,
and what do people experience when the state stifles their political rights. The historical imprint
of the Tiananmen Square student protests remains and seems to signal to the Chinese people that
mass protests can only lead to a dead end. Instead of offering a way to revolutionize the country,
civil society actors have adopted a modest approach to social change without directly
challenging the one-party state rule. The lack of protests and social movements does not mean
that civil society actors have compromised their goals. Even for today’s modest reformers, a
wide spectrum of strategies to enact social change exists, but they exhibit different relationships
with the state. Due to the presence of a strong state, some choose to work closely with the state
for social change from within the system; others work outside of the state system and address
social problems with non-confrontational approaches, often relying on market forces. What are
2

the tradeoffs between these two distinct approaches to social change? What do the dilemmas of
collaboration between non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the state or market tell us
about the state’s role in shaping civil society? Last, how successful are those survival strategies
in responding to crises?
A Synopsis of this Comparative Study
To answer those questions, I compared two strategies and approaches that local NGOs
took toward grassroots social change from 2008 to 2018. The two strategies were linked to
decisions about how to carry out a social change mission (empowering the grassroots and
marginal population vs. creating a new industrial nonprofit sector). The two camps of thoughts
manifested themselves in the development of civil society and nonprofit sectors in the cities of
Guangzhou and Shanghai, China. Conceptually, the nonprofit sectors in Guangzhou and
Shanghai all belong to the same Chinese civil society universe, but they pursued divergent paths.
The early generation of NGOs in Guangzhou conformed to the image of civil society most
readers who are unfamiliar with China had. This community of NGOs in Guangzhou’s nonprofit
sector were bottom-up, grassroots organizations. They assembled a relatively autonomous civil
society. Shanghai’s nonprofit sector, in contrast, was a top-down, state-led civil society.
Nonprofit practitioners contend that civil society in Guangzhou was more vibrant and lively than
in Shanghai. They also saw more diverse, innovative, and progressive NGOs in Guangzhou than
those in Shanghai. How did these two nonprofit sectors generate these perceptions?
In each city, I chose two influential intermediary organizations to study. The intermediary
organization functions to connect smaller organizations, setting up the rules and norms of the
field and mediating between funding agencies and local governments for the community
(Anheier and List 2006). The field refers to a socio-spatial arena where a group of actors both
3

individuals and collectives engage each other with a shared understanding of the field’s rules and
norms (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). Within the intermediary organization categories, I picked
two almost identical capacity training organizations, or nonprofit incubators. Non-profit
incubator programs mimic incubators in the tech industry. They provide seed funding, free office
space, capacity training, and legal support so that NGOs can grow in number and scale up. The
Civil Society Center (CSC) in Guangzhou first introduced, from the US, the concept of nonprofit
incubators in 2005, and Excellence Promoter (EP) quickly adopted the same model and set up a
similar program in Shanghai in 2007. EP spread the model throughout the rest of the country.
Now there are hundreds of nonprofit incubators at street, county, and municipal levels.
Using interviews with founders, board members, formal and current staff, I compared
CSC and EP and traced their organizational trajectories over the past decade. The comparison
helps us understand the emergence of civil society as an organizational field and its recent
development in China. The organizational forms and strategies, which reflect the political and
market structure, evolve and change over time. Therefore, organizations behave differently
during different period. Based on the ebb and flow of these two organizations’ growth, I divided
the past decade from 2008 to 2018 into three periods: the Emergent Period (2008-2014), the
Crisis Period (late 2014-2015), and the Resettlement Period (late 2015-2018). The Emergent
Period refers to the period of rapid growth for the two organizations and their respective fields.
The Crisis Period was the period of slow development when the state strengthened its control
over civil society in contentious episodes following the change of national leaders and prodemocracy movements in Hong Kong. The Resettlement Period occurred when old players tried
to re-establish the order of the field after a crisis and new players, like E-commerce companies,
introduced new rules and norms. I divided the three stages based on the involvement of different
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players, significant organizational changes in strategies and resources, and important events that
my interviewees mentioned (See Appendix I for timeline). They believed those events
significantly affected organizational growth and more broadly the Chinese nonprofit sector. For
each period, I examined one particular organizational dilemma confronted by both organizations,
using archival data, interviews, and ethnography. I analyzed the organizational dilemma at three
points in a parallel manner: the general field environment (macro-level), the local field formation
(meso-level), and the core organizational strategies (micro-level) in resource acquisition and
alliance building for each organization. In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with other
organizations in the field and surveyed 40 to 50 NGOs to triangulate the development of civil
society in each city.
I argue that crises such as a natural disaster sparked new awareness of different actors’
responsibilities, allowing the development of nonprofit organizations. The 2008 earthquake right
before the Olympic Games in Beijing “tugged at the heartstrings of the Chinese Communist
party” (Osnos 2013: A1). More than 87,000 people were killed with a disproportionally large
number of children buried under government-constructed, jerry-built schools. It presented the
government with a significant legitimacy crisis. Many Chinese began to talk about government
accountability, charity, and citizenship. Local nonprofit actors seized the opportunity and
demonstrated their worth and voice, which helped the state with disaster relief. As a result, civil
society blossomed like never before. In that scenario, because the state perceived local nonprofit
actors as allies fighting natural disasters and preserving social disability, an internal state
legitimacy crisis led to the emergence of civil society and a post-2008 nonprofit sector.
However, the color revolutions and pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong since late
2013 generated episodes of contention. The pro-democracy crisis in conjunction with the change
5

of leadership at the national level and economic slowdown narrowed the state’s legitimate
domain. The state perceived advocacy-oriented NGOs and those with international alliances as
the potential enemy of the state. The state tightened control and suppressed the bottom-up
grassroots organizations to prevent movement spillover effects. The perceived crisis destabilized
certain segments of the nonprofit sector, leading to a widespread crisis in the nonprofit field in
general.
Many nonprofit actors relied on the formal or informal relationship with different levels
of state actors to survive because the field was not structured by law. However, the enactment of
the first Charity Law in 2016 and the Overseas NGO law in 2017 further constrained the space
for NGOs because the state imposed more regulation and restriction on NGO activities and
sources of funding. Many grassroots NGOs struggled to survive. The entrance of private
companies into the philanthropic and nonprofit sector provided an alternative for NGOs facing
state repression to survive. The triangle relations among nonprofit players, the state, and the
market led to a new resettlement of the nonprofit sector.
In this study, I focused on the triangular interaction between nonprofit, state, and market
actors before and after the crisis. I argue that the capacity of social skills an actor possesses affect
an actors’ ability to predict, anticipate, and manage the crisis is crucial to the success of
organizations in a contingent environment. The crisis, whether external or internal, entails both
threat and opportunity. A competent social actor can make use of a crisis to advance its own
position in the field. If the indicator of social change lies in policy change, government
accountability, access to welfare resources, and greater awareness of citizenship, crises like the
2008 Sichuan earthquake provided a rare opportunity for nonprofit actors to accelerate and
multiply their efforts and impact when the state is under pressure to act “weak” and swings to the
6

“left.” Swinging to the left refers to the central state’s liberal approach towards society, like a
left-wing party that runs the government. Social skill actors can exploit the opportunity and
leverage the state to scale up their influence. In contrast, when the state swings to the “right”
under the external crisis, local nonprofit actors are better off by holding progressive advocacy
work in abeyance. Due to the unpredictability of the crisis enhanced by a swing state, wellprepared players with a wide net of alliances from different sectors are more likely to survive and
thrive compared to those that relied on a single source of support.
Through the process of tracing the two organizations’ cultivation of their local fields, my
studies also shed light on how social change is achieved in a contingent environment. I applied a
theory of fields to understand how civil societies emerged as an organizational field. I moved
away from the micro and macro tradition of studying Chinese nonprofits and focused on the
meso-level, namely “the relational determinants of social action at the intermediate level of
society” (Barman 2016: 446). I paid particular attention to relationships, informal and formal,
between nonprofit and state actors before and after the crisis. I argue that different levels of
engagement between the nonprofit and local state actors has led to a different configuration of
fields. By comparing the two different configurations of fields, I highlight the role of actors with
social skills in fostering social change. Meanwhile, I also showed the limitations of agency in
fighting broader structural constraints.
Strategic Action Fields
Accounting for social change is one of the central inquiries of social science. How does
social change occur? What is the role of social actors in bringing stability and change in
circumscribed social arenas? Sociologists define social change as the interactive process
through which social groups and individuals collectively transform “taken for granted” systems
7

and culture in both short and long timeframes.1 Over the past thirty years, an outpouring of
work at the intersection of social movement and organizational studies has sprung up to account
for the social reproduction of the status quo as well as social change (Fligstein and McAdam
2012). Social movement scholars are more interested in dramatic changes occurring outside of
institutional settings while organizational studies have paid more attention to institutional
change. Fligstein and McAdam (2011), however, asserted that both scholarly specialties are
interested in the same underlying phenomenon: collective strategic actions (p 2). In light of the
shared interest, Fligstein and McAdam (2012), along with social movement scholars such as
Duyvendak and Jasper (2015), have been pushing for a strategic synthesis in understanding
social change. The synthesis emphasizes strategic actions taken by individuals or collective
actors and situates those choices and actions in the mesolevel field.
According to Fligstein and McAdam, the meso-level field, coined as the strategic action
field (SAF), is:
a meso-level social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are
attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say
consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the
field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the
field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 9).
Meso-level research allows researchers to examine interaction among groups and the
formation for rules and norms shared by different groups.
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that SAFs are the fundamental units of collective
action in society and that society comprises millions of such SAFs nested within each other like a
Russian doll. SAFs are socially constructed based on the issues at stakes and the definition of the

1

Definition modified from the excerpt on the “social change” page of American Sociological Association.
http://www.asanet.org/topics/social-change
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situation, which are constantly changing. Thus, SAF boundaries are never clearly defined. For
example, the nonprofit sector is a SAF. Within this sector, groups of NGOs may work on certain
issues, such as the prevention and treatment of diseases like AIDS. This community constitutes
another SAF with their own sets of rules and norms that might or might not deviate from the
main sector.
A SAF is comprised of three types of actors: incumbents, challengers, and internal
governance units. Incumbents are those who wield disproportionate power in the field to defend
their positions, whereas challengers occupy a less powerful position. Incumbents are active in
mobilizing resources and power to ensure the stability of the field for their own advantages.
Challengers, as the name suggests, are those who want to challenge the existing status quo. The
internal governance unit are internal actors who ensure actors’ compliance with established rules
and norms that perpetuate the existing hierarchy of power, which usually serves incumbents.
Internal governance units tend to form in a stable and organized organizational field. For
example, a trade union is a classic example of an internal governance unit.
The strategic action approach challenges institutionalist tendencies to focus on constraints
imposed by institutional pressure and ignore agency. By emphasizing social skills, SAFs brings
agency back into understandings of organizations. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) explain a
theory of “social skill” that they believe links to the ability of the actor to fashion a shared
understanding of the field. In other word, people or organizations who possess social skills are
more capable of “reading people and environment, framing lines of action, and mobilizing
people in the service of broader conceptions of the world and of themselves” (p17). They add
that social skill depends on the position the actor occupies in a particular strategic action field.
Actors’ position in the field will affect their social skills to secure the cooperation of others. The
9

position of the field links to the broader field environment. According to SAF, field environment
is the totality of a complex web of fields in which our chosen focus of SAF is embedded. The
concept of field environment highlights the importance of the “contextual effect” in which
organizations are operating The embeddedness of a field within a field environment in SAF
theory highlights interlocking relationships, which should be taken seriously in the study of
organization, between fields in the broader environment (Minkoff 2014). The interdependence of
fields becomes the source of change and routine for SAFs, which may experience exogenous
shocks, mobilization, and the onset of contention.
SAF is an integrated theory that accounts for social change, particularly on the
organizational level. The definition of the field is different from Bourdieu’s approach, in which
the field refers to a social-spatial arena where actors within the field vie for advantage.
Bourdieu’s definition of field is relational and mainly operates at the level of individuals.
Fligstein and McAdam's theory expands the unit of analysis of individual to include collective
actors, particularly organizations. Thus, SAF not only concerns the ties between individuals but
also collective actors such as groups and organizations.
The second important advancement of the SAF is the basis of shared understandings of
the rules, norms, and purpose of the field. Instead of unwritten cultural scripts like habitus that
Bourdieu emphasizes, SAF focuses more on institutional logics, the institutional rules and norms
of new institutional theory. According to Thornton and Ocasio (1999: 804), institutional
logics are “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values,
beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence,
organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.” SAF notes that the concept
of institutional logics has become a buzzword because it implies too much consensus among
10

actors in the field, which is not applicable to an unorganized field. This theory’s strength is its
recognition of the purpose of the field while at the same time allowing for a contest over the
rules and norms that structure the field. SAF is a more suitable conceptual frame for
understanding an emerging field like the Chinese nonprofit sector. By applying SAFs to
understand the emergence of the nonprofit field, we can move away from established
assumptions about the nonprofit sector in the West. It treats the community of NGOs as an
emerging field with rules forming and coming apart at the same time. In addition, compared to
the new institutional approach, SAFs allows us to study actors that possess social skills to make
social change.
Emergence and Stabilization of SAFs
By conceptualizing the organization as a strategic actor, I hope to situate the organization
into its operating fields and understand how the players within the organization derive meaning
from their strategic choices. A crisis provides a rare opportunity to test the theory of fields. How
do organizations anticipate and respond to crises? Why do players favor particular strategies over
others? How does the field in which the organization is embedded affect player choices? What
factors determine their decision-making process? What aspect of social skills matters the most?
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue that “the broader environment is a source of routine,
rolling turbulence in modern society” due to the interdependent nature of the fields (p19). A
significant change of a particular strategic field can be an exogenous shock to its proximate field.
For example, the 2008 earthquake in China exposed government corruption, which led to a
public outcry demanding state accountability. The state crisis, however, became an opportunity
for NGOs to push their agendas. Thus, the attribution of crisis or opportunity depends on the
players and their position in the field. Destabilizing change is materialized in the field through
11

the process of emergent mobilization. Emergent mobilization refers to “the process by which
collective actors fashion new lines of interaction with other actors based on altered
understandings of the opportunities or threats to group interests they perceive” (Fligstein and
McAdam 2012: 91). The new line of interaction based on perceived uncertainty is likely to
continue in a period of contention. During such periods, actors in the field try to make sense of
the situation and come up with new cultural frames to mobilize consensus among members in the
field. Eventually the field “gravitate[s] toward a new-or refurbished-institutional settlement
regarding field rules and cultural norms” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 23).
The transformation of the field through crisis happens at the level of the field. How do
social actors interpret and react to the crisis? According to the prediction of strategic action
fields, skilled actors are likely to share a general sense of uncertainty and engage in innovative
contentious action to advance or protect their group interests in the face of crisis and episodes of
subsequent contention. The SAF suggests that the field would experience a sharp rise in the
founding and death of organizations. However, the theory of social skills actors does not provide
a clear roadmap to understand how exactly social skills actors comprehend and react to the crisis.
Why do skill actors favor certain strategies over others? I argue that we can understand the social
processes better by focusing on the strategic dilemma, and the strategic dilemma helps to
advance SAF. The strategic synthesis of social movement and organizational studies calls for a
closer examination of strategic dilemmas that players confront. In other words, players make
trade-offs in specific arenas in which they are involved (Jasper 2006). By accessing those tradeoffs, researchers can present a strategic-interactive picture of real-life scenarios that are “full of
actions and reactions, expectations and calculations, and also emotions” (Jasper 2015: 20). The
strategic dilemmas approach gives voice to agency. At the same time, the dilemmas with which
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players have to grapple also reveal structural barriers in the form of rules and norms that are
“deep in the background” (Jasper 2006: 171). For example, everywhere in the world NGOs
advocate to change government policies, but protests rarely constitute a choice for NGOs in
authoritarian regimes. And protest permits are hard to attain – the police may have already
arrested NGO representatives by the time a permit comes through.
Using interviews and ethnographic data of the two NGOs, I focus on three major
dilemmas: State Avoidance Risk Dilemma, the Market Engagement Dilemma, and the Alliance
Extension Dilemma. The dilemmas present what Anthony Giddens calls “fateful moments,”
times in which players make decisions that tend to be consequential for the future of the
organization. However, as Jasper also pointed out, “we feel torn equally between two paths,
recognizing the value of each, but much of the time nuances of the situation suggest one route
rather than another” (Jasper 2006). I would like to think that the players of my study had choices,
but in reality, choices were limited because players are constrained in the arena and the broader
field environments in which they are embedded.
The State Avoidance Risk Dilemma primarily involves state players and NGOs. The
State Avoidance Risk dilemma builds upon risk dilemma. Jasper (2006) frames the risk dilemma
as the following:
Most engagements and moves within engagements entail unknown and known
probabilities of a number of outcomes, both good and bad – and these are often not easily
compared. Increased odds of a big gain often accompany those of a big loss (Jasper
2006:19).
Jasper further elaborated that the risk dilemma, the level of risk that players will be
willing to tolerate, could be “a prudent choice to risk less or an enterprising one to risk more”
(Jasper 2006:19). I situated the risk dilemma in the Chinese context faced by the organizations
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within the arena where NGOs negotiated with state actors for legitimacy, power, and resources
for survival and prosperity. Grassroots NGOs usually faced two choices: either work with
governments or work hard to avoid engagement with the government. The advantage of
collaborating with government was securing stable income and legitimacy; the disadvantage was
that NGOs risked co-optation and loss of autonomy; the advantage and disadvantage reversed
when NGOs chose to avoid the government. NGOs gained autonomy at the expense of stability.
The Market Engagement Dilemma primarily involves for-profit players and NGOs.
People tend to stay in their comfort zone, as do organizations. The decision to enter into a new
strategic interaction and an unfamiliar arena constitutes the engagement dilemma (Jasper 2006).
Facing the new trend of the marketization of the nonprofit sector, most NGOs are reluctant to
join in unless they have to. For example, when should players enter new strategic interactions in
an online philanthropy platform created by IT giants? Why do the organizations decide to
compete with their peers on the platform? How should they respond to for-profit players that
might have a completely different set of expectations and ways of doing things?
The Alliance Extension Dilemma primarily concerns inter-relationship management
with peers and alliances. The extension dilemma of the NGOs concerns the issue of alliance
building among members of the group as well as their peers in the wake of crises threating
established alliances. For example, how much should an organization expand its team and
alliance? The bigger the team and alliance, the “more diverse it will be and the less unified-in
goals, resources, skills, and contacts” (Jasper 2006: 127). Organizations need to consider their
relationships with internal members and external alliances, keeping those audiences in mind
when shifting an organization’s goal and mission.
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Based on those dilemmas, I seek to answer the following set of questions inspired by
Jasper’s (2006) concluding remarks in his book on the future research agenda for strategic
dilemmas. The first part of questions asks why the three dilemmas exist, how common they are
in the nonprofit sector field, and how my study subjects apprehend those dilemmas. The second
group of questions aims to explain “the choices made by real-life players facing a dilemma.” The
third set of questions concerns “the effects of the existence of a given dilemma.” What did the
organization do to resolve the dilemma? I focused on the innovation of organizational practices
and structure. Finally, I examine the effect of the binary choices made by my two comparative
cases. How were players themselves affected by their choice? How did other players react? Did
arenas, players, or rules change? Did they survive the crisis?
I examine the organizational dilemmas in different periods of emergence, crisis, and
resettlement. The underlining thread that runs through the three organizational dilemmas is the
role of the state. The state’s impact on the configuration of the civil society is ubiquitous. The
authoritarian state has evolved over years. The importance of the state in civil society becomes
the central theme of the literature on Chinese nonprofit organizations. Instead of focusing on the
static state-society relation, my study took a more longitudinal look at the changing state and
NGOs relationship and sought to look for what external factors affected the fluctuation of such
relationship.
A State-Centric Approach in Chinese Nonprofit Literature
My study engages with Chinese nonprofit literature and seeks to address several
shortcomings in the current debates about the development of the Chinese nonprofit sector.
Research on Chinese NGOs tends to center on four major themes: “the linkage between the rise
of NGOs and the expansion of civil society; the rise of NGOs as a reflection of state-society
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relations; nonprofit sectoral development; and to a lesser extent, the development of theory and
frameworks” (Hsu 2012:1).
The first theme concerns macro-level studies of the transformative political powers of
nonprofit organizations (Brook and Frolic 1997; Chamberlain 1998). Scholars argue that the
emergence of NGOs was a response to the government’s retreat from social welfare
responsibility and a result of economic transition (Ho 2001; Schwartz and Shieh 2009). They
focus on the macroeconomic and political factors that contribute to the rise of civil society.
These macro-level analyses on change of regime “overshadow the dynamic at the local level”
(Hsu 2014: 101). Many studies focus on the change of policy without a closer evaluation of the
impact of such policy. Filling a partial gap in the literature, Howell (2007) argues that while civil
society has not yet formed an overarching collective unit in China, multiple civil or pre-civil
societies and emerging public spheres, which are highly localized and specific, exist. To fill the
gap in the literature, my comparative case studies look at the emergence of civil society in
Shanghai and Guangzhou and ask how and why those localized and specific civil societies
emerged.
The second theme focuses on the implications NGOs have on state-society relations and
how to understand state behavior towards NGOs ( Hildebrandt 2011; Simon and Gao 2010). For
example, Hildebrandt (2011) focuses on the complicated registration system. Civil-society
organizations must seek a government sponsor who is willing to supervise the organization as a
prerequisite to registering with the Ministry of Civil Affairs.2 He finds that the different funding
schemes of grassroots organizations may exist to fulfill different registration needs. Some
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Although the new Charity law is intended to erase this requirement, the registration reform is likely to take several
years to complete, according to my interviewee. Thus, this research is still relevant for us to understand NGOs in
China.
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organizations may choose not to register because they have secured international funding, which
makes it unnecessary to incur the cost of registering with the government agency. However, what
explains the change in regulations and policies towards NGOs? I argue that crisis is a key factor
that leads to formal state recognition of nonprofit organizations. In addition, I also argue to fully
understand state-society relations research should look at the behavior of nonprofits and the forprofit sector in the nonprofit sector.
In the third theme, I ask how scholars look at the expansion of the nonprofit sector. The
tendency is to adopt a neoinstitutional approach. DiMaggio and Powell (1983)’s neoinstitutional
approach, which has left its footprint in the study of the Chinese nonprofit sector, focuses on
homogeneous organizational forms and behaviors. Hasmath and Hsu (2016) applied a
neoinstitutional theory to explain the lack of local state-NGO collaboration. They argued that
Chinese NGOs had to rely on private and institutional donations due to a lack of access to public
funding under the coercive pressure of state regulation (Hasmath and Hsu 2016). Copying
successful models and practices from incumbent organizations is also prevalent among Chinese
NGOs (Tam and Hasmath 2015; Wen and Cheng 2012). Finally, Hasmath and Hsu (2016)
highlighted practices such as inter-organizational hiring as a source of normative pressure for
organizational homogeneity. While neoinstitutional theory serves well to explain some
phenomena, research in this vein often lacks a proper recognition of agency in the process and
fails to explain the emergence of localized civil societies with distinct characteristics. The lack of
articulation of agency and change also dictates a scholarship that adopts a neoinstitutional
framework, regardless of where the research is conducted. Strategic action fields aim to address
those loopholes in the neoinstitutional framework. I argue that applying a SAF analysis will help
to advance the scholarship in the study of Chinese nonprofit organization.

17

A few scholarly works on NGOs and civil society in China have sought to build or place
theories in the wider context of nonprofit development (Hsu 2014). Notably, Spires (2012)
argued that both Tocqueville-inspired democratic theory and state corporatist theory failed to
account for the experience of ostensibly illegal grassroots organizations. He proposed a concept
of “contingent symbiosis” that depicts the mutually dependent but fragile interaction among
grassroots organizations and the government. Spires argued that NGOs and government officials
had formed a symbiotic relationship under a fragmented authoritarian state; mutual suspicion and
mutual need permeated such relationships. Illegal grassroots NGOs are a small segment of the
NGO sector in China. Since 2012, the state has given nonprofit organizations more prominent
roles in the 12th Five Year Plan and, for the first time, established a 200 million RMB fund
specifically for contracting out social services (Shieh 2016). Since then, governmental contracts
have multiplied and spread across the country. The suppression of illegal NGOs by the Chinese
state has, however, overshadowed this phenomenon in the literature on the Chinese nonprofit
sector. My study of Shanghai will lend insight on the rapid development of the nonprofit sector
and its interaction with the state. Why did the state even encourage the development of civil
society in the first place?
In addition, most of the studies on the emergence and transformation of the nonprofit
sector in the US rely on historical data. The recent emergence of the nonprofit sector in China
offers a unique opportunity to see how civil society unfolds in a real time. It challenges the
prevailing assumptions of the nature of civil society rooted in the Western experience.
Scholarship generated from the US nonprofit studies is reliant on the ontological recognition that
the nonprofit sector is “an autonomous, third space in society, operating largely distinct from the
private and public sectors” (Barman 2016:445). For example, a wide collection of theories
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related to the trichology of sectors has become known as three-failures theory (Powell 1987).
The underlying assumption behind such research is that each sector operated with its own set of
values and norms (Hall 1987). Most studies in China are motivated by theoretical interest in the
relationship between civil society and democracy. Autonomous associations are the bedrock of
America’s democracy (Putnam 2000; Tocqueville 1835). Scholars in studies of Chinese
nonprofits often wonder whether the rise of the nonprofit sector will eventually translate into
democracy.
I argue that optimism among scholars about the rise of nonprofits conflates the
emergence of civil society with the rise of the nonprofit sector. The rise of a diverse and
unsettled organizational field has also been conflated with a political transition. The explosive
growth of nonprofit organizations does not automatically translate into the emergence of civil
society. Much optimism comes from presumptions rooted in the experience of NGOs in Western
countries. The concept of civil society needs further exploration, particularly the epistemological
recognition that civil society is a distinct sector different from the state and market. By
comparing the two different models of civil society in Guangzhou and Shanghai, I offer a close
look at the tradeoffs that NGOs made when they navigated the contingency of the environment.
I argue that the State Risk Dilemmas and Alliance Extension Dilemma help us
understand the positive and negative consequences of the two strategies dealing with the state.
The State Alliance approach allows the field to survive with the state, potentially allowing for
change from within; the State Avoidance approach promotes consensus and diversity of the
organizational fields. However, every coin has two sides. The State Alliance Approach is likely
to give rise to a hierarchical field as evidenced by lack of shared vision, high turn-over, etc. The
hierarchical field might become potentially too homogenous by working in politically safe areas
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and thereby underserving politically sensitive causes that affect most underprivileged
populations. The close alliance with the state also invites co-optation while the other state
avoidance approach creates too fragile of a field with high fragmentation.
With the entrant of the for-profit actors, NGOs also faced the Market Engagement
Dilemma which NGOs again needed to negotiate with major players. Those new incumbents
quickly took over the nonprofit fields with powerful resources and new technology. The active
engagement with those new players provided alternative resources, particularly for those
grassroots NGOs which suffered from the state’s suppression. However, the dependence on the
new resources might also lead to goal displacement of some organizations. The for-profit actors
were likely to impose new standard and requirement and many NGOs. With the new rules and
norms, many NGOs had to modify their project, shift their focus, or even suspended their old
programs in order to appeal to the new donors. The “business” standard valued replicable and
scalable projects which might further marginalize some organizations with advocacy orientation.
The lack of engagement with for-profit actors and the platforms they created might suggest less
diverse funding schemes or a lack of competitiveness in an emerging philanthropic market in
China.
Organization of Chapters
I will explore the literature on this topic and discuss my analytical and theoretical
approach to answering my research questions, in chapter 2. Chapter 3 will move onto more
discussion about the major crisis faced by the Chinese nonprofit sector and how local
practitioners of different fields comprehended the change or the lack of it. In particular, the focus
will be on the alliance building process, or what I call alliance extension dilemma, i.e., how to
manage relationships with peer NGOs. Chapter 4 will detail the state risk dilemma, i.e., how to
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manage relationships with the state. Chapter 5 is about the market engagement dilemma, i.e.,
what to do with new invading market players? Finally, I will conclude in chapter 6 on how a
configuration of factors led to different outcomes.

21

Chapter 2 The Golden 10 Year
“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.”
-A Tale of Two Cities
Introduction
When Mr. Yang Gang, the founder of Excellence Promoter (EP), first landed in Shanghai
in 2006 from Beijing, he barely found any grassroots organizations to participate in his programs
that were designed to provide capacity-building, training, and technical assistance to NGOs. Mr.
Yang was expecting an emerging market of grassroots NGOs similar to what he saw in Beijing,
from where he hailed. Instead, he found himself in the middle of an NGO desert. Excellence
Promoter, as an intermediary organization, aimed to provide services to help nonprofit
organizations to professionalize and scale up. However, the city of Shanghai in the early 2000s
apparently lagged behind Beijing and Guangzhou in the quantity of NGOs and the development
of their nonprofit sector as a whole. Mr. Yang needed to invent clients for his services! Almost a
decade later, the nonprofit sector in Shanghai has been transformed. Now more than 4,000 social
organizations, 9,839 non-private enterprises, and 335 foundations are registered with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs in Shanghai (Statistic Year of China 2016). The number has kept
growing. The story is not unique to Shanghai. Guangzhou and other major cities in China have
also experienced a rapid growth of autonomous organizations during the same period. Nonprofit
incubators, which belong to a broader category of intermediary organization such as EP, have
played an important role in the proliferation of nonprofit organizations at the local level. EP
claimed it incubated more than 400 NGOs and social enterprises by 2017. The organization
might exaggerate the number as many of the grassroots organizations who received services
from EP were already successfully organized, either informally or formally. Intermediary
organizations, however, played a role in bringing organizations that were loosely connected.
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They came into contact with each other during an early period when the field began to emerge.
The intermediary organization also served as an “accountability broker, communicator, resource
mobilizer, catalyst, and convener” (Shea 2011:59). As a local lawyer who specialized in
nonprofit law and a practitioner said, “nonprofit incubators are barometers of the institutional
environment because they service as a linkage between NGOs and the state.”3
In general, the nonprofit sectors grew in response to the societal need for welfare
services, the government’s changing attitudes towards NGOs, and the increase in opportunities.
Most people see the economic reforms that began in 1987 as the most dramatic social change
occurring in contemporary China. Less is known about the expansion of civic space that took
place in the wake of economic reform. The annual growth rate in nonprofit organizations across
the country almost exceeded the economic growth rate, which was more than 8 percent a year
from 2004 to 2012. The proliferation of the nonprofit organizations in itself is a remarkable
social change in China. Thus, the past decade from 2008 to 2018, as Professor Shu noted,4 was
the golden age of the Chinese nonprofit sector. The Year of Civil Society, 2008, symbolically
marked the beginning of this golden age. Since 2008, the proliferation of relatively autonomous
civil associations gradually formed a new field, separate from the state, with its own rules and
norms.
Why would an authoritarian state allow the growth of civil society whose core mission is
to hold the state accountable? Such a Tocqueville-inspired question usually conflates civil
society with the proliferation of nonprofit organizations and the mission of those organizations. It
is undeniable that many of the grassroots civil associations, as I later show, had a hidden agenda
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Interview with an anonymous lawyer, June 11, 2017. Anhui.
Interview with Prof. Shu on January 07, 2017. Guangzhou
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to advocate for rights and hold the state accountable. Meanwhile, a larger number of social work
and social services organizations emerged to help the state provide social welfare to its citizens.
The authoritarian state facilitated the expansion of those associations because of a mutual interest
in political exchange between the state agencies and the organizations, as predicted by the state
corporatism theory. The single use of either theory, however, failed to provide a full account of
the co-existence of a wide spectrum of civil associations and their uneven geographic
distribution. State corporatism theory explains better the growth of a hierarchical nonprofit field
in Shanghai, although it fails in explaining the rise of a vibrant civil society in Guangzhou.
This chapter introduces the scope, development, and a brief history of nonprofit sectors
in China. I first unpack the definition of nonprofits in China and show how the state defined and
regulated those organizations. I preferred the term civil associations, advocated by Xu (2018), to
describe various forms of association in China during the early stages of development. The term
encompasses a wide range of citizen-initiated, informal hobby clubs; coalitions; grassroots
NGOs; and registered organizations. The civil association excludes government-organized nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs). Then I contextualize the growth of nonprofit fields in
the cities of Guangzhou and Shanghai prior to 2008 by laying out the historical development of
NGOs in China. I first provide a brief overview of the slow development of the sector from the
establishment of People Republic of China in 1949. Then I highlight major milestone events over
the past decade that significantly reshaped the development of the nonprofit sector over the past
decade. In particular, I argue that crises such as the 2008 earthquake and pro-democracy
movements in Hong Kong were important moments in which the former helped to expand the
space for the growth of nonprofits, while the latter, in conjunction with other factors, closed up
the civic space. The 2008 earthquake led to the unification and expansion of NGOs and the

24

sector at a national level, leading to the peak golden years 2012 and 2013. I argue that the
developmental trajectory of the nonprofit sectors in China had a profound implication for the
state-society relationship, which in turn affected how the state managed the NGO sector. I then
introduce my two comparative case studies in Shanghai and Guangzhou. The nonprofit sector in
Shanghai represented a top-down, state-led field while its counterpart in Guangzhou was a
bottom-up, grassroots model. Using survey data collected in 2017, I compare the two sectors.
The basic definitions help us better comprehend the complex history of the growth of the
sector. How did the different nonprofit fields emerge locally and what merged and transformed
the sectors at the national level? What are the implication of those transformations on the
survival of those civil associations?
Nonprofits in China
The Size of the Nonprofit Sector in China
Most of our understanding of nonprofit organizations and their roles in the society is
based on the United States. For people living in the US, nonprofit organizations are ubiquitous
with many people encountering NGOs on a daily basis. Approximately 1.9 million NGOs of
diverse forms operate in the United States (Barman 2016: 443). Compared to the US, the
Chinese nonprofit sector is an emerging phenomenon. According to the most recent yearbook of
China Statistic in 2017, approximately 700,000 officially registered NGOs and a greater number
of unregistered ones operate in China. Around 7.6 million people are employed in the sector.
The sector also received about 78.6 billion RMB in donations（$12.4 billion dollar）in 2016.
Compared to the US, the Chinese nonprofit sector remains small in terms of volume and per
capita rates of NGOs. In an absolute ratio sense, in 2016, five NGOs were available for every
10,000 Chinese people whereas the number was 590 for every 10,000 US citizens. The gap was
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huge. The fast-growth in the number of foundations has signaled greater capital flow to and
development of the sector.
What makes the nonprofit organization nonprofit? Following Hansmann (1980) and
Steinberg and Powell (2006), nonprofit organizations are “precluded, by external regulation or its
own governance structure, from distributing its financial surplus to those who control the use of
organizational assets” (p1). The non-distributional nature of nonprofit organizations sets them
apart from for-profit organizations and governments. For-profit organizations have ownership
rights. Even though governments do not distribute surplus value to officeholders, governments
have a monopoly of legitimate coercive power and the use of violence, which nonprofits do not
have. The non-distributional nature of nonprofit organizations is probably the only common
ground between the US and China. The states define NGOs differently both in a legal and
cultural sense.
Nonprofit organizations in the US tend to have tax-exempt status with the Internal
Revenue Service. In a legal sense, the Internal Revenue Code helps to define different types of
NGOs. For example, the tax-exemption under section 501(c) (3) is commonly referred to as
charitable organizations. In contrast to the US, tax status is less helpful in defining Chinese
nonprofits. In a legal sense, the state only recognizes three types of legal CSOs:
• Social Organizations (SOs) (Shenhui zuzhi, 社会组织),
• Civil Non-enterprise Institutions (CNIs) (minban fei qiye danwei, 民办非企
业),
• Foundations (jijinhui, 基金会).
SOs generally refer to voluntary membership associations. They are similar to mutual
benefit organizations in the US. CNIs are similar to American charitable organizations.
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Foundations includes two types: foundations with public fundraising certificates are public
foundations, and those without public fundraising certificates are private foundations. Public
foundations, a majority of which have been established through government departments, tend to
enjoy many privileges, such as public fundraising activities and more access to government
resources (Xu, 2013, p. 30001). Since 2004, the number of private foundations established by
individuals, public service government units, or corporations grew rapidly from zero in 2004 to
5,550 in 2016.
In theory, the Chinese government recognizes only a very narrow spectrum of nonprofits.
NGOs in China have to register with the Ministry of Civil Affairs to obtain legal status.
Applying for legal status, known as the dual registration system, turns out to be a difficult
process because most organizations are required to seek government sponsors. As a result, many
Chinese nonprofits, known as grassroots organizations, choose to remain informal and
unregistered groups (Zhu, 2013). Some even register as for-profit businesses to circumvent state
regulations.
In addition, a substantial portion of legal CSOs, either created by the government or with
close ties to a government agency, are quasigovernment organizations. These hybrid publicservice government entities are known as “government-organized non-governmental
organizations.” GONGOs might sound self-contradictory, given the voluntary and self-governing
nature of the CSOs (Shieh, 2011a, p. 4). In China, these GONGOs enjoy special privileges, such
as accessing government funding and engaging in public fundraising while operating as a
nonprofit entity. GONGOs have blurred the line between government and nonprofit sectors.
When I use the term NGOs in this study, I mainly refer to those organizations voluntarily
initiated by Chinese citizens, not GONGOs. I also tend to use civil associations to depict those
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organizations neither created by the state nor officially incorporated by the state. For most
Chinese, NGOs and civil society are foreign concepts, either unfamiliar or associated with
foreign countries. However, the term civil associations (in Chinese Minjian Zuzhi 民间组织)
tends to resonate better with the experiences of ordinary Chinese citizens. Those civil
associations are relatively independent from the state.
A Brief History of the Development of Chinese Civil Society
In the 21st century, Chinese civil society has experienced several major and uneven
developments, generally increasing in scope but also experiencing occasional disruptions. Prior
to the economic reforms of 1978, civic space outside of the state and family virtually did not
exist. Under the planned economy as established by the Chinese government, the state provided
almost total job security as well as social programs to support public welfare (Bao 2012). In
Figure 2.1, below, only 44 organizations, in the form of civil society organizations, were
recorded in the historical data. According to the China Statistic Yearbook on Social and
Autonomous Organizations (2017), the number of social organizations grew to 6,100 in 1965.
The Cultural Revolution, however, virtually wiped out all of these social organizations from
1970 to 1978.
The relaxation of social control following the economic reforms of 1978 led to
professional associations, cultural clubs, centers, and student associations (Unger 1991).
However, the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 quickly set back the development of Chinese
civil society when the state decided to repress student movements violently and further
constrained freedom of speech and association (Howell 2007). From 1978 to the late 1990s, the
development of civil society organizations stagnated over an extended period of time as the
growth curve in figure 2.1 shows.
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Associations outside the scrutiny of the state, however, have reemerged after the
deepening of China’s economic reform, especially when the Fourth World Conference on
Women was held in Beijing in 1995. International funding started to pour into China and a new
generation of grassroots organizations grew rapidly in China, which forced the state to interact
with those new players in public affairs (Deng 2010; Howell 2007). The state also began drafting
temporary legislation to regulate the ever-growing number of new entities that do not fit the
category of social organizations. In 1999, the state recognized those organizations as non-private
enterprises, aka charitable nonprofit organizations in the Western definition. Since then, the
growth of NGOs has taken off. In 2004, the Chinese state also enacted regulations on the
management of foundations. Private philanthropic foundations have growth rapidly since then.
During the early period from the 1990s to 2008, grassroots NGOs faced three major
problems: lack of legitimacy, resources, and people. First, only a small fraction of NGOs receive
official recognition from the state, and most of the registered NGOs were GONGOs. The
government implemented “a system of graduated control” in which the state adopted different
control strategies over different types of NGOs according to their mobilizing capacities and the
value of their public services (Kang and Heng 2008). From the late 1990s to early 2000s, they
allowed the growth of grassroots organizations as long as those NGOs did not challenge the
legitimacy of the state by making democratic claims or organizing protests (Spires 2012).
Second, most of those grassroots NGOS relied on international funding, drinking “goat’s milk.”
Third, the lack of resources also constrained the ability of those organizations to recruit talent.
Despite all those obstacles, the number of such civil associations grew quickly, forming localized
nonprofit fields in major cities such as Beijing, Guangzhou, Shanghai, and Yunan. The
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emergence of those relatively autonomous civil associations and the rise of a vibrant public
sphere (Yang 2009) signal emergent fields that depart from complete state control over society.
Figure 2.1. The Number of Chinese Civil Society Organizations from 1950 to 2016 (China Year
Book 2017)
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Post-2008 Era: The Emergent Period
In 2008, two natural disasters occurred, one after another: a powerful winter storm that
brought heavy snows and the Sichuan earthquake. The two disasters caused massive damage.
While the winter storms did not invite a large scale of volunteers, the earthquake attracted
millions of volunteers from all walk of life flooding into the earthquake zones. Before the
Chinese government could fully react to the emergency, millions of volunteers, civic
associations, enterprises, and media across the country sprung up for disaster relief in an
30

unprecedented way. The Sichuan earthquake brought about what media, scholars, and the public
called the “Year of Civil Society.” Shieh and Deng (2011) argue that the earthquake provided a
political window for NGOs to engage the government and government-backed organizations
(mass organizations and GONGOs) to develop networks among these organizations and to
energize themselves. This became a pivotal moment for the changing NGO-state relationship in
China (Hildebrandt 2011; Spires 2012; Xu 2014).
The 2008 earthquake right before the Olympic game was a “consensus crisis,” a type of
crisis that prompted different parties and interest groups to focus on practical issues (Xu 2014).
In particular, the sorrow and compassion mobilized people to act collectively in solving the
emergent problems. In the first few weeks after the earthquake, the central governments and
local authorities inside or outside of the earthquake zones, eagerly worked with formal and
informal civic associations, demonstrating an exceptional capacity in mobilizing disaster relief.
The 2008 earthquake became “an unprecedented opportunity and public stage for NGOs to
mobilize, network and demonstrate their worth” (Shieh and Deng 2011:182). As a result, more
diverse resources from a wider variety of shareholders became available to NGOs. For example,
government resources flowed through GONGOs to social organizations for the first time and
private foundations, such as the Narada Foundation, channeled private resources to grassroots
NGOs, which, appearing in the media and news, became known to a wider population. The
formation of NGO networks later invited more players including private enterprises, the media,
and the public to contribute to the growth of the nonprofit sector in China. In the post-2008
disaster period, the participation of NGOs in disaster relief and the challenges they faced later
called for more friendly fundraising and policy environment for them.
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Since 2008, central and local authorities began to pilot local experimental reforms in
governing civil society organizations at the municipal and provincial level. According to a
government report released by the Guangzhou Ministry of Civil Affairs, the central government
sent a research team to Guangzhou to inform national policy and learn from local experiments.
The report dubbed the year of 2008 to 2009 a period of experiment. Government social service
contracts started to take off in 2010, leading to a peak in state funding for CSOs, during 2012 and
2013. According to the International Center for Not-For-Profit Law , from 2009 to 2013, there
was a flurry of activity among local governments across China to “innovate” by lowering
barriers to CSO registration; contract social services to CSOs; build programs and platforms to
coordinate, support and incubate CSOs; and create or detail regulations and standards to guide
the development of the CSO sector. This period saw the emergence of Chinese civil society. The
number of non-private enterprise at the national level grew rapidly from 2011 to 2014. The
annual growth of foundations was more than 15%. In contrast to civil society organizations,
government affiliated organizations, GONGOs, stagnated. It was not such a surprise because
social organizations tended to affiliate with the state and the party.
In short, the “consensus crisis” of the 2008 earthquake significantly reduced the three
barriers that civil associations used to encounter: lack of legitimacy, resources, and people. The
removal of the double registration system and the legal recognition of those organizations first
solved the legitimacy issue, and then quickly dissolved the problem of resources and people.
Even though several scandals broke out such as the Guo Meimei incident, which posed a crisis of
trust in the nonprofit sector, GONGOs received criticism while civic associations continued to
grow. The Guo Meimie incident refers to the scandalous behavior of a 23-year-old woman who,
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in 2011, severely tarnished the reputation of the Chinese Red Cross by claiming to be the
executive of a Red Cross subsidiary.
Figure 2.2 The Annual Growth Rate of Chinese Civil Society Organizations Registered with the
Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs (China Year Book 2017)
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The Crisis and Episodes of Contention Since 2014
The civil society spring did not last long; winter kicked in in the sector unexpectedly.
The growth rate for social organizations and non-private enterprises began to drop in 2014. What
happened in 2014 that stopped the short-lived prosperity of the sector? Prior to 2014, the Chinese
state adopted a system of flexible NGO repression during Hu-Wen era (Fu 2017). Hu-Wen era,
named after the period of its formal leader, represented liberal/left-wing governance. The HuWen government repressed some NGOs, but it also encouraged the growth of service-oriented
civil society organizations (CSOs), especially after the 2008 earthquake.
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After President Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, however, the repression of civil
society returned and intensified. State control continued to be a system of graduated control, but
also became more sophisticated and punitive/subtle. The change of leadership at the national
level signaled a rise of a conservative leader. In April 2013, a confidential internal Communiqué
on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere (Document No. 9) was leaked to journalists (Chen
and Kinzelbach 2015). The documents approved by the leaders of China warmed of seven
dangerous Western values. Among them were the words of civil society. Shortly after the release
of Document No.9, the government imposed more internet restriction and arrested more highprofile dissents such as human rights lawyers. Most civil society activists, however, had not felt
the crisis yet in 2013. Most activists, in fact, regarded their approach low-profile and modest.
I argue that the year 2014 was the fateful moment when state repression of civil society
accelerated. The pro-democracy movements (also known as the Umbrella Movements) emerged
in Hong Kong when thousands of Hong Kong citizens marched on the central district demanding
universal suffrage. The protests in Hong Kong became one of the most significant political
challenges for Beijing since the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. The pro-democracy
movement in Hong Kong triggered a swift response from the Beijing authority. Not only did the
Beijing authority target protesters in Hong Kong, but they also targeted individuals and
organizations across the border. Several of my informants discussed the sudden deterioration of
the environment and referenced Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement as the trigger for the
crackdown. This short period, from late 2014 to 2015, I label the crisis period for Chinese civil
society.
The pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong was not, like the 2008 earthquake, a
consensus crisis. For the Chinese state, the movements imposed one of the biggest political
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challenges to the legitimacy of the state. According to Sidel (2018), the central government
perceived the eruption of massive protests in the financial center of Hong Kong as a “color
revolution” very close to home. For citizens, divided by their beliefs about democracy and the
nation state, unlike a consensus crisis, structural conditions for state-NGOs coalitions to form did
not exist. The threat of the pro-democracy movements alongside the rise of a stability
maintenance regime put civil society organizations under intense pressure.
The Re-Settlement Period from 2016-2017
In early 2016, China approved the long-waited Charity Law and the Management of
Domestic Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations Law (Overseas NGO). The
Charity law came into effect in September 2016 while the Overseas NGO law started in January
2017. Most scholars and practitioners agreed that the enactment of the new Charity law and
Overseas NGO law sought to standardize the management of the nonprofit and philanthropic
sectors at the national level and to catch the ever-growing philanthropic funds. I also argue,
however, that the enactment of the new laws is part of the rise of the stability maintenance
regime (Wei Wen) in China (Liu 2017). Most political scientists attribute the rise of the stability
maintenance regime to the organizational expansion of the Ministry of Public Security and more
generally the domestic security system (Wang and Minzner 2015). Liu (2017) points out the
state also adopted a proactive and noncoercive way to address social conflicts through the
management of intermediate agencies such as social organizations. The new laws, I argue, aim to
channel more civil associations into the stability maintenance system.
I also argued that the Oversea NGO law was a reaction to pro-democracy movements in
Hong Kong. In particular, the Oversea NGO law put foreign nonprofits under the Ministry of
Public Security (MPS), China’s internal security apparatus, which has effectively forced many
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international NGOs including those from Hong Kong and Taiwan to leave the country (Sidel
2018). By 2017, many domestic NGOs, relying on international funding, had trouble sustaining
the organizations as the new law cut off the ties with their international donors.
On the other hand, the state has also invested more money in founding a “socialist
harmonious society building program.” The state claimed that the provisional welfare program
which delivers social services would address social inequality (Liu 2017). Chan (2008) shows,
however, that the purpose of the welfare provision was, in fact, aimed at depoliticizing
challengers of the political system. The social program was designed to reduce the tensions
between poor people and the state rather than promote social justice. In short, the combination of
repression and state co-optation is a retreat to the “graduated control system” of the pre-2008 era
and an incorporation into the larger stability maintenances regime. The “graduated control
system” pushed grassroots organizations like labor organizations to choose working with the
government or remaining marginalized.
Accompanying the major policy shift is the marketization of the nonprofit sector, a new
trend among nonprofit organizations as they increasingly adopt the approaches and values of the
private market (Salamon and Anheier 1997; Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). For example, some
nonprofit organizations have abandoned their nonprofit status and transformed themselves into
social enterprises. At the same time, the marketization of the nonprofit sector also suggests the
expansion of the nonprofit sector and the “invasion” of new market players in the established
field (Flisgtein and McAdam 2011). IT giants like Tencent, Alibaba, and JD.com along with the
major private philanthropic foundations have led the trend.
At such a crossroad, NGOs were caught between the state and the market, but not all
NGOs have perceived the legal and structural changes the same way. Some NGOs have
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considered the changes an opportunity while other saw them as a threat. The attribution of threat
or opportunity depends on the actor’s position in the field and the broader environment. The
same crisis is likely to produce a heterogeneous impact on different fields.
The Nonprofit Sectors in Guangzhou and Shanghai
China’s multiple layers of governance and regionally plural policy-making process mean
provincial governments, despite constraints imposed by the central government, enjoy
considerable autonomy. Understanding regional differences may help us better comprehend how
different fields develop and interact. When discussing the nonprofit sector among themselves,
practitioners contend that the civil society in the city of Guangzhou supports a greater number
and diversity of NGOs than in the city of Shanghai, which is ahead of the capital, Beijing. With
that said, more progressive NGOs, activists, and social movements have been found in
Guangzhou than in Shanghai. NGOs in Guangzhou enjoyed more opportunities to grow than in
Shanghai in the early years. The advantage, however, reversed in the later years of the golden
age. This shows the paradox of the growth of civil society in authoritarian state. The further the
expansion of autonomous civic space the more repression and control is invited.
I have chosen to compare the nonprofit fields of Guangzhou and Shanghai because they
represent two dominant nonprofit fields in China. The community of NGOs in Guangzhou’s
nonprofit sector were bottom-up, grassroots organizations, and they assembled a relatively
autonomous field; Shanghai’s nonprofit sector, in contrast, is a top-down, state-led field. I
conducted a survey that sampled 40 NGOs in Shanghai and 56 NGOs in Guangzhou to get a
broad sense of how those organizations operate and their perceptions of the NGO-government
relationship (Table 1).
The survey, conducted by NGOCN, a local grassroots organization in Guangzhou, was a
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part of a national survey that assessed local policy friendliness and the impact of the recent law
on grassroots NGOs. We administrated the survey in summer 2017, a year after the enactment of
the new Charity law and a half year into the enactment of the Overseas NGO law. During my
fieldwork in Guangzhou, I established a relationship with this research-oriented NGO and the
director invited me to sit on the voluntary consulting panel to design the survey questions. The
consulting panel included another three researchers, all PhD candidates in public affairs, social
work, and community development from University of Hong Kong, City University of Hong
Kong, and University of Wisconsin-Madison. I helped draft the initial survey questions with
permission to insert my own research questions. Then all the researchers came together with
practitioners to refine the survey questions. NGOCN also helped a conference in Hefei, Anhui
province in June 2017 to pilot the survey and invited over 20 representatives of NGOs to pre-test
the survey. The organization officially launched the survey in August 2017 in collaboration with
local intermediate organizations in more than 10 cities in the country. In the end, we received
680 valid responses. From the data I took out the Guangzhou and Shanghai section. The survey
did not use random sampling. However, the survey showed some interesting pattern that
supported my characterization of the nonprofit fields in Guangzhou and Shanghai. I argue that
the nonprofit field in Guangzhou was bottom-up, grassroots orientated while Shanghai’s was
top-down, state-led. Thus, I hypothesized we would see more advocacy-oriented NGOs
representing marginal populations in Guangzhou. Indeed, the NGOs surveyed in Guangzhou had
a much higher percentage of LGBT organizations than Shanghai. LGBT organizations were
often regarded as the symbol for progressive NGOs.
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Table 2.1 The List of NGOs by Areas
Area of Focus

Shanghai Guangzhou

Medical Emergency

2

0

Migrants

2

4

Environmental Protection

7

5

Agriculture

2

2

Community Development

8

15

Disaster Relief

2

2

Education

14

14

AIDS/HIV

5

2

LGBT

5

13

Elderly

3

11

Children

19

15

Adolescence

11

17

Disability

8

12

Social Innovation

6

9

Capacity
Training/Research/Consulting

6

14

Religious/Cultural/Arts

3

5

Others

2

2
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The survey data showed that NGOs surveyed in Guangzhou had a higher percentage of
engagement in advocacy work (See Chart 1), which supports my claims that the nonprofit field
in Guangzhou was advocacy oriented and the nonprofit field in Shanghai was service oriented.
Figure 2.3 Participation in Advocacy Work by City
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NGOs in both cities relied less on international funding (including foreign governments,
foundations/NGOs) compared to the early years. About 40 percent of surveyed NGOs in
Shanghai and 45% of surveyed NGOs in Guangzhou had government funding. Over 60 percent
of NGOs surveyed in Shanghai had commercial revenue, which was two times the NGOs in
Guangzhou. This pattern confirmed my categorization of Shanghai’s NGOs as market driven
types. A high percentage of individual donations occurred in both cities, indicating the high
participation of online donation among NGOs in the sector.
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Among organizations that received government support, I found approximately 45% of
NGOs surveyed in Shanghai reported a stable income from government contracts. In contrast,
NGOs surveyed in Guangzhou were more likely to gain support from government-organized
venture philanthropy competitions.
Figure 2.4. Percentage of Funding Sources in Each City
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Overall, the development of Shanghai nonprofits showed steady growth over the past
decade (Figure 2.3, below). Due to a lack of data on the city level for Guangzhou, I substituted
the provincial data of Guangdong to impute the growth rate in Guangzhou, the capital city of
Guangdong. As a pioneer city in provincial NGO reform, Guangzhou along with the Guangdong
province experienced rapid growth in the number of NGOs from 2011 to 2014. Since 2014,
however, the rate of Guangdong nonprofit growth began to slow while Shanghai continues to
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grow. What led to the divergence of growth among the two nonprofit sectors?
Figure2. 5. The Annual Growth Rate of Nonprofits in Shanghai and Guangdong
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Two Incubators and Two Fields
Within the cities I focus on are two intermediary capacity-training organizations, also
known as civil society support organizations: Civil Society Center in Guangzhou and Excellence
Promoter in Shanghai.5 Civil society support organizations are “value-based agencies whose
primary task is to provide services and resources that strengthen the capacities of their
constituents to accomplish their missions” (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002: 239). In addition to
performing similar work, the two organizations also gained their reputation through the same
nonprofit incubator programs. Nonprofit incubators (孵化器 Fu Hua Qi) mimic popular tech
industry business incubators. They provide seed funding, free office space, training, and other

5

I anonymized the two organizations to protect my informants even though both organizations expressed their
willingness to use their real names.

42

legal support to increase the number of grassroots NGOs and help them scale up. In 2006, CSC
was the first organization that adopted the incubator concept from the US. EP copied the model
in 2007 and scaled up. Incubators in both cities played influential roles in the proliferation of the
third sector at the local level.
CSC helped incubate what I call the State Avoidance Autonomous field. It was a
community of first generation Guangzhou grassroots NGOs and activists who gravitated towards
the concept of civil society. Based on my interviews and ethnographic research, most members
of the community limited the number of government social service contracts. That is, the
organizations sought to deflect state intervention with their own sets of rules and norms; people
in this field hoped to address social problems using their own way and societal resources.
In contrast, in Shanghai, where the state has promoted nonprofit organizations as an
extension of governmental programs, a State Alliance Social Market Field developed. EP
borrowed the incubator concept from CSC in 2007 and scaled up programs in partnership with
the state. EP modified the incubator program by combining governmental contract programs and
venture philanthropy. As a nonprofit incubator, EP became the flagship NGO in Shanghai and a
popular partner for many city governments in the rest of the country. I named the field in
Shanghai the State Alliance Market field to differentiate it from Guangzhou’s State Avoidance
Autonomous field. Shanghai’s State Alliance Market field prioritized business values such as
applying the logic of the market in guiding organizational strategies over the values of civil
society that have been at the center of the State Avoidance Autonomous field.
Local practitioners tended to view them as two different schools/camps in a spectrum of
Chinese civil society organizations. In the past, people regarded as two dominant approaches
available for local Chinese to embark on social change. The State Avoidance Autonomous field
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chose the boundary spinning approach by addressing social problems outside of or on the fringe
of the state system. In contrast, State Alliance Market field members believe in change from
within the system. Over the past decade, it was a debate between two fields about which has
been more effective in embarking on social change. However, by comparing the two
organizations in the context of two major policy and cultural shifts, my study enables me to
analyze the power of the state and market in shaping organizational practices and forms. I argue
that the nonprofit organizational fields of the cities of Guangzhou and Shanghai evidence the
impact of different levels of state and market involvement.
Conclusion
This chapter provides a brief history of the development of the nonprofit sector in China.
I compare the concept and meaning of NGOs, civil society, and nonprofit sectors in the US and
China. I argue that understanding the trajectory of the development of the nonprofit sectors in
China is important for us to better acknowledge the challenges that Chinese nonprofits faced.
Many theories about the nonprofit sector have taken for granted that it has organically and
indigenously emerged parallel to the formation of the state.
In the second section of the Chapter, I delved into regional differences within the country
to lay out comparative case studies of Shanghai and Guangzhou. I compared the two
intermediary organizations in their respective cities. I laid out the puzzle of the divergent path
taken by CSC and EP, which set the stage for the discussion of the following chapter. In chapter
3, I will discuss the emergence of the civil society period post 2008 and how the two
organizations might take advantage of this unique political opportunity to scale up their
operations.
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Chapter 3 Crisis for Whom?
Introduction
An open letter from the Southern Migrant Center6 to the local government in Guangzhou
in October 19, 2015 showed a sudden deterioration of the institutional environment for
grassroots NGOs and a shared sense of confusion and uncertainty penetrating the nonprofit
sector. Many advocacy organizations, such as labor rights NGOs, obtained legal status with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) in Guangdong province starting in 2012. The state previously
deemed the organizations politically sensitive. During 2012-2013, more than 10 labor rights
NGOs had registered in Guangzhou, Foshan, Shenzhen, and Dongguang after Guangdong piloted
the local policy reforms on governing NGOs. Among them was the Southern Migrant Center,
which specialized in providing legal assistance to migrant workers injured on the job. The
director of the Southern Migrant Center explained at the beginning of his open letter:
The Guangdong government embraced the new social management concept in response
to the increasingly acute confrontations between workers and their employers seen in the
Pearl River Delta. As a result, in 2012, many NGOs in Guangdong, including the The
Southern Migrant Center, blossomed as never before: many groups were able to obtain
NGO registration, and receive government funding to provide services. Between 2013
and 2014, the The Southern Migrant Center also began to receive government funding for
operating social work programs (Cao, 2015:A1).
According to his statement and the perception of local practitioners that I interviewed, the
institutional environment prior to 2014 was conducive to the growth of civil society in
Guangdong province, particularly Guangzhou, the capital of the province. Owing to its proximity
to Hong Kong and distance from Beijing, Guangzhou enjoyed a unique geographic advantage,
nourishing a relatively autonomous public sphere and civic space. Hong Kong had served as an

6

I anonymize the name of the organization and changed the location where the organization operated to protect my
informant.
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“offshore civil society” (Hung and Ip 2012) and a training ground for activists and NGOs in
Guangzhou. Observers also credited Wang Yang, who was seen as one of the leading reformers
in China’s top leadership during 2007-2012, for his role in promoting civil society in
Guangzhou. He piloted the Guangdong Model of development, which emphasized private
enterprise, economic growth, and a greater role for civil society. Thus, local governments
facilitated the expansion of civil society in Guangzhou in the early years of NGO growth. The
state invited NGOs to meetings and conferences to discuss social innovation, and they recruited
representatives of NGOs such as Professor Shu from the Civil Society Center (CSC) to
participate in drafting the new Charity law and to inform national policy. Government spending
on social services and the number of NGOs registered with MoCAs increased significantly,
suggesting a vibrant and innovative civil society would emerge in Guangdong province.
The spring of civil society, during the post-2008 era seemed to end abruptly in late 2014.
The sudden cut of government funding was an early sign of a looming crisis. The second half of
the open letter continues:
However, conditions changed abruptly at the end of 2014. The vibrant and innovative
atmosphere for social management quickly withered. At first, the government suddenly
cut funding for NGOs, including the The Southern Migrant Center. Then, in the new
social management regulations that were to be promulgated, the government made it very
difficult for us to obtain foreign funding. On top of that, from around the end of 2014 to
early 2015, we felt the government begin to tighten control of and suppress a selected
group of NGOs. Our space for survival has sunk to its lowest, and we’re on the brink of
extinction (Cao, 2015: A1).
In December 2015 shortly after circulation of the Southern Migrant Center’s open letter,
its director was arrested along with a dozen Guangdong labor right activists. The government
had criminally charged some of the labor activists with subverting national security through
collusion with “hostile foreign forces” (jinwai didui shili 境外敌对势力). The 2015 crackdown
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had been the toughest in the country for decades. The attack on labor NGOs became “part of a
concerted nationwide campaign against Chinese civil society at large” (Franceschini and Nesossi
2018:000). The international human rights NGO Chinese Human Rights Defenders reported 995
arbitrary detentions of rights defenders in 2014, nearly as many as the two-year total of
1,160 from 2012 to 2013 (Chinese Human Rights Defenders 2015). Liren Rural Library, an
NGO that established a network of 22 libraries across rural China, closed in the face of
government pressure (Piao 2014). Authorities in Beijing municipality shut down Transition
Institute, an NGO think tank dedicated to educational and economic policy, and detained several
of its staff in October 2014 (Chin 2014). The movement continued into 2015. The “Feminist
Five,” were detained by Chinese authorities in March 7 2015 (Zeng 2015). The flagship
advocacy NGO Yirenping was closed in June 2015 (BBC News 2015). Many NGO staff whom I
interviewed in Guangzhou reported that their daily operations and funding were subject to more
scrutiny since 2014. In 2017, when I started my ethnography in Guangzhou, the states also
required all registered NGOs to set up a party branch within the organization. The double
registration system which was temporarily demolished in the post-2008 era slowly made its way
back to the table. The double registration system was a major barrier for NGOs to register
because the system required NGOs to look for a government sponsor and approval from MoCA
to operate. The growth rate of NGOs in Guangdong began to drop after the short-lived gains of
2012 and 2013.
What happened in 2014 that led to the shared sense of crisis among practitioners in
Guangzhou? 2014 was the fateful moment when the city of Guangzhou began to lose its
advantage over Shanghai in nourishing a lively and vibrant civil society. The State Avoidance
Autonomous field comprises a wide network of bottom-up, grassroots driven NGOs and
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individuals who share common identities as members of civil society. The field had a constantly
evolving relationship with the state. I argued that the relationship between the State Avoidance
Autonomous field and the State Strategic Action field in Guangdong was relatively horizontal,
characterized by mutual dependence on each other, even though the state had formal authority
over the field in the early years. In contrast, Shanghai’s State Alliance Market field was more
hierarchically organized with the state actively engaged in shaping the formation of the field
from the very beginning. The State Alliance Market field was subordinated to the State Strategic
Action field in Shanghai, i.e., vertically integrated to the state field (Fligstein and McAdam
2012). The horizontally organized field in Guangzhou allowed the emergence of advocacy
organizations whereas the hierarchical organized field in Shanghai discouraged that. Therefore,
civil society was more developed in Guangzhou than in Shanghai in those early years. I expect
places with more developed civil society, with stronger linkages to each other to be more
resilient and capable in holding government accountable. In an authoritarian context, however,
the expansion and development of civil society is paradoxical because the state becomes more
capable and skillful at liberally wiping out those links. The horizontally organized field is more
vulnerable to exogenous shocks as they become more atomized and disconnected. The
hierarchical organized field in Shanghai, despite confronting its own set of challenges, was less
affected by the change of political environment because of its close alliance with the state. The
stability of the field allowed Shanghai NGOs to continue their work. Thus, a reverse in
advantage between the two cities occurred after the crisis.
The following chapter discusses the sudden deterioration of the institutional environment
that began in Guangzhou at the end of 2014. I frame the period from late 2014 to 2015 as an
episode of contention. An episode of contention “can be defined as a period of emergent,
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sustained contentious interaction between …[field] actors utilizing new and innovative forms of
action vis-à-vis one another (McAdam 2007:253).” The contentious episode caused by an
exogenous shock is likely to threaten the stability of the sector, interrupting the flow of
resources, undermining the legitimacy of the organizations, and destabilizing the ties of allies
(Fligstein and McAdam 2011). I use strategic action field to understand the nonprofit field’s
relationship with the state, market, and other actors in the two cities. Then I focused on local
NGO struggles with the alliance extension dilemma. The dilemma allows me to think more
thoroughly about what is happening internally and externally with the organization. The alliance
extension dilemma concerns inter-relationship management with peers and alliances. How big
should an organization expand its team and alliance? Who should be befriended and whom
should an organization avoid? To what extent can NGOs build strong allies to resist exogenous
shocks originating from the State Strategic Action field? I conclude the chapter with an
examination of the linkage between episodes of contention and the unpredictability of state
action.
Precipitation of the Crisis: Change of Leadership
After Xi Jinping assumed office in 2013, many observers believed that the political wind
had begun to shift. In April 2013, a confidential internal publication Document No. 9 was leaked
to journalists (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015). Approved by the leaders of China, it warmed Party
members of seven dangerous Western values. Among them were the words of civil society. The
report aimed at a wide range of government officials in provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities directly under Party committees, central ministries and state organs, Party
ministries, People’s Liberation Army headquarters, major Party committees, and groups of Party
leaders of civilian organizations. According to the original document:
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Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s social
foundation.
Civil society is a socio-political theory that originated in the West. It holds that in the
social sphere, individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by
the state. For the past few years, the idea of civil society has been adopted by Western
anti-China forces and used as a political tool. Additionally, some people with ulterior
motives within China have begun to promote these ideas.
This is mainly expressed in the following ways:
Promoting civil society and Western-style theories of governance, they claim that
building a civil society in China is a precondition for the protection of individual rights
and forms the basis for the realization of constitutional democracy. Viewing civil society
as a magic bullet for advancing social management at the local level, they have launched
all kinds of so-called citizen’s movements.
Advocates of civil society want to squeeze the Party out of leadership of the masses at the
local level, even setting the Party against the masses, to the point that their advocacy is
becoming a serious form of political opposition.7
The document criticized the theory of civil society as a foreign socio-political theory that
might potentially challenge the party’s domination. The report called on Party members to
“strengthen their resistance to ‘infiltration’ by outside ideas, renew their commitment to work ‘in
the ideological sphere,’ and to handle with renewed vigilance all ideas, institutions, and people
deemed threatening to unilateral Party rule.”8 Shortly after the release of the Document No.9, the
government imposed harsh internet restrictions and arrested high-profiled dissidents from civil
society organizations. In short, the party felt increasingly unsettled with the rise of the civil
society discourse in the public sphere and with social management at the local levels. The

7

This is a data file that is translated by ChinaFile. Retried from http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafiletranslation.
8
Op. Cit.

50

document also signaled the reluctance of new leaders to political reform and a return to the era of
Mao Zedong.
Diana Fu and Greg Distelhorst (2018) compared the Hu-Wen and Xi eras and saw the
new leadership as the key instrument behind the repression of civil society. During the Hu-Wen
era, repression of labor NGOs was selecteive, fragmented, and heterogeneous (Fu 2017). The
repression of labor NGOs has been a periodic feature, recurring in cycles and typically
coinciding with major events (Franceschini and Nesossi 2018). Nonetheless, experts, including
Diana Fu, who has conducted extensive ethnographic study of labor NGOs in 2009-2010, argue
that repression has shifted from reactive and massive incidents to proactive and sophisticated.
Not only did the government orchestrate unprecedented attacks on major social service-oriented
and labor movement-type NGOs, the state also publicized on national TV what used to be local
matters. The criminalization and public shaming of labor NGOs in the national media was not a
traditional way to handle labor NGOs.
Franceschini and Nesossi (2018) also argue that the state’s tactics shifted from
“unofficial” means such as putting informal pressure on landlords to evict NGOs to legal
regulations. Shortly after the attack on labor rights activists in December 2015, the new Charity
law that has been in limbo for 10 years passed in March 16 2016. While the new Charity law was
anticipated by most of the practitioners in the field, the Overseas NGO laws, which came right
after the new Charity law on April 28, 2016, were unexpected. The Overseas NGO laws, part of
a slate of security-related laws introduced between 2014 and 2016, put foreign NGOs under the
management of the Ministry of State Security (Sidel 2018). According to Fu Ying, former
minister of China, more than 7,000 foreign NGOs active in China will be affected by the new
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law.9 The Overseas NGO law has effectively underscored the advent of the new Charity law. The
remaining puzzle is why the Overseas NGO law has singled out Hong Kong and Taiwan-based
organizations as foreign NGOs, which contradicted the country’s “one country, two systems”
approach. In addition, international NGOs have existed in China for many years. Why all of a
sudden did those organizations become intolerable to the state?
Presuming that the change of leadership at the national level was behind the repression of
civil society, the coercive pressure from the central state in controlling civil society would
eventually trickle down to local nonprofit sectors across the country. Then it is reasonable to
expect that the leadership shift was a crisis for all. In general, most scholars consider the Chinese
state as a fragmented authoritarian regime, suggesting local government autonomy in interpreting
and executing national policy (Spires 2012; Lu 2009). Such fragmented authoritarianism
explains the rise of civil societies in liberal provinces such as Guangdong. A Chinese saying
reflects popular opinion: “Those above have policies while those below have their own way of
getting around them.” Subordinate authorities do not always have an incentive to carry out
central government policy. I thus hypothesize that Guangdong province would continue its social
innovation reform and lower the pressure from the central state to keep civil society alive. The
Guangdong model of development had received a lot of praises and recognition. In the past, local
NGOs had established a more collaborative relationship with local governments and had
perceived such relationships would buffer them from attacks by the central government. Yet why
did Guangzhou’s robust civil society invite more repression? Party dynamics and Xi’s overall
shift on civil society is insufficient in explaining the abrupt change in conditions at the end of
2014. I argue that the a myriad of factors including Xi’s overall shift on civil society, the change

9
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of leadership at the provincial level, and the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong
collectively accelerated the demise of civil society in the city of Guangzhou and beyond. The
impact of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements was underappreciated by most scholars.
Many of my informants in Guangzhou characterized the shift as abrupt and some made
references to the pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong as the trigger that accelerated the
state’s control on the sector. The mass protests on the special administrative region, right next to
the Guangdong province, became an exogenous shock that destabilized the proximate field of
nonprofit sector in Guangzhou. Central and local governments were eager to “do something”
about the situation and began to target organizations with close ties to Hong Kong-based NGOs,
foundations, and activists. The central state thus ordered local governments to attack groups that
showed any sign of connection to Hong Kong. The episodes of contention after the exogenous
shock destabilized the State Avoidance Autonomous field, which resulted in more repression and
the loss of discursive power in the broader nonprofit field. By loss of discursive power, I mean
the marginalization and loss of power in mobilizing collective actions that occurs when
meaningful topics and knowledge shared among members of the field no longer can be voiced.
For example, due to state pressure, the concept of civil society can no longer serve as a collective
frame that provides meaning for people’s action.
The Guangzhou’s Advantage: “Close to Hong Kong and Far Away from Beijing”
Hong Kong as China’s Offshore Civil Society
The city of Guangzhou is only 70 miles to the north of Hong Kong. Guangzhou and
Hong Kong are closer than Los Angeles and San Diego. The two cities share the same spoken
language, Cantonese, and culture due to the migration from Guangzhou to Hong Kong in the
early 20th century. Since the handover of sovereignty in 1997, Hong Kong’s civil society has
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been rejuvenated by rounds of democratic movements against Beijing’s attempts to control civil
liberties (Hung and Ip 2012). Democratic movements in Hong Kong have not only strengthened
local civil society but also serve as an important “offshore civil society” for mainland China
(Hung and Ip 2012). Hong Kong’s offshore civil society has several effects on mainland civil
society. First, the movements have inspired rights activists, bloggers, and liberal intellectuals as
information and ideas disseminate from Hong Kong to mainland China. Second, Hong Kong has
become “the hub of political organizing and exchange” and “a free platform for activists and
intellectuals from mainland” (p 505). Cross-border activism between Hong Kong and the
mainland supported the preservation of the local Cantonese dialect and Chinese activists in
Guangzhou and nearby cities. Third, Hong Kong also serves as a support and learning center for
China’s nascent NGO sector. NGOs finding it difficult to set up in mainland China register in
Hong Kong and obtain local and international funding in the city. Hong Kong academics and
NGO professionals nourished Chinese NGOs by providing capacity-building programs. These
cross-border NGO networks have contributed to the growth of southern China’s civil society.
Another important factor, often neglected by scholars, is the relationship between the
nonprofit field and the local provincial state. During the early years of NGO resurgence, Wang
Yang was an important political ally of NGOs in Guangdong. Under Wang’s leadership,
Guangdong piloted the reform of NGO social management (Wacker 2012). NGOs focusing on
labor rights and other issues did not need to find an official government sponsor to register.
Wang’s liberal approach significantly aided the development of civil society in Guangdong. The
number of NGO rose more than three times as fast as the national average during Wang’s era
(LaFraniere 2011). The social reform model in Guangdong, in fact, learned from Hong Kong.
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According to my interview with Kevin10, who participated in political and social reforms
initiated by Wang Yang:
During the Wang Yang era, we sent dozens of study groups to Hong Kong and
Singapore. The groups comprise government officials, scholars, and junior officers at all
levels. We mainly learned the governmental contract from Hong Kong, more than half.
Also, Guangdong is close to Hong Kong. Shenzhen is also close to and hugely influenced
by Hong Kong, but Shenzhen did not have a good university. Without a good university
such as Sun Yat-sen University, you do not have scholar to learn from the Hong Kong
model, to think, to explain, and to localize what they learned from Hong Kong.
Therefore, CSC is unique in a sense that they had college background. It is a pity that
Shenzhen scholars did not fully utilize their natural advantage their proximity to Hong
Kong and come up with innovative governmental contracts. In fact, the earliest form of
governmental contract started at Zhong Ying village, the border between Hong Kong and
Shenzhen at Luohu distribute. They learned from Hong Kong. The local government paid
for social services.
The provincial state not only allowed but facilitated the exchange between the nonprofit sector in
Hong Kong and Guangzhou. Shenzhen was also closed to Hong Kong as a city, but Shenzhen
did not utilize its geographic advantage and failed to make itself the hub of civil associations in
the Guangdong province. The close connection between Hong Kong and Guangzhou used to be
the unique advantage of Guangzhou in incubating a vibrant civil society, but it soon became the
source of problems.
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Interview with Kevin, November 16, 2017. Grand Rapid, US.
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Figure 3.1. The Map of Delta Pearl Region (Guangzhou and Hong Kong)

The Unintended and Paralyzing Effects of Pro-democracy Movements on Chinese Civil
Society:
“Occupy Central,” also known as the Umbrella Movement, was a pro-democracy
political movement in Hong Kong. It began September 2014 and lasted for 79 days (Lee and
Chan 2013). The campaign was initiated by and found an advocate in Occupy Central with
Love and Peace, which was led by three leaders, known as the Occupy Central trio: Reverend
Chu Yiu-ming, Benning Tai Yiu-ting, and Chan Kin-min, an associate professor at the Chinese
University of Hong Kong. Later, Occupy Central gained the name “Umbrella Movement” after
activists and participants used umbrellas to protect themselves from the Hong Kong police’s use
of tear gas. The goal of the campaign was to pressure the Chinese government to grant an
electoral system as promised in the Hong Kong Basic Law Article 45. The Chinese government
granted Hong Kong electoral reform but required candidates be screened and approved by the
Chinese government first. The movement demanded “real universal suffrage” (Wong, 2016:
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A1).
Sidel alluded to the impact of pro-democracy movement in changing the state’s
perspectives on the management of international NGOs. Based on interviews in Beijing in 2015,
Sidel (2018) argues that the higher political authority and the National Security Council were
disappointed at the ability of the Ministry of Civil Affairs and other agencies to understand and
manage foreign supported nonprofits and educational activities in China. The pro-democracy
movements in Hong Kong became a critical moment that pushed the transfer of authority and
power over foreign NGOs from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security.
However, Sidel (2018) did not show how the incident unfolded in a real time and how the
grassroots NGOs responded to the crisis. My research provides a full account of the emergence
of the crisis and the aftermath of the crisis to the Chinese civil society.
The Emergent Mobilization of the Central State
Occupy Central was the largest episode of social unrest in China since the Tiananmen
Square protests in 1989 (Pomfret and Zhu, 2014). Even though protesters in Hong Kong
demanded universal suffrage within the self-governed territory, the Chinese state’s reaction
suggested that the government has taken the insurgency as a threat to national security. As
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) argue, “the ultimate stability and legitimacy of states depend
critically on their ability to minimize instability across the myriad fields they oversee” (P. 108).
That means that the states have a great incentive to avert to any instability within their governed
fields. How did the states restore order on terms favorable to themselves in a timely fashion?
China enacted a comprehensive stability control system to restore order. For protestors in
Hong Kong, Beijing chose the “sit and wait” approach and the Umbrella Movement eventually
died down after 79 days of struggle. For domestic challengers, states act as strategic actors,
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deploying multiple tactics to prevent democratic spillover (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015). The
central state quickly imposed strict censorship about the insurgency in Hong Kong. All forms of
reporting, even social media mentions of any news about the movement in Hong Kong were
banned across mainland China (Jacobs 2014). Xinhua News, China’s official media was the
only venue from which news about the movement came, one week after the protests. Xinhua
News portrayed the protestors in Hong Kong as “illegal,” “disobedient,” and disrupting Hong
Kong society (Li 2014).
On the other hand, the central state had become more sophisticated and skillful in
dismantling alliances and organizational networks. The government was deeply averse to the
possibility that the protests would diffuse to mainland China through the network of cross border
activists (Bradsher and Buckley 2014). Since the spread of the Arab Spring from Tunisia to the
rest of the Arab world, authoritarian states have paid attention to the contagious nature of social
movements. According to Sidel (2018), the central government perceived the eruption of
massive protests in the financial center of Hong Kong as “a color revolution” too close to home.
The regime learned the repertoires of contention developed by protesters and quickly adapted to
them (Heydemann and Leenders 2011). The swift response from the Chinese government was
directed to not only Hong Kong protestors, but also to “imagined protestors in mainland China”
(Kennedy 2012).
The instability of Hong Kong prompted the Chinese state to regain control over myriad
fields they oversaw, including the nonprofit sectors. Under emergent condition, states are likely
to resist change and restore order aggressively at any cost, and state actors may switch
allegiances regardless of previous allies. Meanwhile, the State Strategic Action field may also be
subject to the same dynamic (Fligstein and McAdam 2012). While it was impossible for me to
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document the internal decision making within the state strategic field, the local reactions that I
observed in Guangzhou provided a glimpse into how the State Strategic Action field in China
reacted to crisis.
The Chilling Effect
All fields were interconnected. The destabilization of Hong Kong inevitably affected
Guangzhou, given its geographic proximity between the two cities. “Guangzhou is ruled from
Beijing, whose leaders, in 2014, fearing that the demonstrations in Hong Kong might spread to
the mainland, detained more than 100 people who had voiced support for Hong Kong protests”
(Forsythe and Wong 2016:A1). The arrests of outspoken activists were not a surprise, but why
were NGOs, which remained silent towards the pro-democracy movement, also affected?
Many grassroots NGOs were slow in appreciating the severity of the crisis, even though
their state alliance had given them a warning that an order from a higher level might come to put
the organizations in jeopardy. While the protests in Hong Kong had little impact on the daily life
in mainland China, Zheng Yi, the director of the Southern Migrant Center, who had been
imprisoned for four months during the unprecedented attack on labor rights NGOs, told me
during a walk, “panda has told me to watch out. I knew the day (of arrest) would come.”11 Panda
is slang that local practitioners use to refer to the official controller within the state security
apparatus. Those official controllers, usually are undercover and act as a coercive internal
governance unit (IGU) that oversees their supervised actors’ compliance with state-set field
rules. IGUs were usually uninterested in whether the organizations they supervised were doing
their work properly, filing transparent financial statements, competing fairly, or otherwise
adhering to the rules and norms of the field. IGUs, on the other hand, cared whether
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Interview with Zheng Yi, November 17, 2016. Guangzhou
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organizations crossed the state’s red line. “Crossing a red line” is a common phrase in China that
signals the Party’s figurative point of tolerance for unwelcome activities. Sometime pandas used
coercive methods—interrupting events or “checking water meters”—with the help of police
reinforcements; sometimes they just invited people for tea or dinner to monitor organizational
activities. Pandas, however, were human, with emotions and compassion, and they sometimes
established personal relationships with the people whom they surveilled. For example, months
after Zheng’s release, Zheng recalled, pandas even made small monetary donations to the
Southern Migrant Worker Center. In some cases, pandas also served as negotiators to resolve
conflicts between NGOs and higher officials.
How much an IGU could ameliorate the crisis for local NGOs was limited, or perhaps
only a small fraction of IGUs had any intention of doing so. After all, the state security apparatus
at the local level was subordinated to a hierarchical State Strategic Action field. The local state
actors had to obey orders from the top. In the midst of the crisis, local state actors tried to
interpret orders from higher officials and to act accordingly. The 2015 attack on labor NGOs
showed that the central state went after groups of NGOs that showed any connection to Hong
Kong because they did not have the time to fully vet the qualities of those linkages. The state
launched a ruthless attack on a large group of labor rights organizations despite their prior
allegiances to the state. The Southern Migrant Center in fact had a close relationship with the
local government.
Zheng Yi told me he was still confused about the arrest. The Southern Migrant Center
was one of the few labor NGO’s that received official recognition from the local district. “We
were very close to the government, and we had several governmental contracts. We even got
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criticism from our peers, saying we were too close to the state,” said Zheng. Zheng and his
organization won numerous awards and recognition from local governments. Many modest
reformists, like Zheng, had counted on their alliances with local state actors as a bulwark against
the state’s repression. However, even though local state actors had given NGOs space to grow,
their relationships remained fragile in the face of crisis. When orders came from higher level
authorities, local state actors exhibited little power to resist though some local state actors may
have wanted to protect their alliances.
The community of practitioners interpreted that the sudden deterioration of the
environment for NGOs was related to the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong, which
caused anxiety for higher state officials. The state’s main target was cross-border NGO networks
between labor rights organizations and Hong Kong. Zheng’s connection with Zeng Feiyang
might also be the ultimate reason why he became a target. Zeng Feiyang was China’s most
prominent labor activist and campaigner for workers’ legal rights. Zheng used to work at Zeng’s
organization. A veteran labor activist suggested that all those criminally detained were connected
to Zeng: “It’s obvious that the raids were well planned from a higher level of government.” He
added, “from the way several friends were questioned, you can gather that the authorities wanted
to ‘prove’ that several independent labor organizations are part of a network, with Zeng Feiyang
as the ringleader” (Cao 2015).
On the surface, the attack on labor rights NGOs might be part of a periodic and
temporary control over them. A closer look revealed, however, that behind the attack state actors
sought to dismantle the potential alliance between Hong Kong and Chinese civil society. Zeng
Feiyang’s organization, founded in the early 2000s, was the first labor NGO in China. It
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campaigned against evictions, intimidation, and other forms of state repression. Due to the
sensitive nature of its activism and workers’ inability to finance the organization, it had to rely
on funding from Hong Kong and abroad: for example, the German-based Church Development
Service [Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst], the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee,
and the Hong Kong-based China Labor Bulletin, among others (Cao 2015). The international
funding of Zeng’s organization did not seem to provoke much trouble in the earlier years, even
though the police had made several attempts to close down the organization. The state had
tolerated their activities for years. However, in September 2014 right after the pro-democracy
movement emerged in Hong Kong, public security authorities warned Zeng that his organization
should no longer accept any funding from China Labor Bulletin, at the time its only source of
money. As the only source of finance, Zeng rejected the public security authorities’ warning. His
recalcitrance subjected him to a 24 hour spell of imprisonment, a threat on his life by
unidentified men, and a physical attack by an unidentified man on December 25, 2014. Zeng had
also been denied entry to Hong Kong after two unsuccessful attempts in September and
November 2014. In the end, the state accused Zeng of “disturbing social order” and working
with foreign NGOs hostile to China (France-Presse 2016). Zeng’s funding from the Hong Kongbased organization China Labor Bulletin became the source of contention.
I argue that the hierarchical structure of the State Strategic Action field in China
perpetuates uncertainty. It leads to what Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have called an episode of
contention. The Chinese central state relies heavily on the public security departments, including
state security apparatuses in maintaining social stability. A wide network of official controllers
from the state security apparatus closely monitor a broad range of fields. The relatively
autonomous nonprofit field in Guangzhou, in fact, existed at the mercy of the state because the
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local government of Guangzhou during Wang Yang’s term allowed the expansion of this field
without much intervention. However, the central state still kept a close eyes on the activities of
the field. The state security apparatus can activate its control over the field at any time, acting as
an internal governance unit (IGU). In Fligstein and McAdam’s term, governance units are
“charged with overseeing compliance with field rules and, in general, facilitating the overall
smooth functioning and reproduction of the system” (p14). They emphasize the importance of
the internal nature of such organizations, citing how they are “distinct from external state
structures that hold jurisdiction overall” (p14). In the case of the state security apparatus in
China, however, such state organizations are almost internal to the field given their ubiquitous
presence in the field and their power in overseeing compliance with state regulations and shaping
the fields’ rules and norms. Thus, the interlocking relationship between State Strategic Action
fields and the nonprofit fields in China make it almost impossible to categorize the state security
apparatus as external to the field.
Dismantling Key Alliances
The 2015 attack on labor NGOs was the toughest in history, according to Chen Huihai,
director of worker training at a leading labor law NGO/firm (Harvey 2015). The attack on the
labor NGOs had a chilling effect on the civil society at large. “The party-state has rolled out a
wider campaign apparently aimed at eradicating independent civil society and returning to a
more Mao-Zedong-style form of political governance,” said Eva Pils, an expert on Chinese law
at King’s College London (Dominguez 2015: pA2). Not only politically sensitive NGOs were
under attack. NGOs with links to Hong Kong, regardless of their activities and orientation, were
also subject to more scrutiny. GCSC (Guangzhou Civil Society Center), which had split from
CSC and was where I conducted my field work, was a modest activist group that focused on
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empowering marginalized populations using non-confrontational strategies and tactics. The
national security police interrupted GCSC’ training sections in the middle of the Nonprofit
Leadership Camp in the winter of 2014. The Nonprofit Leadership Camp was regarded by local
actors as the “birthplace of Southern China’s civil society” because the program nurtured and
trained leaders of the first generation of advocacy-oriented grassroots organizations, including
the Southern Migrant Center and Zeng’s organization. GCSC faced huge pressure from
authorities to detach themselves from their international alliances and donors as well as their
trainees. At that time, a Hong Kong based foundation was GCSC’s major donor. According an
anonymous informant, the major donor of this Hong Kong based foundation was a supporter of
Hong Kong independence. Besides a direct warning, the state security officer also put pressure
on property owners to evict GCSC. The organizations had been evicted several times within a
few months until they finally settled down in the place where I began my internship. GCSC
managed to re-open the office after one of the main people in the office, who was on a black list
declared by panda, resigned from the organization. GCSC’s parental organization, CSC,
permanently lost its license to operate during the same period.
The harsh punishment on CSC and its constituents in the State Avoidance Autonomous
field may have to do with one high-profile person. That was Chan Kin-min, one of the Occupy
Central Trio who called for the Hong Kong protests and borrowed from the repertories of
Occupy Wall Street. Few people knew that Chan Kin-min had another role in mainland China.
He has been a key player who forged the cross-border NGO network and nourished the growth
of civil society in Guangzhou and beyond. Chan devoted himself to promoting Hong Kong’s
democracy and China’s civil society development (NG, 2016). Prior to 2013, Chan’s normal day
ran like this. He finished his teaching at 4 pm at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and ran to
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the University Station and hopped on the high-speed train from Hong Kong to Guangzhou. By
sunset, Chan would start his evening class at Sun Yat-sen University. After the second shift in
Guangzhou, Chan rushed back to Hong Kong by midnight and started the day again.
In July 1st, 2017, the Stand News, a Hong Kong-based media outlet, published an article
titled: “the most devastating consequence about the Umbrella Movements is that China has lost
Chan Kin-min (The Stand News 2017).” Chan was regarded as the invisible hand behind the
emergence of civil society by local practitioners. He planted the idea of civil society in China
and incubated many first generation grassroots NGOs in Guangzhou. Chan helped to establish
one of the first research institutes on the study of civil society and NGOs in southern China in
collaboration with Sun Yat-sen University.12 Headquartered in Guangzhou, the center consisted
of different research programs for specific fields, such as NGOs, collective action and corporate
citizen research.13 This research center was the formal entity of CSC before Professor Shu took
it over. Chan also incubated several grassroots NGOs in China and was a board member for
several different NGOs and foundations including GCSC (Luo 2015). The Chinese government
even invited Chan to consult on Chinese grassroots NGOs and the reconstruction of Sichuan
province after the earthquake in 2008 killed thousands (Chen, 2008).
Since 2014, the state has put pressure on groups that Chan had worked with in China (Ng
2016). The scholarly exchange between Chan and his fellow collaborators in mainland China
also has been restricted. According to my interviews with practitioners in the field, state security
controllers kept a close eye on the activities of NGOs and sometimes they would interrogate
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practitioners about various issues. 14 With the emergence of the movement in Hong Kong, more
questions have been directed there, among them: What is your relationship with Hong Kong?
The objective of state action is clear, to destroy potential ties to allies. The state exercises
its control through a form of “collective punishment” on offenders and their related parties.
Collective punishments originated in the 2nd century BC during the Qin Dynasty of China. The
emperor enforced strict laws, punishing perpetrators and their family and relatives to uphold his
rule of the country. During the Cultural Revolution, relatives and friends of “political
descendants” suffered because of personal connections with the descendants, another form of
“collective punishment.” In the modern era, “collective punishment” took a different shape in
which the state would track down offenders’ personal network and put pressure on those related
parties. Officials went after those networks to prevent social movements from expanding via
those networks.
The Reverse Advantage between Guangzhou and Hong Kong
Many Chinese rights activists have commented that the state-led suppression of labor
rights organizations and Hong Kong related activists has had a chilling effect on civil society.
Many low-profile NGOs have also experienced various state interventions. For example, several
local NGOs have been forced to move their offices several times within months. Landlords broke
contracts days after they signed the leases. Events were suddenly canceled. When organized
events managed to take place, organizations had police officials interrupt in the middle of the
event.15 Policemen claimed they were there to “Check water meters!” [Cha Shui Biao]. That is to
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say; police would monitor events by pretending to be ordinary workers (Philip, 2012). An
informant would tell me that the panda paid more visits to her organization and asked for her
connection with Hong Kong during late 2014 and early 2015. That seemingly harmless visit and
inquiry from a state actor might not directly lead to ending advocacy work, but the
internalization of surveillance by the director and team member would reshape organizational
practices.
The Chinese state also reframed issues differently and portrayed protesters as radicals
manipulated by foreign forces. The Occupy Central Trio faced a charge from Hong Kong’s chief
executive, Mr. Leung, accusing them of engaging in a conspiracy with “foreign hostile forces”
(Bradsher and Buckley 2014). The Chinese Foreign Ministry also responded, “China opposes
any external force supporting ‘illegal movements,’” referring to the Occupy Central protests. On
one hand, Chinese party-state perceived Hong Kong’s democracy movement to be part of US
and EU democracy promotion (Chen and Kinzelbach 2015). On the other hand, the “foreign
hostile force” was the excuse for the state to destabilize the cross broader alliances between
mainlander and Hong Kong. It did not matter whether NGOs had a real relationship with any
foreign entity, such relationships could be as trivial as having a foreigner as an intern in the
organization. The norms of working with foreign NGOs, what used to be tolerated in the field,
were no longer accepted.
Before I secured access to my fieldwork site, I had an interview with Wendy, the human
resources director of GCSC. The first question Wendy asked me was whether I was Chinese or
American? Which passport was I currently holding? The CV I sent gave people the wrong
impression that I was a US citizen since I has spent almost 10 years abroad. I clarified my
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nationality as a Chinese citizen. At that time, however, I was unsure why the question was
significant. I thought that Ms. Wan was just curious about my background and wanted to make
sure that I could live in China without an interpreter. Not until I got into the field did I realize the
importance of my nationality. If I was an America or held a green card, I would not be able to
gain access to the organization. The organization was cautious about letting in foreign interns
and researchers because the director did not want to jeopardize their relationship with the state.
Later, in 2015, I learned that the organization was rebuilding its trust with the local state actor
after the Ministry of State Security (MoSS) interrupted the nonprofit leadership program. Since
then, the team became more cautious about its collaboration with international individuals and
organizations, because they did not want to give the wrong impression to the state actors that the
organization had ties to “foreign hostile forces.” The phrase refers to any international entities
including NGOs and researchers from foreign country, which the central state claims are
destabilizing the country through infiltration of western ideology.16 My colleagues still
occasionally made fun of my “foreignness,” using “foreign hostile forces” as my nickname.
When I started my field work, in Shanghai, at my second field site, staff there they also
asked about my nationality and required me to submit a copy of my national ID card before the
start of my internship. Unlike Guangzhou, however, EP allowed international interns as I later
found out. The tension between the state and NGOs made for higher stakes in Guangzhou
because NGOs in Guangzhou had a much more frequent interaction with Hong Kong based
NGOs and activists. Thus, the advantage of Guangzhou and Shanghai reversed after the crisis.
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My survey data collected in 2017 showed some evidence that the nonprofit field in Shanghai
enjoyed more freedom than its counterpart in Guangzhou.
Since late 2014, NGOs in Guangzhou have faced more scrutiny from the state. In
particular, many grassroots NGOs in Guangzhou relied on international funding prior to the prodemocracy movements in Hong Kong. State actors had imposed more restriction on Guangzhou
foreign donor-NGO connections. NGOs in Guangzhou expressed that the local government had a
lower approval rate for NGOs working with foreign entities. The high percentage of N/A
responses reflected a lack of contact with international players and some hesitation to answer
sensitive questions in the survey.
Figure 3.2. Local Government Approval for NGOs working with Foreign NGOs
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Beyond the direct intervention of particular organizations, the state has imposed sectorwide new legal regulations and laws to restore order to the field. The enactment of the Charity
law was not a surprise as the law has been in limbo for almost ten years. Overseas NGO laws
were unheard of, however, until the Legislative Affairs Office proposed the draft to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress of China in December 2014 (An 2015).17
Opponents argued that the new Overseas NGO Law “represented a severe blow to non-profit
groups involved in issues such as the environment, public health, education, and human rights”
(Phillips 2016: A1). With the new law, the central government could legitmately control the
flow of the reources in this sector. International funding suspended for many domestic NGOs,
especially for those public interest groups with a troubling relationship with the
government. Thus, the new laws have pushed grassroots organizations to choose whether they
wanted to work with the government or remain marginalized.
NGO Responses to the Crisis
Many NGOs faced the alliance dilemma: to what extent can NGOs rely on previous
alliances to resist the crisis? Due to the state’s ruthless attempt to dismantle their network of
support, NGOs seemed to be better off rejecting alliances. Local state actors’ relationships were
fragile and lacking loyalty. International alliances turned out to be the source of trouble for
grassroots NGOs in an authoritarian regime. The political risk of forging a network of advocacy
organizations was suddenly amplified. Thus in face of a hostile takeover by an authoritarian
state, challengers like CSC or GSCS were unlikely to overcome the crisis by forging a collective
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alliance horizontally with other challengers. The state has proactively prevented organizations
from mobilizing collectively.
Local NGOs who were affected by the crisis faced two choices: either intransigent
opposition or a supine acquiescence to the state power. Local practitioners framed the choices as
“standing to die” or “kneeling for survival.”18 Intransigent opposition was not a choice for a
group of modest reformers because the state had disproportionate power in virtually any field.
Most organizations had to compromise and adjusted their activities to survive. In their daily
practices, practitioners internalized the censorship. The internalization became a central logic
that guided an organization’s activities and strategies. At my interview with the founder of CSC,
Prof. Shu concluded19: “everything we have done is to avoid political risk. We don’t have any
success to brag about. Survival is everything!”
Take GCSC as an example. The director of GCSC was lucky that he avoided jail.
Continuous harassments from state actors, however, resulted in a loss of talent and diminished
morale. The priority for CSC’s leader was to desensitize (Qu Min 去敏), get rid of the politically
sensitive element of their activities and re-establish legitimacy. Some practitioners also framed
this practice as “bleaching.”20 As the director of GCSC, Mr. Qin knew he had to balance the
demands from different parties and navigate the complex relations with each of them. The first
thing Mr. Qin did was to discontinue GCSC’s foreign funding to regain legitimacy. GCSC could
have continued to live on foreign funding for a short-lived period but the political risk increased
significantly based on Mr. Qin’s judgment of changes in the environment of the field. Mr. Qin
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chose to play it safe because it is almost impossible to operate in China without the approval
from the state unless an organization goes underground. As a result, he gave up the international
funding, which used to be the organization’s most stable source of funding. The choice was
almost a catastrophic for the organization. Like many other first generation NGOs, GCSC relied
on foreign funding to sustain the organization. on, GCSC had to change its organizational focus
to depoliticize itself. Depoliticizing is an organizational strategy commonly used by many local
NGOs to reduce their advocacy work and focus more on apolitical activities. By 2016, GCSC
has already abandoned their signature project “Nonprofit Leadership Camp” and re-orientated
the organization to work in the area of disability when I began working with them. To regain
trust and rebuild its relationship with state actors, GCSC had to re-assess its relationship with its
multiple stakeholders including donors and allies. Because of its politically unstable institutional
environment, GCSC prioritized the relationship with the state and chose to depoliticize the
organization by changing their program focus from labor rights to disability. Disability is a safe
area to work on. Since 2008, the state wants to channel more grassroots organizations to elderly
care, disability, education, which used to be the state’s social welfare responsibility. By working
in the area of state preference, GCSC could appeal to the government and rekindle its
relationship with the state.
Despite the difficulty, challengers had been extremely creative in responding to the crisis.
Table 3.1 is a summary of the tactics that I have documented from my ethnography and
interviews.
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Table 3.1. Organizational Strategies and Tactics to Crisis
NGO

Type
Capacity

GCSC
Training
Capacity
GCSC
Training
Capacity
GCSC
Training

Tactics
Increase the publicity of the organization through official
media as a harmless organization wanting to do something
good for the local communities.
Engage with different government departments. For
example, if a relationship with MoCA is contingent, the
organization should focus on cultivating a relationship with
the Communist Youth League, which is a powerful faction
of the party.
Work on the area that is less politically sensitive in the eyes
of government such as education, elderly care, disability, and
arts etc.

Guangzhou
Community
Neighborhood
Development

Look for mediators to advocate the organization and manage
the relationship with the state actors

Love
Feminist
LGBT
Group
KP
Development

Move from offline mobilization to online mobilization

Youth
Development

Decentralize into one or two people informal autonomous
group

Despite all the creative acts, challengers remained alert to the contingency of the
environment. After closing the leadership camp, Mr. Qin adopted a more modest approach to
achieve his organizational goals. He no longer actively voiced his support for opponents targeted
by the state because his organization was still under the radar. Many peers of GCSC rued Mr.
Qin’s lack of action and integrity. Some even cursed Mr. Qin as a betrayer of civil society values
and groups. Mr. Qin told me in sad resignation, “many of those people deleted me from their
WeChat.” The previous alliances gradually fell apart in the face of censorship and uncertainty in
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the field’s environment. With diminished networks, civil society discourse was depleted. The
State Avoidance Autonomous field became atomized and disconnected.
Conclusion
This chapter discussed episodes of contention that struck the nonprofit field starting in
late 2014. I argue that a configuration of factors led to the sudden deterioration of the
institutional environment, particularly for advocacy NGOs. The change of leadership in the
central government precipitated a conservative approach to the rapid development of civil
society in the post-2008 era. Within the new leadership’s first year, pro-democracy movements
in Hong Kong emerged and challenged the legitimacy of the state and became a trigger for the
state to mobilize. The central state enacted comprehensive stability control directed at movement
related activities across the borders. In particular, the state went after the cross-border NGO and
activist networks between mainland China and Hong Kong. In the face of such a crisis, local
state actors had no loyalty to their NGO alliances and orchestrated harassment and several arrests
against local NGOs that they perceived to have conspired with “hostile foreign forces.” The
episode of contention suppressed civil society spaces that had taken years to create at the
regional level. I argue that nonprofit fields such as Guangzhou’s State Avoidance Autonomous
field was more affected by the crackdown because of its close relationship with Hong Kong. Due
to the strong capacity of the authoritarian state, NGOs could not mobilize horizontally with their
peers. NGOs faced an alliance extension dilemma. They had to be strategic about with whom
they could form alliances and when to let go of established alliances. During the initial stage of
the crisis, NGOs, individually, reacted creatively to diminish repression from the state. Some
NGOs sought to rebuild relationships with different local state actors; some NGOs went from
offline to online organizing; some NGOs gave up their international partners. As challengers in
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the field, those NGOs slowly and quietly re-established their legitimacy with the state, built a
wider network of domestic support, and took advantage of diverse funding. Another important
path that NGOs took was to look for alliances with new powerful players in the field, which I
will discuss further in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4. The Paradox of “Incumbents” in a Contingent Environment
“Who talks of victory? To endure is all.”
– Rainer Maria Rilke

Introduction
Uncertainty was the norm even before the 2014 crisis that resulted in a decline in the
development of NGOs, particularly advocacy organizations, in the city of Guangzhou. When the
pro-democracy movements occurred along with the arrests of human rights lawyers and activists,
many practitioners in the field assumed that it was another turn in a periodic cycle of state
control. Most NGOs were still in their honeymoon phase during the post-2008 era when the
state, both central and local, had become friendlier towards NGOs.
In 2008, a 7.9 Richter scale Sichuan earthquake caused the death of almost 70,000 people
and displaced more than five million, spurring a surge of donations and volunteerism in China
(Shieh and Deng 2011; Xu 2014). Grassroots NGOs, which used to be suspicious of the state and
invisible to the public, demonstrated a great capacity in disaster relief. The Chinese government,
formerly hostile to NGOs, also began to change its stance towards NGOs. The 2008 earthquake
became what Xu (2014) has called a “consensus crisis,” an emergent situation of little dispute
over what should be done. The “consensus crisis” provided Chinese NGOs a situational opening
of political opportunity (Xu 2018) and set off the first round of mobilizations for the unification
and expansion of the nonprofit sectors at the national level.
Every time when there was a crisis, there was an opportunity. You need to look for the
opportunity embedded in the crisis. Meanwhile you need to calculate how to diversify the
risk. Sometimes you can resolve the problem of the risks and rewards. Sometimes you
can’t. Sometimes you have to wait, and you might end up wasting a great opportunity.
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Sometimes you have to take the risk. Every time you succeed, you increase the chance of
failure.21
The above excerpt from the interview I conducted, in June 29, 2018, with Professor Shu,
founder of Civil Society Center, three years after I began following the development of his
organization and more than a decade after he devoted himself to the incubation of civil society in
southern China. Crisis, as Professor Shu said, entails both opportunity and risk. The 2008
earthquake was a crisis/opportunity that nonprofit on which actors took a ride. During the natural
disaster, the state was in critical need of civil society services because the earthquake also tore
down government buildings and challenged the state’s managerial capacity. Nonprofit actors
collectively characterized the earthquake as an opportunity, mobilized to induce the co-operation
of potential alliances, drew in resources, and established legitimacy for their own groups
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012). The collective attribution of opportunity from a crisis is only the
first step of three interlinking mechanisms: responding to crises, resources mobilization, and
sustained action. The 2008 earthquake, however, was an opportunity for a brief time because the
contingency of the event and the broader field environment might change the direction of the
crisis at any time. Crises are never static but constantly evolving.
While they do not completely support what Fligstein and McAdam (2012) predicted,
incumbents who “wield disproportionate influence within a field” do not always enjoy the ability
to preserve advantage, overcome crisis, and restore order (p13). Incumbent interests and views
can be heavily reflected in the dominant organization of the strategic action field during the
“settled times,” a relative stable period (Fligstein and McAdam 2012:12). However, the
incumbent advantage, I argue, depends on the kind of field in which such incumbents are
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Interview with Prof. Shu, June 28th, 2018. Beijing.
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situated, the interest of the incumbents, and the broader stability of the field environment. In
addition, the binary of incumbent and challengers often fails to capture the fluid nature of how
the actors themselves and how others perceived them. The attribution of incumbent status to an
actor in an existing field may quickly dissolve and transform into a challenger if the strategic
action field begins to merge or overlap with other strategic action fields during crises. As
Professor Shu commented, “every time you succeed, you increased the chance of failure.” He
pointed to the disadvantage of incumbents in a contingent institutional environment where the
state actor begins to interfere in the activities of the field.
Even though the 2008 earthquake crisis became a rare opportunity for NGOs to change
discourse and images and scale up their operations, not all actors seized the opportunity.
According to the proposition of SAFs, some established Chinese NGOs characterized as
incumbent had a unique advantage to reinforce their status quo and to fashion a new settlement
that served their group interests during this destabilizing period. In my case studies, both Civil
Society Center in Guangzhou and Excellent Promoter in Shanghai were well positioned to take
advantage of the political opportunity to increase their lion’s share of material and status in their
respective fields. However, their growth has followed different paths. Since 2008, EP has
experienced exponential growth, from a one-person organization to one of the biggest centralized
NGOs in China, employing, in 2017, more than 250 full-time employees with an annual budget
of 70 million RMB. In contrast, CSC has instead decentralized into multiple smaller
organizations as an alternative way to expand the organization. The puzzle is why CSC gave up
the opportunity to become a bigger incumbent in an emerging field. I argue that nonstate actors
like CSC proactively chose not to dominate the field for two reasons. First, it was their interest to
foster a coalition field that was based on collaboration rather than a hierarchical field that was
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based on coercion and competition. Second, nonstate actors also confronted a State Avoidance
Risk Dilemma which prevented the organizations parallel with the state from scaling up because
of the state’s fear that such organizations might challenge the party’s domination.
The organizational dilemma perspective advocated by Jasper (2006) allowed me to
understand what is happening internally and externally with the organization. The SAFs in turn
pushed me to think more systematically about how such dilemmas arise and their relationships to
the state, market, and other actors in the field. The first section of this chapter discusses the
organizational dilemma of State Avoidance Risk Dilemma in face of new political opportunities:
scale up or down, centralize or decentralize. I focus on the decentralization strategies of CSC and
examine multi-level levels of influence by specific factors that intertwined with each other and
collectively led to CSC’s decentralization over the course of three years. In the third section, I
draw upon case studies from a wide range of NGOs with different degrees of political sensitivity
to look at a wider variety of decentralization strategies. In the final section, I conclude with a
discussion of the short-term and long-term effects of these different decentralization strategies. I
illustrate the different degrees of “contingent symbiosis” relationships with the state action fields
in the two cities simultaneously. They are contained and liberated through a set of strategies that
organizations can deploy in responding to opportunity and challenge.
The State and NGO Relationships Before and After 2008
As I argued in chapter 2, civil societies are new organizational fields that emerged in
multiple cities in China since the late 1990s, but they remained scattered and marginal prior to
2008. The rise of the State Avoidance Autonomous field led by CSC in Guangzhou in early
2005 was a newly forming field that tried to create a coalition field parallel to the state. The field
organized around the key concept and identity of civil society with a focus on collaboration and a
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limited dependence on government resources. In contrast to Guangzhou, EP helped to build a
new State Alliance Market field in Shanghai that was based on market competition and
subordinated to the State Strategic Action field. EP captured big donations from international
corporations and secured financial and legal support from municipal and county governments.
EP then distributed part of their resources to smaller organizations in the field. EP served as an
intermediary between the state and the local NGOs, and the new field was dependent on the State
Strategic Action field. All those characterizations of fields are ideal types. The reality can be
more murky and complex. Some NGOs in the State Avoidance Autonomous field might behave
a lot more like their counterparts in the State Alliance Market field if they found an open minded
government official (Ming Bai Ren 明白人)to work with.
The two fields represent two distinct types of Chinese nonprofit sectors in their vision of
civil society and their orientation to the state. From the standpoint of state actors, most state
actors welcomed the rise of the State Alliance Market field because they were nonthreatening
and helped the state deliver social services. State actors adopted a laissez-faire attitude,
occasionally suspicious, toward the State Avoidance Autonomous field because of their
connection with the international community. Since many NGOs, however, were very effective
in solving social problems and remained low-profile, the state tolerated their existence as long as
they withdrew from making democratic claims. Such state-NGO relationships constituted what
Spires (2012) called “contingent symbiosis.” Contingent symbiosis suggests a mutual need and
suspicious relationship among the state and nonprofit players. Both players in the field
recognized the existence of each other but they had limited engagements because state actors had
no prior experiences to regulate the State Avoidance Autonomous field.
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Since the Year of Civil Society in 2008, the state’s relationships with the two fields have
profoundly changed. State actors from central to local governments had a greater incentive to
engage with the NGOs. Within the State Strategic Action field, the central government began to
realize the power of those autonomous NGOs in disaster relief and its potential for social service
provision. In addition, the central government also wanted to capture the ever-growing private
philanthropic fund. The central government began to draft new laws and regulations to manage
this newly configured field. At the local levels, provincial governments in places like Guangzhou
and Shanghai, since they had prior experiences interacting with NGOs, started to pilot local
experiments on the governing of NGOs. Guangdong province became the first province that
implemented reforms for the governance and registration of NGOs (China Law Monitor 2014).
Following Guangdong, Shanghai began social reforms of the governance of NGOs in 2009. The
relaxation of local policies in the post-2008 period unleashed the potential for NGO growth.
On the surface, the 2008 earthquake seemed to signal a political opportunity with the
state allowing NGOs more space. Nonetheless, the event had a paradoxically and unintended
effect on the state’s orientation toward the emerging nonprofit field. The state facilitated the
expansion of the nonprofit sector through a range of activities including aggressive sponsorship
of incumbents through passive certifications. The State Alliance Market field became a more
desirable form because of the hierarchical nature of the field. The state retained its control over
the State Alliance Market field by controlling resources and using competition to encourage
organizations that are services oriented over those that do advocacy work. It was also less costly
to monitor the State Alliance Market field than the State Avoidance Autonomous field where the
state had to place a large number of official controllers from the state security apparatus to
oversee the activities of the field. As an expert on the nonprofit field in China, Sidel (2018)
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argues that the Chinese State wanted to “mold” civil society into a form that serves the Party’s
domination.
Nonprofit players all of the sudden found themselves involuntarily drawn into
engagement with the state, facing what I called the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma, which
primarily involves state players and NGOs. The State Avoidance Risk Dilemma is a prudent
choice of risk during their engagement with the state actors: what level of risk will players be
willing to tolerate (Jasper 2006)? Inevitably, NGOs in China came to interact with the state in
different arenas and had to negotiate with multiple levels of state actors for legitimacy, power,
and resources for survival and prosperity. According to Fligstein and McAdam (2012), the state
in itself is a system of strategic action fields that has a unique advantage of ratifying and defining
the rules of public strategic action in a given geographic territory. More important, state actors
can enforce these rules through the use of physical violence. I argue that State Strategic Action in
the Chinese context goes beyond administrative bureaucracies, legislatures, and police forces.
The state actors comprise a wide web of individual players who occupy positions in state fields
such as universities and social organizations with government backing. All state actors are tied
together by a set of rules and norms in an incomplete way, and they have arbitrary power to
influence non-state actor alone or collectively. From the perspective of NGOs, the individual
players represent the state, and NGOs have to strategically engage with them. NGOs cannot
operate autonomously because the organizations are embedded in a broader field environment
with numerous connections and dependence on the State Strategic Action field – the same holds
true in the context of the United States. Yet the arbitrary use of power by individual state players
posed the most significant risks, and opportunities, for NGOs.
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Some players in the nonprofit fields were happy to see the involvement of a wider range
of state actors because that suggested more resources and legitimacy; others were concerned with
the autonomy of the field that had taken years to establish. The potential tradeoffs from working
with the state were obvious in the Chinese context for many practitioners. The propensity for
NGOs to create a parallel field of the state ran against the state’s fundamental logic of control
and security, which posed a potential threat to the survival of the organizations and the personal
safety of members of the team. Regardless of the content and activities of the organizations, the
state rarely tolerated autonomous organization outside of the Party. The alternative choice,
aligning with the state mission and working within the state system, meant resources and
legitimacy to continue to operate, but the dependence on government funding also provided
greater opportunities for the state to control and co-opt organizations, which may contravene the
ethical commitments of the nonprofit organizations. Even though some NGOs were happy when
co-optation secured resources, their alliances with the state might change due to government staff
turnover.
For most NGOs, interacting with state actors was daily business that they had to manage,
but boundary issues arose. How much political risk could NGOs tolerate to stay autonomous?
How could NGOs avoid or limit the intervention of state actors in their organizational work? In
an interview with a leader of a disability NGO with governmental contracts, she said, “dealing
with the government is like having a relationship with a gangster” (Liumang 流氓).22 For
nonprofit players, the “relationship” with state actors is like an arranged marriage, but how the
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Interview conducted on July 15, 2016 in Guangzhou
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relationship unfolds depends on a myriad of factors, including the social skills of actors in both
parties and the broader field environment.
The following figure depicts relations with state actors and their implications for
organizational autonomy and levels of political risk. To achieve an optimal outcome, NGOs
should not avoid engagement with the state but should learn to keep a healthy distance with the
state (See Figure 3.1). The further the organization tries to pull itself away from the state, the
more vulnerable the organization may become. The distance from the state measured in the
intensity of interactions and personal connections with state actors is closely associated with
political risk and autonomy. Sometimes NGOs reduce political risk at the expense of their
organizational autonomy. Such relationships with state actors also subject them to crises that
may quickly dissolve their relationships.
Figure 4.1. The Distance from the State, Autonomy, and Risk
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Building a Coalition Field in Guangzhou versus a Hierarchical Field in Shanghai
In the case of Guangzhou, the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma became more evident for
CSC after 2008. CSC had successfully run capacity-building programs for almost three years. It
gathered public support and the organization itself grew from a three-person team in 2005 into an
organization with almost 20 full-time staff in 2009. CSC’s original office inside Prof. Shu’s
school used to be the gathering place for early practitioners in the field, and the number of the
office 520 became a symbolic collective memory for many of my interviewees.23 The
organization also reflected the dominant form of organization in the State Avoidance
Autonomous field that CSC helped to nourish. Using SAFs, CSC was the incumbent and the
model to follow by members in the field. By 2009, CSC became a centralized organization with
four core areas of focus under the leadership of Professor Shu, who was one of the organization’s
original founders. These four core areas encompassed four different functional platforms that
catered to different NGO needs: an NGO capacity-building platform, a social innovation
platform, a financial support platform, and a research platform. The capacity-building platform
included a leadership-training program. Those functions served to nourish the development of
the nonprofit sector and civil society in Southern China. The platform became the predecessor of
the Guangzhou Civil Society Center (GCSC), where I conducted my ethnography in 2016. The
social innovation platform included an incubator program, a magazine, a drama troupe, and a coworking space and library. The incubator program merged with the library, which was dedicated
to promoting public engagement and social responsibility among university students. The drama
troupe, working on public engagement through arts, also independently registered as a separate
entity. Some staff members saw the drama troupe as an organization that was incubated by CSC
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The number of the office is made up to protect the identity of the organization.
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rather than a spin-off organization. The financial support platform provided small grants to startup NGOs and established NGOs during a period of transition.
Starting in 2009 and over the course of three years, CSC began to split into a starfish-like
organization (See Figure 4.2). In the Western management world, Bradfman and Beckstrom
(2006) have labeled these types of organizations which utilize decentralized networking
“starfish” organizations. When a starfish loses most of its body, the starfish can regenerate itself
from a single amputated leg. A similar innovative approach has been widely applied in the
Internet business world as a way to respond to major players in an established field, such as in
the recording industry. Following the “starfish” model in the management world, each platform
of the CSC registered with MoCA independently and with a new leader. Most of the leaders
were former staff members of CSC. Professor Shu was no longer the head of all the
organizations. In the original design, spin-off organizations maintained close contact with each
other, forming an alliance that carried on the original mission of the organization. The financial
support platform was the first organization that went independent.
Figure 4.2. CSC’s Decentralization
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When I asked Professor Shu, about decentralization in his office, he offered a long list of
explanations24.
I had this idea that I could apply the (cluster) theory to the proliferation of civil society.
By bringing NGOs together through capacity-training programs and small funding
programs, we could build trust, networks, and collective action as well as reduce
transaction costs among those groups. We wanted to scale up the totality of NGOs from
this sector. That is why we [CSC] used to have an open office (similar to WeWork) for
all the grassroots NGOs working in this area."25
In his vision, civil society supposedly was composed of many small grassroots
organizations forming various networks that supported each other. They resembled an industrial
cluster. This vision of a future society provided shared meaning and collective identities to
induce cooperation from members in the field. Using SAFs, the State Avoidance Autonomous
field was in fact a collaborative coalition field. While Professor Shu was not the first person to
see civil society as the concept that originated in Western democratic countries, most
interviewees agreed that CSC had disseminated the concept and made it a collective identity for
practitioners. CSC was the incumbent of the field at that time, and it “fashion[ed] an informal
agreement to share the field” (Flgistein and McAdam 2012: 15). The making of incumbent in an
emerging field relied on many factors. Beside material rewards, actors’ social skills for fostering
a new cultural frame and identity to mobilize people and resources is an important factor.
Professor Shu possessed a set of entrepreneurial social skills to induce cooperation from
people of different backgrounds and forged a shared meaning and collective identities among his
followers using his scholarly knowledge. Professor Shu was assistant professor at a prestigious
local university in Guangzhou when he and his team launched the CSC in early 2000. He had
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Interview with Prof. Shu on January 07, 2017. Guangzhou
Interview with Professor Shu, January 07, 2017. Guangzhou
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overseas education and domestic working experience as a researcher on the economic
development of the Pearl River Delta in the Guangdong. His rich experiences allowed him to
translate the foreign concept of civil society and localize it to make it accessible for people who
had no prior experience with NGOs. Co-workers perceived Professor Shu as a social movement
leader rather than a scholar. More precisely speaking, Professor Shu was a scholarly
entrepreneur. He was bold, knowledgeable, and adventurous. “I would be lying to you if I said
we had a plan to decentralize right at the beginning. We learn by doing.” Professor Shu came up
with three major guiding theories that directed the development of the organizations over
decades of his working experiences: grounded community development theory (扎根社区),
cluster theory (集群理论), and civil society theory (公民社会). His ability to translate the
academic theories into local knowledge and to frame the issues gave him a lot of credibility to
persuade others. The localized strategy, integrating host country cultural and political factors, is
an important social skill to have for people who introduce a Western concept into a non-Western
society. Over the course of a decade, Professor Shu attracted a devoted crew of members to the
organization, including human rights lawyers and a philanthropist who was the descendant of a
prominent Communist official. Kevin,26 who is now a postdoctoral student in the US but had
worked with Professor Shu during his undergraduate study, commented: “he is an excellent
entrepreneur…he has created many organizations.”
Similarly, EP’s founder, Mr. Yang Gang, who came from a business background, also
possessed a set of entrepreneurial social skills like Professor Shu. He is skillful in framing issues
and persuading people. He founded a private company and later served as a chief editor for a
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Interview with Kevin, November 16, 2017. Grand Rapid, US.
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quasi-government press. Even though Mr. Yang might lack scholarly claims, he knew how to
draw on his cross-sector experiences to reframe issue. Mr. Yang created a rich network and set of
experiences working in three different fields including the state, the market, and the nonprofit
sector. One of Mr. Yang's formal staff members said, “Mr. Yang came from a public relations
background. He knew how to maneuver different systems”27. Mr. Yang saw the emergence of
the new nonprofit sector in China as a market rather than civil society different from government
and the private sector. Mr. Yang positioned EP as a supplier of demand unmet by the state and
market. Thus Mr. Yang framed the issue differently. In an open letter to recruit staff in 2006, Mr.
Yang said:
In the nonprofit field, most people agree on one thing. That is, NPOs [nonprofit
organizations] were born out of a mission. Therefore, many people who have chosen this
career or even volunteers have some kind of saintly enthusiasm and a sense of mission.
However, many Chinese NGOs’ missions are too general to be useful, for example, the
statement of “for the sake of all humanity.” When you are still struggling to make ends
meet in an impoverished area of China, how could you care for people in Africa and
Latin America? It is not criticism for people who have ideas above one’s station, but a
criticism towards those who ignore the real demands of their surrounding environment
(Mr. Yang 2006: para. 2).
The letter aimed to address the issue of the shortage of NGOs and lack of professionalism
in the sector during the early 2000s when the sector just emerged. Instead of promoting civil
society, Mr. Yang advocated for a new NGO movement that would learn from the mature
business sector to scale up the quantity and quality of NGOs, which in his opinion was a new
pathway to the development of the nonprofit sector in China. Social enterprises would be the
main change agents for this new NGO movement. Using the ideal type of SAFs, what Mr. Yang
advocating was in fact a hierarchical field based on market competition.
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Interview with Wei, June 14th, 2017. Shanghai.
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As a result, EP grew into a classic “spider-type” centralized organization by 2012. The
spider-type organization typically entails a centralized leadership model as is common in the
business world. EP has its headquarters in Shanghai, a clear division of roles within the
organization, and a hierarchical structure. EP also achieved the same kind of specialization in its
individual factories without completely splitting its central organization up. For example, even
though the Community Resilience Group (CRG), a subsidiary of EP, registered as an
independent entity, Director Yang Gang was still the person legally responsible for the
organization and had control over all the subsidiary locations. Maintaining centralization has
some obvious advantages, such as allowing the organizational leader to have more control over
each unit and the capacity to control the flow of resources. Unlike Mr. Yang Gang, Professor
Shu ceded control to members of the organization.
Figure 4.3. Organizational Structure of EP
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“Government is a Complex System”
Even Professor Shu praised Mr. Yang and his organization for their corporate wisdom.
“They knew how to work with the state,” Professor Shu added. In that regard, Mr. Yang was
pragmatic and chose to work with the state to reduce uncertainty for the organization. To scale
up, partnership with the state was necessary. Mr. Yang’s approach also influenced many
nonprofit actors in Shanghai. Before the establishment of EP in Shanghai, another intermediary
organization called Green Image founded by a graduate from Harvard’s Kennedy School carried
similar services and functions as EP. According to my informal conversation with a professor
who served as a consultant for the organization, Green Image maintained a close relationship
with foreign donors, which upset the Shanghai government. The trust fell apart between the
government and the organization. In contrast, led by Mr. Yang, EP was extremely flexible and
willing to compromise with the demands from the state.
“Shanghai’s NGOs will only do what the government allow them to do,” a former
employee of EP noted in an interview.28 EP thrived after winning a major bid to manage a
community center on behalf of the state. Since then, EP also expanded its nonprofit incubator
after gaining government contracts from different level of governments. EP claimed the program
had incubated more than 400 NGOs, and many of those organizations became flagship
organizations in the nonprofit field. What EP did not reveal, however, was that EP only
nourished a very limited category of NGOs. According to my interview with a formal
government official in another city who purchased EP’s incubator services, “EP openly
acknowledged that there are two types of organizations that EP would not incubate: first one is

28

Interview with a formal employee of EP, June 14, 2017

91

advocacy organization and the other one is religious organization.” 29 Thus, the absence of active
advocacy organizations in Shanghai can be partly attributed to a lack of incentives from EP to
nourish them. In the early 2000s, the Shanghai government also facilitated the expansion of the
State Alliance Market field by discouraging NGOs from accepting international funding but
encouraging, instead, governmental contracts and competitions among peers. Thus, the early
intervention of the Shanghai government and key players such as EP collectively led to the
emergence of a hierarchical field based on coercion and competition.
In contrast, Professor Shu held on to his image of civil society as a large network of small
grassroots organizations. CSC did not want to become the sector incumbent. Rather, Shu
envisioned CSC would be only one of many nodes in the network of civil society. “Didn’t I
already make it clear? We imagine civil society to be a network of small and weak grassroots
organizations. Those small and weak grassroots organizations can equally connect with each
other. This is our value.” Shu re-emphasized his political view:
Don’t try to mess with it [the government]. You had better not do it. We would not
actively look for a government partnership. We didn’t even bother for the government
social contact.”
Active distance did not imply no exchange with state actors. To exert influence on policy
in China, the organization had to engage with the state. The boundary between the civil society
and social market approach was never clear cut. Instead of resource dependence on the
government like their counterpart EP, CSC had middlemen that helped the organization navigate
the red line set by the state. One of the co-founders of CSC, who was the descendant of a
prominent Communist official and a middleman connecting CSC with the government, had
connections with various state actors such as the university system and the Ministry of Civil
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Affairs. The middleman served as an important resource for the two parties to communicate with
each other and more important, helped the organization survive the crisis, which I will discuss in
the following program.
In short, the state avoidance approach did not mean CSC completely gave up the
opportunity to work with open-minded state actors. In fact, since 2012, the relationship between
CSC and MoCA in Guangzhou warmed up when Professor Shu taught a public administration
class at his local university. It was also a period where the local state began reform under the
leadership of Wang Yang. Many government officials began to educate themselves about NGOs
by attending weekend class and training. One of his students, who occupied a high official
position in MoCA, later became his supporter. With the help from this high-level government
official, Shu registered the School of Philanthropy as an independent organization. Therefore, it
is simplistic to categorize organizations based on the relationship between organizations and a
single supposedly unified state. The state, a complex web of actors, occupied a position within
the State Strategic Action field. As Professor Shu put it:
“Government is a complex system. Related administrative bureaucracies, schools,
university all are representative of the state. Each actor is independent.”
Generally speaking, Professor Shu’s connections with local state actors were fewer and
weaker than Mr. Yang’s in Shanghai. What Professor Shu wanted was a parallel system that had
a greater chance of violating the state’s control over everyday life. For the state, the existence of
those autonomous organizations was a threat to national security. Thus, it was also hard for CSC
to form a strong partnership with the state if CSC held on to its civil society goal, even though
CSC had a middleman that helped it engage with the state. In contrast, Mr. Yang knew what the
state needed, and what EP did helped solve the state’s problem. The organizations depended on
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the state for survival, which gave the state strong control over the organizations and the sector as
a whole. Mr. Yang had a strong alliance with the former director of the Ministry of Civil Affairs
at the municipal level. In fact, the director invited Mr. Yang to Shanghai to start the NGO. The
state facilitated the success of EP and, more important, allowed the growth of EP as an
incumbent in a hierarchical field subordinated to the state.
Fligstein and McAdam (2012) highlighted social skill as “the ability to induce
cooperation by appealing to and helping to create shared meanings and collective identities” (p
46), which involves a set of actions to interpret the situation and frame the course of action.
Mobilizing people, however, is only the beginning part of the emergence of a field; how to
sustain and maintain the field requires more than the superior capacity to constantly provide
meanings to members in the group, but also dealing with “ambiguities and uncertainties of the
field and work off of them” (p 51). Fligstein and McAdam (2012), however, did not explicitly
discuss how to understand the ambiguities and uncertainties especially in a contingent
environment. I argue that incumbents in such a field have to constantly calculate risk and even
take a leading role in managing relationships with different actors in or at the proximate field to
diversify risk. For example, in face of the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma, actors constantly need
to consider the political risk. Risk management requires the social skill actor to have a realistic
and long-term projection of organizational goals and a careful read of the environment. Actors
employing social skills in a contingent environment actively balance the amount of risk they are
willing to take with their objective goals. Furthermore, the amount of risk that social skill actors
can take is associated with their ability to create a safety net of support. Among a network of
alliances, a solid relationship with the state tends to outweigh other kinds of relationship. The
development of the State Avoidance Autonomous field is a paradox. Professor Shu saw that the
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more an organization grew, the greater the uncertainty of the future of the organization, which I
call the paradox of the incumbent. The management of risk requires a proactive anticipation of
crisis as well as management of risk during and after the crisis. Therefore, diversifying risk is a
central theme that leaders of organizations always have to consider.
Organizational Level: Organizational Goals, Values, and Structure
Popular narratives about the success of a business or a social movement tend to narrowly
focus on leaders and often stop their analysis at leadership. Beyond that, however, social skill
actors are constrained in their embedded environment, which limits the array of strategies one
can pursue to attain goals. Considering organization as a small field, the leader is only a member
of the organization, albeit occupying a very significant role. The structure, goal, value, and
capacity of the organization affect the kind of strategies organizations pursue.
CSC was a coalition field in SAFs’ terminology. Internally, CSC was organized relatively
democratically, and each platform had a vice director that was in charge of special issues.
According to interviews with former staff members of CSC, Shu provided the framework for
members of the team to come together, but he was not involved much in the internal
management of the organization. His work focused more on setting the agenda, cultivating
relationships with alliances, and recruiting capable members to join the team. Even though he
introduced the decentralization idea, the team collectively discussed the issue at the board
meeting and came to a final agreement on executing the agenda. The decentralization strategy
also required a lot of faith and produced pressure on the team members. Each vice director
needed to run the organization independently. Professor Shu could not be the person legally
responsible for more than one organization. The relatively democratic internal structure of the
organization and the organization’s store of talent in the early period also made the
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decentralization strategies feasible and appealing. In particular, people were bound together by
the same set of civil society values and identity, which provided “existential” meaning to
members in the organization.
Compared to CSC, EP existed in a classic hierarchical field. Some staff members came to
work at EP to be part of the “new NGO movement” advocated by the leader, and some were
there only for the salaries. Due to close alliances with the Shanghai government, EP avoided the
use of politically sensitive language and Western socio-political theory, especially civil society
theory. Instead, the organization tended to use vague language like social innovation or change to
mobilize team members. It was never clear to people, however, what social innovation really
meant since the organization de-emphasized civil society values. Ms. Ting, who was the vice
director of EP and had worked with Mr. Yang for a decade, viewed Mr. Yang’s leadership style
as more authoritarian than democratic. Ms. Ting often expressed concern about the hierarchical
power structure of the organization and saw it as the problem that prevented the growth of the
organization. During my summer interning at EP, I attended a meeting about mobilizing
grassroots organizations to participate in the annual online fundraising event with senior
managers and Professor Shu. After the meeting, the business development team to which I
belonged received a task of recruiting 50 NGOs within six weeks without any prior experience in
online fundraising. Being someone who had gone through the process last year in Guangzhou, I
expressed my concern and questioned the feasibility of carrying out the task.
I asked my direct boss Mr. Xiang, “why 50?”
Mr. Xiang patted my shoulder and smiled, “because our big boss (Mr. Yang) said so.”
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No one really challenged the leader’s decision. Yet I did not see Mr. Yang purposely
discourage challengers; rather the situation followed the pattern and norm and was accepted by
team members.
I also interviewed the vice director of CRG, who registered independently with MoCA in
Shanghai, and asked about the autonomy of the organization. The vice director told me that the
group had a certain degree of autonomy, but in the end CRG answered the call from EP
headquarters. The development of a hierarchical field in fact undermined the meaning of work
for many members in the organization. It was an unspoken taboo to talk about the high turnover
rate in EP staff. In my first meeting with Ms. Ting and her assistant Wei at a coffee shop,
however, Ms. Ting was very candid about the high turnover rate of the organization. Compared
to a 27 percent average annual turnover in the field, the number was considered high. After
meeting on a separate occasion when Wei and I were at EP’s headquarter office, Wei secretly
brought up the topic of high turnover rate with me again, citing the number could be a lot higher.
I first came to the headquarter half a year ago. I met some good friends here who could
join me for lunch. Look, only one people is left and the rest have gone (approximately 5).
This one person just handed in her resignation letter.
Wei also expressed her desire to leave the organization. In fact, she had already applied other
jobs by the end of my internship at EP.
For many staff members, the hierarchical structure of the organization and the business
approach drained meaning from much of their work in the organization. Based on my
observations, most staff members came to work in the nonprofit driven by the desire to help
others. People like Wei in fact quit high paying jobs in the private sector because of
competitiveness and lack of meaning in their jobs. However, having an organization resemble
the hierarchical structure of private enterprise instantly crushed many of the staff members’
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image of nonprofit work. In addition, due to the limited resources compared to private sector,
nonprofit staffs often received lower pay and work longer hours. Thus, the disadvantage of the
hierarchical field was amplified by a lack of commitment from members. A coalition field
organized around collective meanings, such as at CSC, was more likely to retain staff.
The coalition field also had its own set of problems. Sustaining a coalition field, much
like a political coalition, is a tricky task that requires continuous effect to hold the coalition
together. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) do not clearly define the kind of social skills required for
such sustainable action, but a hybrid form of hierarchy may be needed to sustain people’s
passion and deliver work on time, as Chen (2009) argues in her study of the major art festival,
Burning Man. Besides the social skills of fostering a collective identity and interest, the social
skill to manage internal conflicts among group members is equally important, although neglected
in the theory of fields. For example, Shu’s lack of internal management led to conflicts among
the group of idealists. Unlike Mr. Yang who came from a business background and managed the
group as if it were in a corporation, the division of work within CSC was fluid and sometimes
unclear. To comply with school regulations and laws, administrative staff needed to put limits on
how the programs could run. Those limits conflicted with program designers’ own visions. The
lack of a professional division of labor created tensions among the different departments within
the CSC system. The absent of a leader who had executive power to mediate and channel
internal conflicts made CSC system more vulnerable to the uncertainly of the environment. The
external crisis could quickly dissolve the organization. Thus, in anticipating such challenges, I
argue that a combination of internal and external factors encouraged CSC to decentralize the
organization.
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The Initial Configuration of the Fields
As an incumbent, CSC played a large role in creating a coalition field – State Avoidance
Autonomous field – either through conscious decisions or through setting themselves up as a role
model for other members in the field. Though, as Fligstein and McAdam (2012) predicted, the
emergence of a new field usually involves more than one actor. An emerging field is “a socially
constructed arena occupied by two or more groups whose actions are oriented to each other but
who have yet to develop a stable order that effectively routinizes field relations” (Fligstein and
McAdam 2018). In the case of the emergence of a State Avoidance Autonomous field in
Guangzhou, initial players included domestic grassroots organizations like CSC and international
donors who provided the material base to sustain this field in the early period before the rise of
the governmental contracting age. Equally important, local governments tolerated the interaction
of grassroots NGOs and international donors in those years. In a casual conversation with Mr.
Qin, the director of GCSC, he said, “they (international donors) also do not want to give all the
money to one organization.” International players shared a vision of creating a coalition field
through the distribution of resources. In what amounted to a joint effort, a more horizontally
organized field emerged in Guangzhou with the acquiescence of the state. CSC also exhibited a
different kind of relationship with its peers. Even though organizations still competed for the
same pool of resources, the absent of one dominant group invited more collaboration and
exchange among the small organizations. Such a community of NGOs bonded with the same set
of values, rules, and norms; they helped each other with activities and resources. Such collective
behaviors local practitioners in the State Avoidance Autonomous field called it “grassroots
bonding.” The grassroots bonding was collective behavior in response to state repression and
limited funding source in Guangzhou in the early years.
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In contrast, the state was heavily involved in the emergence of the State Alliance Market
field in Shanghai. The director of the Ministry of Civil Affairs in a special administrative zone in
Shanghai invited Mr. Yang to start a new organization in Shanghai when the state actor saw the
need for social services. In the early 2000s, Shanghai experienced rapid economic development
with an annual GDP growth of 12% over a decade—occasionally it rose to 30%. Social problems
such as income inequality, land disputes, and protests, however, also escalated. Petitions against
local cadres (known as letters and calls; xingfang in Mandarin) surged, so did government
funding for social stability. The Chinese government had been using the logic of market
exchange to buy off protestors and absorb popular protests, commonly known as buying stability
(Lee and Zhang 2013), but buying stability still did not solve the problems that accompanied
rapid growth, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs began to introduce social organizations as
mediators to prevent and resolve social conflicts at the community level. Shanghai’s municipal
government had begun to facilitate the configuration of Shanghai’s nonprofit sector when there
was only a few NGOs operating in Shanghai.
The early version of CSC started in Shanghai, but the Shanghai government forced the
organization to migrate to Guangzhou seeking more freedom. The state allowed EP to seek
international funding during its first year in Shanghai. After the initial years, however, the local
Shanghai government began to warn EP and other NGOs not to take any more international
funding. Meanwhile, the local government began to provide alternative resources for those
organizations through government contracts and venture capital competitions for start-up NGOs.
Thus, the state encouraged more competition among the peers in the State Alliance Market field.
By limiting the input of international funding and concentrating government resources, the
Shanghai government facilitated the formation of a top-down and competition-oriented nonprofit
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field. On one hand, the state used EP’s incubator program to proliferate the sector, and EP
benefited from government resources. On the other hand, the constrained environment also
forced EP to secure more funding just to survive.
As a result, a hierarchical field—the State Alliance Market field —emerged in Shanghai.
The field prioritized business values, such as applying the logic of the market to guide
organizational strategies, over ethical commitments that were the center of the State Avoidance
Autonomous field. The conglomeration of EP into the biggest NGO in China is not such a
surprise given the hierarchical nature of the field. Becoming the incumbent in the field gave EP a
more strategic position in resource acquisition than its competitors. The State Alliance Social
Market field was subordinated to the State Strategic Action field due to a high level of
dependence on government resources.
The Incumbent Disadvantage
An old Chinese adage says, “Destruction pursues the greatest.” It echoes the famous
quote from Ovid about the disadvantage of being an incumbent in any given field: “Envy assails
the noblest; the winds howl around the highest peaks.” Conventional wisdom alludes to the
potential downsides of being a major player in a field. The Sichuan earthquake became the
public stage upon which CSC demonstrated its capacity for mobilization, collective action, and
worth, but such a reputation can also attract unwanted suspicion from the state.
According to Fligstein and McAdam, any given field is embedded in a complex
interrelationship with other fields through shared ties. Such myriad ties inform the strategic
actions taken by actors in the field. This powerful and ever-changing set of relations influences
the stability of any given field. Although CSC seemed to have successfully incubated the State
Avoidance Autonomous field, the field was embedded in a broader field environment that
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comprised many other strategic action fields. As the field expanded, the interdependency
between the State Avoidance Autonomous field and the State Strategic Action field increased.
Potential players outside of the State Avoidance Autonomous field began to engage with players
inside the field. A player like CSC was forced to engage with the state. The state, as an actor
with its own set of interests, might impose rules and norms on its interactions with CSC. For
example, the local government in Guangzhou wanted to incorporate CSC as an extension of the
government, just as the local government in Shanghai did with EP.
When I interviewed CSC’s founder and staff members regarding the reasons behind the
decentralization of the organization, they revealed the state’s role as the behind-the-scenes
reason. My informants always started answering the questions with organizational goals that
were tied to the broader mission of civil society. When I kept asking, however, they would
finally reveal the true rationale behind the decentralization. For example, a former CSC staff
member finally admitted at the end of my interview, “Of course for a political reason: safety. If
one was clamped down upon, the rest can still survive” (Interview with Zhou, November 16,
2017). The other informant Cheng said it more explicitly, “we don’t want to die together”
(Interview with Cheng, January 07, 2017). As the founder, Shu gave a more thorough
explanation: “On one hand, we are inspired by cluster theory. On the other hand, being a highprofile figure in China is very dangerous. The moment you succeed also suggests the moment
you are going to fail" (Interview with Professor Shu, January 07, 2017).
The sense of insecurity and unpredictability further convinced the leader of CSC to
decentralize the organization. The decentralization strategy is an outcome of an internalization of
the existential contingency of the State Avoidance Autonomous field and the State Strategic
Action field. CSC has lived through the contingency of the environment given an extensive
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experience dealing with different state actors, particularly the branch of the state security
department known as “panda.” Later, panda became the secret term that practitioners used to
refer to this particular group of state actors. CSC’s predecessor was Green Roots (GR), the first
grassroots NGO that appeared in Shanghai, in 2003. Later, the organization had to relocate from
Shanghai to Guangzhou due to the Shanghai government’s pressure to close the organization.
Guangzhou’s environment was relatively friendly at that time, and GR found a host research
institution at a local university. Nonetheless, GR was forced to close again in 2006 by the
university under pressure from the state. The organization survived with the help of an
international foundation and mediator, and it was reborn as CSC. Starting in 2005, the
organization began publishing a magazine with considerable influence on forging collective
identity and a shared understanding of the rules and norms of the field. Nonetheless, the
magazine was discontinued after three years, again due to state pressure.
My informant who has had encounters with state actors said, “our government naturally
opposes the freedom of association. If you do not belong to its system, the government
automatically activates its preventive measures against you.”30 The aforementioned incidents
raise a red flag about how much tolerance the Chinese state has towards the growth of potential
oppositional forces that have different ideologies than the Communist Party. When an
organization grows through dedicated followers, the rise of the autonomous field becomes a
threat to the state. The state is likely to try to handpick the leading organization. Therefore, such
an organization needs to be proactive in risk reduction, especially when the organization’s work
is deemed as “politically sensitive” in the eyes of the state.
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Compared to CSC, EP’s size was not a threat to the state. First, EP’s organizational value
and mission aligned with that of the government. The State Avoidance Autonomous field
stresses the value civil society associates with democratic claims. In contrast, EP has openly
discredited civil society terms and emphasized professionalism as the key to bringing social
change to China. Therefore, Mr. Yang called for a realistic approach to address Chinese social
problems. He argued that instead of emphasizing vague missions and visions, Chinese NGOs
should meet the unfulfilled demand left by the reconstruction of social welfare in China. By
downplaying the missions and values of NPOs, EP could refrain from making democratic and
civil society claims. EP also branded itself as a new type of NGO, which governments trusted.
The political correctness of EP won the trust of the Chinese government.
Second, EP’s work revolves around social service provisions. EP’s first project with the
Shanghai government was a government contract for a community center in a resettlement
neighborhood. The Shanghai municipal government had resettled around 18,000 residents and
270 enterprises in preparation for the 2010 Expo. Residents were relocated to Sanlin and Pujiang
Expo gardens on the outskirts of the city. According to personal conversations with the staff that
used to work at the community center, the government built the community center to demobilize
residents from protesting against the state. The resettlement project caused widespread
grievances among residents over land use and property rights.
“The government used to run the center, but it was terrible because local residents
distrusted the government and wasted resources. Thus, EP became a perfect candidate because it
was a grassroots organization and therefore it was more respected by local residents,” my
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informant said.31 Governments in general need organizations like EP as a third party to stabilize
society. EP had a unique edge in helping the state to manage and prevent social unrest. Since
then, millions of renminbi (RMB) in government funds started to pour into EP. When I
interviewed Mr. Yang in 2017, he admitted, “the community center was a turning point for EP.”
Since then, EP has incorporated a community resilience group as a new department of EP. Due
to frequent interactions with the government, EP learned that the government needed a third
party for program evaluations of governmental social contracts. To meet this new demand, EP
established a philanthropic counseling group for the government. The collaboration between the
government and EP has taken many different forms, and EP has been skillful in seizing new
opportunities to deepen the collaboration.
One of my informants, Chang, concluded, “in general, what EP has done is to tailor itself
to the government’s needs. Thus, our governments like EP and welcome it. EP enjoys
government resources that are inaccessible to many other grassroots organizations. For other
organizations, our governments still maintain a distance and suspicion. I think that is the
uniqueness of EP.”32 The growth of EP in turn has helped legitimize the state.
Variation in Decentralization Strategies
To what extent did decentralization strategies reflect the uncertain institutional
environment? My study shows that decentralization strategies have diffused across the State
Avoidance Autonomous field. I interviewed at 18 different organizations besides CSC and EP. I
found three more organizations that also adopted a similar approach as CSC: One Plus One
Group, MT Foundation, and the Southern Migrant Worker Center (SFB). MT Foundation was
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the first grassroots organization that managed to register as a private foundation in Guangdong.
The Southern Migrant Worker Center was a labor rights organization. In the spectrum of
politically sensitive organizations, MT Foundation stood at the safe end because the organization
was working on rural education. In contrast, the Southern Migrant Worker Center stood at the
other end as labor rights were highly political, a sensitive subject for the Communist Party. MT
Foundation had over 10,000 active volunteers with an annual budget of 10 million RMB from
2015 to 2016. When I interviewed Mr. Mo, the founder of MT Foundation, I asked how they had
managed to grow so fast over the previous 10 years from a one-person NGO to a giant33. Mo said
the organization had accelerated growth after it officially registered as a private foundation in
Guangdong with the help of CSC. MT Foundation differs from CSC in many ways. Mo noted:
“We have three bottom lines. We don’t talk about politics; we don’t talk about marketization of
the organization; we don’t accept cash donations.”
The first bottom line, politics, reflected MT Foundation's and many other organizations’
relationship with the state from the perspective of the State Avoidance Autonomous field. It has
not taken a single penny from the government. Although many quasi-governmental foundations
and organizations wanted to work with MT Foundation, the organization decided to keep its
distance from the government. “We don’t purposely avoid the government. We just think we can
solve problems ourselves without choosing that path [of working with the government],” Mo told
me during our interview. MT Foundation relied on 100 percent private donations from the
public. Unlike CSC, which had a clear mission to advocate for the concept of civil society, MT
Foundation refrained from making democratic claims.
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Although MT Foundation avoided the direct use of the language of civil society and
refrained from engaging in political discourse, the core value of the organization still aligned
with the values of civil society. MT Foundation was careful not to “cross the red line.” However,
as the organization kept expanding, MT foundation also confronted the same State Avoidance
Risk Dilemma.
Over the past decade, MT Foundation has accumulated over 78 different local branches
and more than 10,000 active volunteers. Yet the headquarters of MT Foundation is in Guangzhou
and had only 11 full-time staff, in 2016. I immediately questioned how the organization’s
headquarter office managed to oversee such a big group of people. To my great surprise, Mo
answered:
We don’t. We have encouraged our local branch to go independent. Now we have Foshan
MT, Kunming MT, Zhengjiang MT, and so on. Those local branches registered with their
local Ministry of Civil Affairs. That means they have an independent legal person, a
financial system, and an identity. However, they share our collective brand of MT and
call themselves X city + MT. By doing so, those local branches make the same
commitments to our shared values and missions.
I call the approach the franchise decentralization strategy. For a typical franchise,
independent businessmen need to pay a management fee up front to join the group. Mo insisted,
however, that they were not a franchise because all the newly established franchising branches
belonged to MT Foundation in the first place. It was the headquarters of MT Foundation that had
been pushing those internal units out of the major organizational structure. He noted that there
were several rationales behind the franchise decentralization strategy.
First, independently registered local branches can tap into more local resources. The
existing fragmented system makes local governments compete with each other, and each
geographic unit is a relatively closed system. Thus, the boundary and the limited freedom of
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NGOs to operate across those geographic units make it difficult for NGOs who register in City A
to work in City B. Blue Letter, another grassroots organization working on rural education, faced
the same challenges when they wanted to expand their operations to different provinces. Despite
that many rural governments have an incentive to work with MT Foundation, they might still
refuse to give resources and favorable policies to the Foundation. The reason is simple: local
officials cannot claim credit or overcome the bureaucratic procedures to fund an organization
that registers outside of their territory. Second, independence makes each unit stronger. Mr. Mo
explained, “if our branches have independently registered, local volunteers and staff would
seriously consider the survival problem for the organization. In that way, we can push those
branches to grow faster.” Then, Mo smiled at me and asked me what the last factor of the
franchise decentralization strategy would be. “Of course, there is an even deeper rationale behind
all these. Do you know what it is?” I shook my head, and he added:
When you describe it. You had better describe it in a careful way. In my mind, when we
have dozens of independently registered branches, we become more resilient. If we keep
our existing management model, there is a potential risk inherent to the traditional spider
model. When the head is cut off, the rest will die.
In the end, he knew that such a decentralized approach, in which the headquarters team
no longer has complete control over branch organizations, increased the risk of managing the
brand. Still, Mr. Mo believed that the trade-off made it worth it because of the uncertain field
environment in which the MT Foundation was operating. He further elaborated:
Organizations like MT Foundation, in fact, are a threat to the government because you
are too big as an organization in the eyes of the government. In addition, you have public
support, unified identity, and a culture. The state would pay extra attention to your
organization. Therefore, [by decentralizing] our organization can be more resilient.
MT Foundation’s franchising decentralization strategy differed from CSC’s because MT
Foundation could still keep its brand, i.e., the collective identity it shared with the public. CSC
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did not, however, have the luxury to do this even though such an approach might have been
appealing to CSC if it had wanted to keep the group unified. The field environment significantly
affects the range of strategic choices that an organization can take. After all, MT Foundation was
working in the area of rural education, which was much less politically sensitive than CSC’s
work. It was different because the ideologies that CSC disseminated directly challenged the
legitimacy of the state. During the liberal governance era local governments tolerated CSC
leading the growth of the field, but CSC was likely to show up in the crosshairs of conservative
forces within the government system when the rotation of leadership occurred. CSC had to act
cautiously to prevent government repression on the whole organization. As a forerunner of civil
society, CSC knew that “people who start the revolution are likely to be the first to fall.”34 CSC
spin-off organizations needed to look, in the eye of an outsider, like a loosely connected network
of organizations rather than a unified group.
CSC’s decentralization strategy is what I call functional decentralization. The
organization split according to its different functions. Unlike MT Foundation, which focused on
one particular area, CSC’s organizations were harder to replicate as a franchise. The Southern
Migrant Worker Center, at the extremely politically sensitive end of the spectrum, adopted the
same approach as CSC. Two former staff members of the organization left and registered a new
organization in a different county of the city. It decentralized into three independently registered
organizations under different names. Thus, within the same field, organizations adopted a
variation on the decentralization strategies depending on the nature of their work and the level of
risk they perceived in their relationship with the state.
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Table 4.1. The Variation of Decentralization Models in Relationship to Perceived Political Risk
Political Risk High

Medium

Low

Functional
Decentralization
Strategy (e.g., CSC)

Franchising
Decentralization
Strategy (e.g., MT
Foundation)

Field
State Avoidance
Autonomous Field

Replicated
Decentralization
Strategy (e.g., SFB)

State Alliance Social
Market Field

Centralization
Strategy (e.g., EP)

The Impact of Decentralization Strategies
How effective are decentralization strategies? What are their outcomes? Organizations
strategize and behave in accordance with their relationship to time and their current context.
Before 2012, CSC enjoyed a short-lived success by proliferating civil society in southern China.
The organizational mission of CSC has always been the incubation of civil society, and it
succeeded to some extent during the four-year post-earthquake period. When the earthquake
occurred in Sichuan on May 12, 2008, CSC quickly mobilized its resources and networks to
respond. On May 23rd and 24th, CSC invited disaster relief experts from Taiwan to provide
training for its network of volunteers and grassroots NGOs. CSC also conducted studies and
evaluation of grassroots NGOs that came to Sichuan for the first time. At that time, many
government officials at the local and higher levels were still unfamiliar with NGO activities and
had no idea how to manage a vast group of volunteers and groups. CSC’s study helped
policymakers to come up with a better social management system for post-disaster
reconstruction. In addition, CSC built an alliance of volunteers and NGOs working in the area to
prevent information asymmetry, increase collaboration, and build trust among the different
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groups working together. By doing so, CSC had the opportunity to reshape the state’s impression
of CSC as a troublemaker. Since then, CSC has had more room to expand its activities and scale
up its operations. Moving beyond its host city in Guangzhou, CSC expanded its training
programs to Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunan, and other provinces. The relationships between
CSC and local governments became warmer and partnerships began to form. CSC has
successfully cultivated its capacity to lobby political actors for more favorable policy towards
NGOs. For example, the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Guangdong province hosted a Charity Law
Legislation Council in Foshan, Guangdong in 2011 and Professor Shu represented CSC at the
meeting. A limit to how big civil society can grow under the authoritarian regime in China
remained. Even though CSC had established relationships with local governments and won their
trust, it was still embedded in a larger field environment where the state had dominant power.
The growth of civil society existed at the mercy of the state.
The 2014 crisis became the test to evaluate decentralization strategies. As discussed in
chapter 3, civil society has become a politically sensitive term since the rise of a conservative
leader. In addition, CSC faced tough suppression from the state. The organization was closed
under pressure from the state. The spinoff organizations also faced official challenges to their
activities. Among them, the Philanthropy School, which used to be an intendent entity, was
permanently shut down. In 2018 when I met again with Shu, his position at the local university
in Guangzhou had been suspended, and he had to leave the city and seek a new position in a
university in the north, thousands of miles away from his beloved city. Luckily, the rest of the
spinoff organizations survived the 2014 crisis. Similarly, the local government in Guangzhou
closed the SFB migrant worker center of CSC, in 2015, during an unprecedented arrest of labor
rights activists. The two smaller organizations that split off from SFB carry on SFB’s mission
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and continue to serve migrant workers in a different way. In such regard, the decentralized
strategy has proven to be effective in the face of state repression.
Conclusion
In this empirical study, I discussed the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma faced by both CSC and
EP during the emergence of the nonprofit sector in the post-2008 era. I started the chapter asking
why CSC in Guangzhou chose to decentralize into smaller organizations instead of scaling up
into an incumbent like its counterpart EP did in Shanghai from 2009 to 2012. The post-2008
period was a critical period in which many nonprofit organizations received favorable treatment
from the state, and civil society flourished like never before. Yet NGOs in the State Avoidance
Autonomous field faced the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma, i.e., engagement with the state
always entailed risk and opportunity. Social skill actors had foreseen that the contingency of
unpleasant encounters with the state lie underneath the prosperity of the sector. The perception of
uncertainty and the internalization of censorship forced CSC leaders to adopt a risk-averse
approach to the development of the organization. I highlighted multiple factors that interactively
shaped the CSC’s decision to decentralize into several organizations. I also showed how such
practices had disseminated into the nonprofit field in Guangzhou as a popular strategy to avoid
potential state suppression.
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Table 4.2. Summary of Multiple Factors Leading to a Decentralized Strategy
Level of
Analysis

Quality

Social Skills

Leaders’ Social Skills

Civil Society Center

Induce Cooperation of Others
Perception of Uncertainty and Risk Taking

Organizational Goals

Incubate Civil Society

Incubate Nonprofit
Sector

Organizational Values

Civil Society
(Qinghuai)

Social Innovation

Internal Structure of
the Organizations

Horizontal

Hierarchical

Organizational
Level Factors
Organizational
Network

International NGOs and
Foundations
Hong Kong-based
Scholars and Activists
Local Enterprises

Field Level
Factors

Different
Fields
Relationship
(Field
Environment)

Excellence Promoter

State Actors
(Quasi-Government
and Government
Agencies)
Transnational
Enterprises
International NGOs and
Foundations

State Avoidance
Autonomous field

State Alliance Social
Market Field

Structure of the Field

Horizontal

Hierarchical

Inter-Organizational
Relationship with Peers

“Grassroots Bonding”

Client

Resource Dependence

International
Communities

Government

The Orientation of the
Field to the State

Parallel

Subordinate

Relationship with the
State

Distant

Close
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Chapter 5 The Market Engagement Dilemma
Introduction
On June 22, 2016, GCSC invited a group of practitioners from different cities and fields
for an informal gathering at its office. About eleven visitors working in the areas of
environmental protection, elderly care, social work, AIDS, etc. attended the meeting. Mr. Qin
wanted to update his peers about a new disablity program (The Tree project) that GCSC was
undertaking. Before the formal presentation, visitors and Mr. Qin began to engage in a heated
debate about the new challenges that NGOs faced in the current phase of development in the
field. Aside from being unsure about how to respond to the deterioration of the insitutional
environment and policy changes (i.e., passage of the new Charity and Overseas NGO laws),
many organizations were also unprepared for another parallel shift in the sector—the
marketization of the nonprofit sector. The new Chairty law, by improving the tax incentives and
making it easier for the wealthy to establish charitable trusts, had invited new entrants to the
field, and some incumbent nonprofit orgnaizations felt dismayed that these newcomers would
challenge the status quo and rewrite the rules and norms of the field.
Mr. Qin raised the question: “what is a social enterprise? I am afraid that we have no
choice. It (becoming social enterprise) is a defenseless response to the new Charity law.
When a different field (i.e., the private sector) crosses over into the field of the nonprofit
sector, some people combine the market with philanthropy; diverse views clash with each
other. Social change! Lack of efficiency and resources! (Those words become
buzzwords.)
Visitor A: Stupid entrepreneurs! They have tried it for more than ten years. It was a total
waste of resources. Now they are coming back to do the same thing. What is the
efficiency of philanthropy? It is not about the end goal but the process.
Visitor B who was more optimistic, said: Some entrepreneurs are looking for change and
transformation too.
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Through conversations among nonprofit organizations, local actors were trying to
comprehend the impact of the exogenous shock resulting from the marketization of the nonprofit
sector. On one hand, marketization refers to a new trend in which nonprofit organizations are
increasingly adopting the approaches and values of the private market (Salamon 1997; 1999;
Eikenberry and Kluver 2004). For example, some nonprofit organizations abandoned their
nonprofit status and transformed themselves into social enterprises. On the other hand, the
marketization of the nonprofit sector also suggested the expansion of the nonprofit sector and the
“invasion” of new for-profit players in the established field (Fligstein and McAdam 2011). I used
the term for-profit players to introduce those new powerful outside actors originating in the
private sector, particularly those from the tech industry, such as Tencent Holdings, and financial
institutions. Only recently were they active players in the nonprofit fields. The involvement of
those new for-profit actors imposed a major challenge, however, to the prevailing settlement and
set of field relations.
The emergence of for-profit players signaled a paradigm shift in Chinese philanthropy,
which started in 2008. As opposed to the “old” philanthropy that focused on traditional
charitable areas such as education and disaster relief, the “new” philanthropy led by a group of
emerging entrepreneur-type players emphasized scaling, professionalism, and measurable social
impact. Those for-profit players in the field started a movement after the 2014 crisis for the
marketization of the nonprofit sector, and the movement has gained momentum since 2015. In
responding to the new movement, I observed the State Avoidance Autonomous field in
Guangzhou as a whole. It collectively tried, starting in 2016, to make sense of the new change
through rounds of debates and discussions among peers, state actors, and others at informal
gatherings and meetings, on social media, in blogs, and at conferences. In an ongoing flow of
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events, some practitioners noticed that the for-profit players had entered the field. Practitioners
started to make sense of private companies’ impact on the field through interactions with private
companies such as participating in online fundraising.
While some saw the change as a threat, others considered it an opportunity. During the
aforementioned meeting, Visitor A called the entrepreneurs “stupid” for their relentless attempt
to shape the nonprofit sector. His emotionally negative remark about the entrepreneurs reflected
practitioners’ doubts and resistance to the new entrants in the field; their objections centered on
whether for-profit players would disturb the field ecosystem that had taken years to establish. I
observed in a separate meeting on June 23, 2016. Professor Yan Ning, a local practitioner and a
public intellectual in the field, traced the origin of the term of “Marketization” and her
interpretation in front of a group of 30 young practitioners at a Culture Salon. Professor Yan
Ning tried to define the situation for her audiences. The State Avoidance Autonomous field
seemed to share a sense of uncertainty/crisis regarding the rules and power relations structuring
the field.
According to Professor Yan, the director of a major foundation in China who coined the
term “marketization” in his widely circulated article Using Marketization of the Nonprofit Sector
to Open up a New Path for China's Social Transformation.35 Since the central government had
banned the use of some Western concepts, including words associated with civil society, the
nonprofit sector was in search of a new cultural frame and a new collective identity for the
existential and material interests of the field, especially after the state had delegitimized the
original purpose of the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 53). To coordinate collective action,
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social skill actors had to identify unifying meaning and action. In borrowing concepts, such as
the free market, whose legitimacy the Chinese state has accepted, Professor Yan argued that the
director was calling for more autonomy for the nonprofit sector. It would echo the state’s
embrace of the private market through economic reform in early 1978.36 The original adoption of
the term “marketization” was an attempt to circumvent the state’s censorship of civil society.
Ironically, the new cultural frame introduced a buzzword into the field when a group of
new and emerging for-profit players picked up “marketization” as a way to legitimize their
invasion of the field. Instead of giving more autonomy to nonprofit organizations, for-profit
players used the term to legitimize their ideological and financial control of NGOs through a
professional management and business approach to social change. Mr. Xu Yongguang (徐永光),
the director of the Narada Foundation and a forerunner of private philanthropy, was the most
controversial figure who led the movement. According to his statement published on June 1,
2016, Mr. Xu argued that marketization of the nonprofit sector should wipe out, within five
years, the third of NGOs that are inefficient but currently active in the field.37 By his standard, a
good NGO should operate like a business and their services should be scalable, replicable, and
profitable. In addition, donors should be able to quantify their social impact. Mr. Xu’s statement
challenged the legitimacy of many grassroots organizations in the State Avoidance Autonomous
field that applauded civil society values and incremental social change, particularly advocacy
NGOs. Those advocacy NGOs tended to serve marginalized populations and diverse social
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When I attended a youth salon among practitioners in Guangzhou, the speaker explained the original meaning of
marketization of nonprofit sector was in fact a call to free up space for NGOs, out of the state’s control.
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values in a highly stratified and unequal society, which had arisen during the country’s
transitional period.
Grassroots organizations were confused about what constituted legitimate “good”
organizations in the eyes of their peers, the state, and potential donors. As demonstrated in the
following discussion, practitioners also realized that the new marketization of the nonprofit
sector had overtaken the discourse that had once dominated the State Avoidance Autonomous
field. The boundary between the nonprofit sector and the for-profit sector became blurry, which
potentially decreased the legitimacy of the original field.
Visitor A: …Regarding the discussion of civil society, we are no longer engaging in the
debate of recent years. The emergence of the third sector is a response to the state and
market failures. Citizen rights and justice. People rarely talk about civil society anymore.
Visitor B: I agree. If the social problem can be solved by the private market, we should
all go to the private market; and such organization should belong to the field of the
market, not the nonprofit sector. If market has failed, those who cannot afford the service
should come for help within the nonprofit sector.
Visitor C: When the state decided to intervene in the field of the nonprofit sector in an
aggressive way, this sector has come to the end. The problem is what should we do? How
can we respond (to this new crisis)?
The legitimacy crisis led to the question of the boundary of the field. To what extent
would the boundary between the for-profit sector and the nonprofit sector be redrawn and by
whom? The invasion of for-profit players had crossed the boundary of practitioners’ “own
comfort zones.” Such sensemaking of the change in the field tends to be the initial step of players
learning to respond to the field crisis. As visitor C said, “the problem is what should we do? How
can we respond?”
What did the marketization of the nonprofit sector in China imply? During this
transitional period, how did grassroots organizations in Guangzhou and Shanghai respond to the
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field crisis? Using SAFs, I showed entry of powerful new players reshaped the rules and norms
of fragmented nonprofit fields, creating what I call “pocket subfields,” which disseminate
business practices. The emergence of such pocket subfields, which I detail later in this chapter,
provided a temporary haven for many grassroots organizations struggling after the 2014 crisis.
On one hand, those pocket subfields could be retailored to cloak civil society in a more
politically acceptable guise; on the other hand, the introduction of business practices and values
potentially disempower grassroots organizations, particularly those advocacy organizations. I
argue NGOs faced what I call the Market Engagement Dilemma. The Market Engagement
Dilemma primarily concerns for-profit and nonprofit players. People tend to stay in their comfort
zones, as do organizations. The decision to enter into a new strategic interaction with unfamiliar
for-profit players constitutes the Market Engagement Dilemma for grassroots organizations. The
following chapter will be concened with the impact of marketization on the nonprofit sector in
Guangzhou and Shanghai and how local organizations solved the Market Engagement Dilemma.
By comparing the two approaches to marketization side by side, I showed the complexity of the
institutional environment in an authoritarian regime in shaping organizational practices and
strategies. I start with the case in Guangzhou and the move on to Shanghai. The two cases
illustrate how their organizational trajectories have shaped their perceptions of the market and
their strategic interaction with for-profit players. I also showed the pros and cons of adopting the
business-like approach to run NGOs. I conclude with an argument that local NGOs have made
new alliances with for-profit players to counterbalance state repression.
Organizational Appropriation
The field achieves a real change when the cognitive understanding of the situation leads
to some substantial behavioral change in organizational management and decision-making.
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Fligstein and McAdam have coined the term “organizational appropriation” to describe the
process by “which an emerging definition of threat/opportunity comes to be wedded to a specific
organizational vehicle” (2011:9). They argue that the perception of threat or opportunity can
mobilize and sustain organizational resources in the face of the crisis. The key is organizational
resources. In the past, international donors held the majority of resources in the State Avoidance
Autonomous field, and they distributed resources based on donor ideologies. GCSC director Mr.
Qin said, “International donors have strong ideological preferences.”38 However, the exit of
international donors and the entry of for-profit players in the field reshaped the norms and rules
of resource distribution and the power relationship between players in the field.
First, nonprofit players in the field needed to orient themselves to the new players in the
field. Some local practitioners began to recognize that for-profit players, with their powerful
resources and alliances with the state, had emerged as the new incumbents in the field. In the
previous chapter, I discussed the paradox of being an incumbent in an emerging field. During the
quickly transforming period, previous incumbents lost their status in face of new players. Old
incumbents disappeared, and new incumbents arose. During my interviews and participant
observation, practitioners called several of the new emerging players “big brothers” (Da Ka 大
咖). Not only did the “big brothers” control resources, they also began to take over the dominant
discourse and redefined the rules and norms that structured the field. For example, AY
Foundation, a major private philanthropic foundation in China, set up training programs to “reeducate” their donees regarding efficiency, KPI (Key Performance Indicator), social impact, etc.
The director of AY Foundation said the organization neither wanted to give fish to the poor nor
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to teach them how to fish. Instead, the establishment of AY Foundation aimed to “revolutionize”
the whole sector. Tech giants such as Tencent, Alibaba, Baidu, and JD all established their own
private foundations and reshaped the rules and norms of the nonprofit field in an astonishing
way. All three private foundations were subsidies of IT giants. The three companies dominated
the country’s consumer Internet and social media. They emerged as major players in online
charity fundraising. Tencent Holdings had taken the top spot as the most active donor. Alibaba
followed in the footsteps of Tencent Holdings. In particular, the Tencent Foundation shook up
the nonprofit field through its online donation platform and the 9.9 Charity Day event. The
online fundraising platform provided alternative resources for grassroots NGOs. Alibaba and JD
followed quickly and created their own donation platforms that linked billions of users to their
commercial platforms. By 2017, those for-profit players have brought in billions of RMB into
the Chinese nonprofit sector.
This is a transitional period where for-profit players aggressively entered the nonprofit
fields, and international players slowly exited. The nonprofit fields became more fragmented,
established incumbents lost their status in the new environment, and subfields emerged. The
following figure depicts the dynamic during this transitional period.
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Figure 5.1. Fragmented Nonprofit Fields
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The state facilitated the rise of the new incumbents, powerful IT giants in the nonprofit
field. According to NGO regulations and Charity laws in China, NGOs had no right to fundraise
in public; only public philanthropic foundations could do so. However, when Tencent
Foundation piloted the first 9.9 Charity Day Event in 2015, the new law had yet to be enacted,
which left a grey zone where Tencent Foundation exploited the opportunity to innovate. Tencent
worked closely with the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Shenzhen, and local open-minded state
actors allowed ineligible grassroots organizations to pair up with a public philanthropic
foundation to fundraise in public through Tencent Foundation’s online donation platform. In the
first year, Tencent Foundation collaborated with 95 public philanthropic foundations and each
public philanthropic foundation could choose and “adopt” grassroots NGOs from a pool of
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organizations on the platform. Those pubic foundations would collect public funds donated to
grassroots NGOs and help them manage the money and file taxes. In return, the public
foundations might charge a management fee. Most foundations did, and the average rate was
about three to five percent of the total donation. A local practitioner commented, “the 9.9 Charity
Event had deconstructed the monopoly of public fundraising by the state through new
technology and management.”39 The innovative pair-up practice effectively bypassed national
law. The state had compromised, allowed the “adoption” to continue, and legalized the practices
in the new law. Nonetheless, the new law designated only 13 online foundation platforms, half of
them owned and operated by IT giants.
Grassroots NGOs confronted the Market Engagement Dilemma. That is, they decided
whether to enter a new arena and align with those “big brothers” by playing by their sets of rules.
Nonprofit players seemed to have a choice. In reality, many grassroots NGOs did not have a
choice because the resources were scarce and distributed inadequately in an emerging nonprofit
sector during episodes of contention since late 2014. The local field environment also
constrained the set of strategies and choices that they had. In the case of Guangzhou, many
grassroots NGOs relied on international funding and enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy by
working at the periphery of the fields of state and market. Those organizations did not need to
cross over different fields for resources. However, with a change in the field environment, those
grassroots organizations could no longer keep their distance from state and for-profit actors
because they needed resources from them to survive. The practitioners realized that they were
losing their voices in public discourse and the ability to structure the nonprofit field by
submitting to the rules and norms of the new resource. Money became the gold standard to
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evaluate the “success” of NGOs. The ranking system promoted by the for-profit players further
polarized resource distribution in the field. Those possessing more resources became the new
incumbents, regardless of their mission, value, or contribution to society.
The marketization of the nonprofit sector affected local fields differently. NGOs in
Shanghai had worked from the beginning closely with state actors and transnational
corporations. EP’s prior experience with international for-profit players compelled them to look
for opportunities with those “big brothers,” such as Tencent and Alibaba domestically. Thus,
different actors have taken different stands based on how urgently they needed resources and
their pre-existing relationships with the state and for-profit players. I summarize the pro and cons
of engaging the for-profit players in the following table.
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Table 5.1 The Advantages and Disadvantages of Engaging Market Players in the Two Nonprofit
Fields
Principle of Comparison

Guangzhou

Shanghai

Focus

State Avoidance Autonomous field

State Alliance Market field

Case

GCSC

EP

Previous Donors

International donors, individual
donations

The government, Corporate
Social Responsibility
(CSR) of transnational
corporation

Attitude Towards
Domestic For-Profit
Players

“Forced” to embrace, confused,
and resistant

Ignore embracing

Relationship with State
Actors

Repressed by state actors

Sponsored by state actors
through government social
service contracts

Relationship with Peers

Collective apprehension of the
new challenge; debate and
discussion; help each other

Relatively independent;
relationship with peers
based on programs

Relationship with ForProfit Players

Donation recipients and users of
the online fundraising platform

Partner; contractor

Collaboration/Competition

Collaboration

Collaboration and
competition

•
Advantage of
Marketization

Disadvantage of
Marketization

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Counterbalance state
oppression
Alternative resources
Professionalization
New platforms
A safe place for peers to
voice support for those
under attack by the state
Goal displacement
Unfair competition
More pressure on leaders
and the team
Loss of discursive power
Legitimacy crisis

•
•

Increased publicity
Income

•
•
•

Goal displacement
Legitimacy crisis
Unscrupulous
players
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Guangzhou
The for-profit players only took a few years from 2015 to dominate the discourse in the
State Avoidance Autonomous field in Guangzhou. According to field theory, the ability of the
invaders to bring new definitions of the situation and new forms of action to the field depends on
a number of factors: “the strength of field incumbents,” “the defection of challengers to the side
of the invader,” and “the attitude of relevant state actors toward invading group” (Flisgtein and
McAdam 2012:100). The theory does not cover the history of the field development that
preceded the invasion. The new Charity law and the state’s repression of civil society had
already destabilized the State Avoidance Autonomous field in Guangzhou prior to the entry of
for-profit players. Some “wounded” nonprofit players were desperate to embrace new alliances
because the state had dismantled their previous alliances and starved them of their resources. On
the other hand, not only did the for-profit players bring in new definitions and new forms of
action, the most powerful for-profit players armed with new technology and resources
transformed the field by creating new platforms. Some of those new platforms limited the
involvement of the state, which created a structural opportunity for marginalized actors to
survive.
Changing NGO Relationships in the Field Environment
When Mr. Qin started working at the community development in Shanghai GCSC relied
on international donors, who provided a decade of stable income. Mr. Qin told me, “we used to
have a lot of freedom while working with international donors. We only needed to focus on our
work and provide them a final report. Then they (international donors) were happy.” As a result,
GCSC did not have to engage with other potential donors and the public for financial support.
GCSC worked in a relatively autonomous field. Under the coercive pressure of the state,
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however, Qin decided to terminate the partnership with the international donors even though
resources were still available. The state had destabilized the State Avoidance Autonomous field
starting in 2014 by delegitimizing many advocacy and organizing activities. By the time forprofit players began to enter the field, the State Avoidance Autonomous field was unstructured:
challengers in the field were looking for new resources and legitimacy. The entrance of for-profit
players provided an alternative channel for grassroots to access public fund.
GCSC opted for a more diverse funding scheme after turning down their international
funding. Beginning in 2016, Mr. Qin started to look for business alliances more actively. AY
Foundation became GCSC’s biggest donor, and many more grassroots NGOs formed new
alliances. AY Foundation became, and remains, GCSC’s biggest donor in 2015. The director of
AY Foundation had the vision to revolutionize the nonprofit sector through marketization. The
Foundation provided comprehensive MBA-type training sessions and connections with the
business world for its constituents. The rise of AY Foundation and other grant-making private
foundations provided important alternative funding for GCSC and many other grassroots
organizations after the state cut off their international funding. Backed by resourceful and
independent private corporations, those for-profit players had a certain degree of autonomy in
terms of whom they worked with. They also tended to value innovation, social impact, replicable
and scalable programs, which differed from the government’s selection criteria. The government
preferred social service-oriented organizations that were unthreatening and apolitical.
More important, the for-profit players were new to the field, and the state had not yet
reacted to their presence and learned to regulate those new players. As a result, for-profit players
had not yet worked under the normative constraints and scrutiny of the state when, from 2016 to
2017, I conducted my research. In addition, based on my interactions with several major private
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foundations during my internship, non-profits tended to form “diplomatic” relation with the state.
By diplomatic relation, I mean the for-profit players acknowledged the authority of the local
state actors by appealing to the state through formal visits and recognition of the state in their
events. The state did not provide financial support, nor was it involved in planning the events.
For example, when Alibaba planed the September 5th Philanthropy Week event, they invited
government officials to the opening ceremony as a diplomatic partner. The two fields overlapped
in a relatively shallow way, which created structural opportunity for grassroots organizations to
exploit. Forming an alliance with the for-profit players helped “politically sensitive” grassroots
organizations such as GCSC to tap into alternative resources for survival and quietly circumvent
state oppression. GCSC received three years of administrative cost support from AY Foundation,
starting in 2015, which allowed the organization to survive after withdrawing from international
funding.
The Emergence of “Pocket Subfields”
In addition to resources, for-profit players also created new platforms for fundraising,
collaboration, and advocacy. Those platforms emerged temporarily as small subfields within the
fragmented nonprofit sector. I labelled such temporary, unstructured subfields “pocket
subfields.” The pocket subfields served as a temporary haven for many grassroots organizations
to circumvent the state’s surveillance because some of those emerging platforms had relatively
few regulations and excluded some state actors. As invaders, resourceful for-profit players had
some unique advantage to forge a configuration of a new subfield, which benefited from forprofit players existing networks, technology, and resources. For example, AY Foundation
created a membership-based “AY Family” platform where the grassroots organizations they
supported could connect with external actors. The AY Family grew from three grassroots
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organizations in 2013 to 10 organizations in 2014, and then 100 organizations in 2015. Members
of the AY Family had exclusive access to AY Foundation resources and networks.
While for-profit players sometimes collaborated with each other, more often they were
competing; each of them wanted to attract more organizations to join their own platforms, which
presented more options for grassroots organizations to choose. Another famous platform was
Tencent’s online donation platform. Tencent Foundation’s September 9 annual 9.9 Charity Day
gained more and more momentum, attracting more than 12 million users who donated 829
million RMB in 2017.40 The 9.9 Charity Day created an open platform that allowed grassroots
organizations and foundations to raise public funding. In the first year, Tencent Foundation
donated 199 million RMB and recruited additional corporate donation of 101 million RMB to
match online donation made by ordinary netizens through their social media platform WeChat
(Chinese version of Whatsup). The donation matching created a huge incentive for both
grassroots NGOs and potential individual donors who wanted to maximize their good deeds.
More than 20 million netizens participated in the first 9.9 Charity Day and raised about 1,279
million RMB (approximately 200 million USD) within three days. The event became a huge
success and since then, practitioners called the annual movement-like event “the carnival for the
philanthropic sector in China.” In the first year, the online donation platform only hosted 929
programs. If each NGO only handed in one program, the number of programs signaled less than
1000 NGOs participated in this open platform to compete for a total of 428 million RMB
donation. Hypothetically speaking, each organization would receive 460,710 RMB if the
donations were equally distributed. For many grassroots organizations with annual budgets of
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less than 10,000 RMB, the 9.9 Charity Day presented a huge opportunity. Since then, the
platform has grown larger, attracting more players. The number of programs/organizations that
participated in the platform grew from 929 in 2015 to 3,643 in 2016 to 6,466 in 2017, according
to official numbers released by Tencent Foundation.
Figure 5.2. The number of NGOs/programs participating in Tencent Foundation’s 9.9 Charity
Day
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From day one of my internship at GCSC in 2016, I attended many meetings in
preparation for 9.9 Charity Day. GCSC was not heavily involved in the first event because they
had no prior experience in public fundraising. As Ms. Wan recorded, “we didn’t really
participate when it (9.9 Charity Day) first came out last year (2015). Only Mr. Qin and our
fundraising program officer participated.” The organization began to realize the potential
opportunity in this event and started to engage more. By the second year, GCSC had devoted the
whole crew to fundraise at this carnival event. With the institutional environment in Guangzhou
continuing to deteriorate, GCSC faced a more severe financial deficit than in its previous year.
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The 9.9 Charity Event became one of few opportunities for GCSC to raise money for an
experimental new project they wanted.
GCSC was not the exception in the field. Another example was the labor rights
organization the Southern Migrant Center whose difficulties were greater than GCSC’s. In the
previous chapter, I documented the state’s unprecedented clampdown on labor rights NGOs in
December 2015. All funding was cut off for the Southern Migrant Center when the police
suddenly detained Zheng Yi, the director of the organization, on a cold winter day. Zheng finally
returned home after 128 days of detention. Luckily, the local state actor had not yet taken away
the organization’s license even though the organization had been evicted from its original office.
Zheng used his personal career development grant (a three-year grant) from a Chinese private
foundation, made prior to the arrest, to keep the organization running, but there was still a deficit.
Zheng’s media friends and peers in the field urged him to try online fundraising and helped him
with application and marketing materials. With a mentality of trying it out, Zheng submitted their
program and received approval by Tencent to join the online donation platform. Moreover, the
Tencent Foundation introduced a public foundation to receive donations on behalf of the
Southern Migrant Worker Center.
The emerging “pocket subfields” also created a safe space for anxious bystanders
including local state actors to voice their support for a politically sensitive organization in a
surveilling society. When the news of Zheng Yi’s arrest spread in the field, many practitioners
did not dare to sign the petition or voice their support in public because they were scared that
such collective action might jeopardize their own organizations in relationship with the state.
Most of the practitioners in the field had internalized the censorship, feeling the state was
watching them. However, as a member of the field, those challengers looked for an alternative
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way to help their peers who had suffered. On the 9.9 Charity Days, I was amazed to find that
many practitioners in the field fundraised for NFY at the friend circle (a mini version of a
Facebook page on WeChat) even though they needed donations for their own organizations. The
Southern Migrant Center raised less than 50,000 RMB on the first two days and Zheng’s
personal donation accounted for a majority of that. However, on the last day of the Charity Day,
the donation skyrocketed to almost 160,000 RMB with a flood of support from practitioners in
the field. When I met with Zheng again after the Charity Day on September 13, 2016, Zheng was
very happy and told me that the money was enough for the whole year of operation, “we are a
small organization. We don’t need that much.” However, Zheng also expressed his concern that
whether the organization could rely on this platform for fundraising next year. Zheng perceived
that the platform was still new, and the rules of the game were unsettled, which created an
opportunity for the organization. If new laws imposed new regulations on the online fundraising
platforms, the Southern Migrant Center might not be as lucky next time.
In addition to peers, Zheng told me that the panda (state security officer) who was
responsible for surveilling him and the organization also donated his personal fund for the
Southern Migrant Center through the online platform. “He donated four times for us in front of
me, 50 RMB each time.” Zheng said, “he even gave me a suggestion about our online materials,
calling it too wordy.” In Zheng’s perception, the state actors just needed to do their job because
they were only small screws in a giant government machine. “They [state actors] can’t publicly
voice their support to you because they would get into trouble if they do that.” However, those
state actors also formed their own opinions about the grassroots work and helped the group if
they could do so safely.
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The Ministry of State Security (MoSS) is a special branch of the government unit that
employed the pandas. It functioned as a governance unit in the field that was “charged with
overseeing compliance with field rules and, in general, facilitating the overall smooth
functioning and reproduction of the system (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 14).” Fligstein and
McAdam envision internal governance units (IGUs) as internal to the field, having both internal
and external functions that are different from the state; an example would be trade associations.
However, in the case of China, government regulators like MoSS blurred the conventional
internal/external distinction of governance units in the field. The state infiltrated the structure and
manipulated the rules of the nonprofit fields secretly. Instead of serving as external liaisons and
lobbyists for the collective interest of the field, the presence of MoSS, as the governance unit,
was to ensure the reproduction of the stability of the field in relationship to the Party’s
domination. Put bluntly, MoSS was to “control the Chinese people to maintain the rule of the
Communist Party.”41 However, unlike the Ministry of Civil Affairs, MoSS was not formally
recognized in the field. Only a small segment of NGOs, particularly advocacy NGOs came into
contact with this particular coercive governance unit. The interaction between those NGOs and
pandas were generally informal. Panda surveilled nonprofit players by inviting them for tea,
drinks, or dinner. Even though the job of MoSS was to spot suspicious behavior, it understood
that informal relationships formed with local players could ameliorate potential conflicts with the
central state and ease MoSS’s ability to collect information.
Internal Organizational Change
The entry of for-profit organizations into the non-profit field eventually trickled down to
reshape internal organizational practices and strategies. First, grassroots organizations began to
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engage with the for-profit players who became the new donors of the organization. A new power
relationship formed between the grassroots organization and for-profit players. Second, by
entering the new platforms created by for-profit players, grassroots organizations also faced new
actors in the field because the online platforms had transformed geographic and field boundaries.
Grassroots organizations faced more competition from their peers on the level playing field.
Third, the new platform pushed many grassroots organizations to interact with the public. Most
of the public was unfamiliar with civil society values. Thus, to pitch for support from the public,
grassroots organizations also needed to adjust their cultural frames and language. In short, many
grassroots organization faced external pressure to adjust their internal organizational practices
and strategies.
How did for-profit players plant the seed of marketization within grassroots
organizations? My study shows that capacity training became the vehicle through which a
business approach was disseminated among the networked organizations. The AY Foundation
provided intense training support for directors and junior managers of the organizations. When I
was in the field, I sat right next to Mr. Qin and the junior manager Bing Xia. Their absence from
meetings usually signaled that they had gone to Beijing for some sort of training from AY
Foundation. Those training sections proved to be effective in disseminating business rules and
norms. Qin and Bing often shared with the team and me what they learned in the training section.
For example, when we had a meeting to prepare for the 9.9 Charity Day online fundraising
event, Bing led the discussion. He started to write down the keywords that helped us to orient
ourselves to and finalize the fundraising strategies. The keywords were “products, scale-up,
measurable outcomes.” They reflected Bing’s training at AY Foundation. Mr. Qin also adopted
those words to describe and design new programs.
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In addition, the for-profit players also provided consulting services to grassroots
organizations. AY Foundation visited the organization for an annual audition in July 2016;
GCSC presented their ideas for a new project at the meeting. GCSC proposed to build an
independent living center for the disabled. Mr. C, the program officer from AY Foundation,
immediately provided advice from a potential donor perspective. He told a lengthy story of how
Tencent transformed Chinese lives through the invention of China’s Twitter, WeChat. “The key
was three words: demand, frequency, and pain points,” said Mr. C. The three words are part of
the business language Chinese use. “Pain points” refers to problems confronted by customers,
either real or perceived. Based on those dimensions, Mr. C recommended GCSC focus on two to
three of the problems that are confronted in everyday life. AY Foundation provided advice to
strengthen GCSC’s core program and future project, borrowing ideas and concepts from the
market. GCSC had faithfully followed the suggestions when I was an intern there.
AY Foundation’s leadership training reshaped the director’s perspective and thinking
about the mission and goals of the organization. Mr. Qin remarked on this when we were
discussing the value of civil society and the future of GCSC in December 2016.
What is the mission of GCSC? We are working to foster more connection between people
in society, not just for civil society. What is civil society then? AY Foundation really
pushed me to think deeper about the depth of our work rather than the breadth. What kind
of substance/real change we made to the lives of people we served. I want to make real
change in their situations. Therefore, I want to work on the employment issue within the
disability community. Jobs encourage personal growth of our disabled friends and invite
public engagement.
Mr. Qin reflected that GCSC used to work like a closed system that only served the
community of nonprofit organizations, with no engagement with the public or direct contact with
marginalized populations. AY Foundation made him realize that GCSC could no longer just live
in the ivory tower of the State Avoidance Autonomous field, dreaming that civil society would
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be realized in a near future. The state and the market have torn down the wall of the State
Avoidance Action field and forced the organization to transform faster.
From Collaboration Oriented Field to Competition Centered Field
The transformation did not come easy. When I worked for GCSC in fundraising, I saw
the organization was struggling to gain support from the business sector. Besides a one-time
donation from a private businessperson in Sichuan that helped GCSC transit into its current
stage, Mr. Qin seemed to have no other alliances with the private sector. The discussion about
how to look for potential supporters, bridge connections, and design special programs for
business owners, etc. became a central theme for meetings. None of the team members had any
experience or connection with the private sector. I happened to know a young businessperson, Xi
Jiali [a pseudonym], in the city. Mr. Qin asked whether I could set up a visit and meet with Xi. I
helped them to make the appointment and went with them. The meeting went well, and Xi
offered 350 sq. meters of free office space for GCSC to carry out activities. The office space,
however, was located at the outskirts of the city with limited subway access, it was not ideal for
the activities of GCSC whose participants were mostly physically challenged. Mr. Qin tried hard
to convince Xi to participate more in the activities organized by GCSC. Nonetheless, the
connection faded after I exited the field because the two parties had very different expectations.
While Qin talked about connection, values, and civil society, Xi was keener to learn about
efficiency, impact, and scale.
First, grassroots organizations like GCSC had to find new meaning and legitimacy in the
field. GCSC and its precursor organization CSC had lost its discursive power in the field. The
concept of civil society that CSC helped to popularize in the field faced strict censorship. The
word almost lost its meaning-making function among members in the field. Grassroots
136

organizations needed to understand from the dominant cultural frame what activities and goals
were legitimate in the new leveling field. That they would get from interactions with the forprofit sector. One major concern was goal displacement, the tendency of organizations to
substitute alternate goals for the goals that the organizations originally established to serve
(Selznick 1949; Mitchell 2014). The new goals might serve the interests of donors, leaders, or
employees. Goal displacement frequently occurred during this period of rapid transition.
Members of the organization might not purposely and strategically set a new goal to replace the
established one, but rather a new goal might arise from confusion and chaos. For example, at the
end of the organizational retreat on January 21, 2016, a team member proposed a new arts and
disability project, which demanded a larger resource allocation. However, other team members
challenged the new project because it did not meet established organizational goals. GCSC’s
mission was to incubate civil society. The new project served at most to bridge the gap between
the public and the disability community. Team members suspected that adjusting the project was
a complete acquiescence to funding pressures from 9.9 Charity Day.
Second, small grassroots organizations face more competition from professionalized big
NGOs on a relatively level playing field. Every NGO seems to have an equal chance of
succeeding. The new platforms, however, worked as a rudimentary open market, which favored
large, professionalized NGOs and NGOs that served certain areas such as education and disaster
relief. Both the state and the market collectively channeled organizations to work on those areas
that were considered apolitical and fundable. Established big NGOs tended to have more
resources to advertise their programs on the front pages of online platforms; therefore, they
produced incumbents via increased publicity. After all, the users of Tencent’s online platform
had more than 3,000 programs from which to choose. Those organizations also tended to have
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more social capital, compared to small grassroots organizations. For example, an educational
foundation from a prestigious university usually had a large base of alumni who supported their
alma mater’s charitable work. For a small NGO that served a marginalized population, it was
harder to fundraise because the organization did not have a rich community base. One
respondent to a survey I piloted in 2016 wrote that “the biggest challenge is the unfair
distribution of resources. Resources tend to go to the stronger organizations rather than helping
those that needed the most.” The stronger becomes stronger and the weaker becomes weaker.
Sociologist Robert Merton (1968) coined such a phenomenon the Matthew effect.
The competition on the platform was not always fair. Due to a lack of transparency and
regulation of the matching donations, some individuals and organizations exploited the system.
For example, a private company would make an annual donation to a major charity organization
regardless of the 9.9 Charity Day event. Companies waited for Charity Day, though, and asked
the staff to donate the money to the platform. By doing so, the company and the organization
could double their donation because donations were matched by the Tencent Foundation. The
Foundation came up with different strategies to stop such practices, for example, limiting the
amount of matching donation per person. Many NGOs found a way to get around the new rules.
Third, the level playing field also put more pressure on directors and their staff. As the
case of GCSC demonstrated, the social capital of the director directly influenced the outcome of
the crowdsourcing. Each team member also bore some responsibility in the fundraising event.
Based on my interviews with team members, most were reluctant to ask for donations from their
friends, families, or acquaintances because of the social stigma related to NGO work in China.
Online fundraising has increased the workload of already underpaid members. During my six-
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months at GCSC, three members of the team left. Two admitted that understaffing, coupled with
the demand to secure funding was part of why they left the GCSC.
Shanghai
Compared to Guangzhou, Shanghai’s State Alliance Market field encountered a different
set of challenges because of the original orientation and configuration of the field. The State
Alliance Market field did not experience major suppression from the state like its counterparts
did in Guangzhou. In addition, the majority of the organizations at which I interviewed in
Shanghai had a stable income from the government or transnational corporations. Thus,
organizations in the field had less incentive to join the new platform because there was no urgent
need for alternative resources. Based on the interviews I conducted in Shanghai from 2015 to
2016, only one out of 9 had experience with public fundraising. The rest mentioned they did not
participate much in public fundraising with the Tencent Foundation. One of the associate
directors of an elderly care NGO never heard of 9.9 Charity Day and even asked me how to
register for the event in August 2016, a month before the event, when I visited the organization.
Along with those NGOs, EP was also a latecomer to online philanthropy.
When I work for EP in the summer of 2017, I had a unique chance to interact with three
major private foundations in China: the Tencent Foundation, Alibaba Foundation, and JD
Foundation. In contrast to GCSC’s relationship with the AY Foundation, EP was not the
recipient of a donation from any of those private foundations. EP has grown into a small
incumbent in the field given its size and reputation as one of the largest NGOs in China. As Ms.
Ting said, “those private foundations think that we are big enough and have no need for
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funding!” As a result, EP had to push for collaboration with those private foundations as a
service provider rather than donor recipient.
Prior to the annual 9.9 Charity Day, Tencent Foundation invited the business
development department of EP, at which I interned, to its headquarters in Shenzhen for a training
session. By attending this training session, EP along with other nine NGOs received firsthand
information about the rules of the game. The 9.9 Charity Day was an annual event that Tencent
Foundation set up on September 7-9 every year for online donations. Tencent Foundation gave
out 2 billion RMB to match online donations made by ordinary netizens through the social media
platform WeChat. The game of match-up donation changed every year. Tencent Foundation
wanted to expand the influence of this event and invite more grassroots organizations to use their
online donation platform. Thus, Tencent Foundation invited EP to the free training session and
hoped EP could mobilize organizations in EP’s network to participate. If EP could organize over
100 grassroots organizations, Tencent Foundation promised a financial reward to cover EP’s
administrative costs for training those grassroots organizations. EP was new to the game. It had
not participated in the 9.9 Charity Day, and it was not ready to take on the task. It claimed it had
incubated more than 400 grassroots NGOs and had a network of over a thousand; however, EP’s
relationship with those NGOs was fragile and program-based. As a result, besides the firsthand
information from the Tencent Foundation, EP was unable to deepen its partnership with Tencent
Foundation through the 9.9 Charity Day Event. EP, however, still managed to mobilize 50
grassroots organizations to join the 9.9 Charity Day event.
The 9.9 Charity Day event exposed the weakness of EP’s relationship with its incubees
and partner organizations. Nonetheless, EP’s reputation for having a large network of grassroots
organizations quickly won her another opportunity to work with the Alibaba Foundation.
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Tencent competed with Alibaba in the market field and in the domain of philanthropy. The
philanthropic department of Alibaba invited EP to its headquarters in Hangzhou for a potential
collaboration in August 2017. The day before the meeting, I received a notice to accompany Mr.
Yang Gang, the director, for the trip. Mr. Lin told me that Yang really valued this opportunity
and asked me to join the meeting to brainstorm ideas, given my background as a PhD studying
the Chinese nonprofit sector. Yang, two other colleagues, and I took the high-speed train from
Shanghai to Hangzhou and another one-hour drive to the headquarter office. On our way, we had
no clue what the collaboration would look like since Alibaba revealed no details when Mr. Lin
communicated with them prior to the trip. We only knew vaguely that Alibaba wanted to work in
the area of volunteers. Mr. Yang expected that Alibaba came to EP for consultant services, for
which the organization was well known. We spent much time discussing different consulting
services we could provide for Alibaba over the three hours of travel. After all, we believed
Alibaba was new to the game, compared to Tencent.
When we finally met with the team in the philanthropic department and with one of
Alibaba’s 13 high-profile executive partners, we found out that it already had a plan. In its plan,
EP was only the contractor. Alibaba expected EP to recruit 100 grassroots organizations to use
the volunteer platform that Alibaba recently developed. Alibaba required us to keep the final
plan a secret from our partners and other actors in the field until it launched the platform on 9.5
Philanthropy Week on September 5, 2017. Alibaba also organized a Charity television show at
the government-affiliated China Central Television (CCTV) and called for each participant to
donate three hours per year to volunteer work. The volunteer platforms had to be ready before
September 5 right before Tencent’s 9.9 Charity day, which left only one month for EP to gather
information. In short, EP had to supply Alibaba with 100 grassroots organizations and make sure
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that every grassroots organization posted appropriate information online. While we were shocked
by the amount of work needed to be accomplished within such a short timeframe, we were also
amazed by Alibaba’s ambition to compete with Tencent. During the meeting, Alibaba did not
mention Tencent once, but every move they made mimicked the action of their peer player. For
example, Alibaba set a rule for the newly launched volunteer platform that donations could only
account for 0.5 hours of volunteer work. The meeting leader from Alibaba said even Jack Ma,
Alibaba’s founder, who has donated millions of dollars, was no exception. Jack Ma had to work
extra hours to accumulate his volunteer hours. The rule seemed to challenge Tencent’s online
Donation platform. My colleagues from EP who attended the meeting shared the same feeling.
While Alibaba positioned itself with Tencent, it was not aware that its involvement in the
new nonprofit field might completely take over EP’s share of the market in the new field.
Alibaba became EP’s new competitor. As an incubator in the field, EP’s 2015-2017 strategic
goal was to become a platform for the nonprofit sector that nationally served and connected
different players in the field. EP has invested millions of RMB in building an online and offline
platform called NGO Creative Space, but the program had been losing money from day one
when EP launched the program in 2016. EP had faced great difficulty enticing people to use the
platform. Compared to EP, Alibaba has unbeatable advantages. With more than 488 million
active users42of its online stores, Alibaba could easily channel those online users to the volunteer
platform, which solved the problem of access faced by many. Many of those grassroots
organizations might no longer need intermediary organizations like EP for services. The platform
could easily wipe out intermediaries, such as EP, that requested service fees. The relationship
between EP and Alibaba thus became strained: they were client and competitor at the same time.
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The involvement of powerful for-profit players like Alibaba in the nonprofit field quickly
challenged the dominant positions of some established players. Players like EP needed to adapt
to the changing environment. Instead of competing with the new player, EP chose to collaborate
and looked for a new niche market for survival. By the end of the meeting, Mr. Yang already
came up with some ideas about the work, and he accepted the contract. After all, the opportunity
to collaborate with Alibaba was rare and EP could use the opportunity to increase the publicity of
the organization.
On our way back to Shanghai, we conferred, and Mr. Lin joined in remotely through a
conference call. Mr. Yang shared some of his new thoughts. He said that this meeting completely
reshaped his thinking about EP’s overall strategy.
I have utterly given up the plan to build a platform today. We need to pivot in our overall
strategy and transform our organization. Now that we have gotten in contact with the
three [Alibaba, Tencent, and JD]. We can focus on building a collaboration with them.

The meeting with Alibaba made Mr. Yang realize that EP had no advantage in becoming
a platform organization for the sector. As he put it, “in the long run, we are a service provider.
We do not have the resources to build the platform.” Then Yang commented on their social
enterprise project, NGO Creative Space, as a failed project. Up until the meeting with Alibaba,
he was reluctant to accept the mistake of investing millions of RMB on the NGO Creative Space
project, as Ms. Ting perceived it.
Internally, the sharp turn in strategy confused members of the team. An incident
happened after the meeting with Alibaba. I uploaded the meeting minutes on a group chat. Mr.
Yang’s comments on the NGO Creative Space caused a huge reaction from one of the managers
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who ran the Space. The manager did not want to accept Mr. Yang’s off the cuff comment that the
Space project was a failure. In addition, she was anxious about the huge change in direction. She
asked Mr. Yang to reply: “Are we giving up the platform strategy so quickly after one meeting? I
would love to hear more from the director. In addition, are we really going to form a strong
alliance with Alibaba? This will mean a significant change in our target population.”
The manager was not the only person on the team who had doubts. Many team members
shared the same sense of uncertainty and cluelessness facing the new change. Ms. Ting, the vice
director of EP, held a different view of the overall strategy of the organization, in particular its
business approach, which had already negatively affected EP’s organizational culture. EP had a
high employee turnover rate (approaching 40-50% per year). Ms. Ting had expressed her
concerns about the Space project with me on multiple occasions. During the last two meeting
before I exited the field, Ms. Ting would hold my hand and whisper to me in a low voice, telling
me how concerned she was about the future of the Space Project. The project was, in fact, Mr.
Yang’s attempt to launch a social enterprise, but social enterprises by nature operate at the
boundary of the two fields, the market, and the nonprofit sector. Not only did the organization
need to familiarize itself with two competing institutional logics and cultural frames, the
organization also had to compete with players from the two fields. Ms. Ting told me that the idea
and model of the incubator and co-working space that inspired the Space project came from the
private sector. Compared to a mature private entity, EP had no advantage competing with IT
giants directly. On the other hand, EP could package itself by targeting nonprofit organizations
as potential clients. However, many grassroots NGOs could not afford the high rent; some also
did not want to pay as they expected it to be a free service sponsored by private donors or the
government. By setting up this social enterprise, EP put itself in a difficult position at the
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boundary of the two fields. Many scholars argue that innovation is more likely to appear at such
boundary work (Dart 2004; Chell et al. 2010); however, those scholars do not necessarily see the
complexity and competition within this narrowly defined boundary. While practitioners and
academics may see social enterprise as a silver bullet, few recognize the challenges they faced
and the success rate of those social enterprises.
The blurring of the boundary also imposed another question regarding the legitimacy of
nonprofit organizations. In a State Alliance Market field, EP considered organizations that align
with the state’s mission as the unspoken criteria of a legitimate organization in the current
regime. As a new player in the field, however, Alibaba had not yet accustomed itself to the
unspoken rules and norms that structured the field. For example, EP was supposed to provide a
list of 100 grassroots organizations to be initial users of Alibaba’s volunteer platform. In
addition, EP needed to ensure each organization had posted at least one advertisement that called
for volunteers on the platform. Yet Alibaba did not have a clear idea of what constituted
legitimate NGOs. Legitimate organizations should be able to attract potential volunteers and
keep Alibaba away from any potential scandal. Most of the organizations incubated by EP
became service contractors for local governments. Some parts of the local state even
institutionalized Party activities in incubator parks. For example, it was common to find a
Communist Party study group in an EP-run incubator park. EP added some of those study groups
the list. When I presented the list to the representative of Alibaba at its headquarters on my
second visit in August 2017, the representative immediately crossed out those organizations,
noting, “those do not count.” Then we discussed the definition of philanthropy and the boundary
of the fields. Even though we did not reach any conclusion, neither party agreed on who is an
actor in the field. When I communicated the result back to EP, the director suggested we hold a
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conference with speakers and scholars to debate the issue. The emergence of the new platforms
tore down the boundary of small subfields that operated with different rules and norms, for
example, State Avoidance Autonomous field versus State Alliance Market field.
Unscrupulous Players
In addition to those challenges, I found an unintended consequence resulting from the
marketization of the field. The expansion of the boundary between the market and the nonprofit
sector created a precarious space that attracted unscrupulous players who might potentially
destroy the collaboration between the for-profit players and nonprofit players. For example,
some for-profit players enter the field not to do philanthropy but to exploit loopholes in the new
Charity law. Chinese people called the behavior of exploiting the ambiguity in a system as
digging a structural hole (Zhuan Kongzi 钻空子), which is very close to the English term
loophole. When two distinct fields overlap with each other, there tend to be more structural
loopholes. In addition, changes in the new law expose inadequacies in the system.
When I started my fieldwork in China in June 2016, the new Charity law took effect on
September 1, 2016, during my internship in Guangzhou, but due to the new law’s ambiguity, it
did not seem to affect the nonprofit sector much, particularly for organizations that had already
obtained legal status. The new law requires registered nonprofit organizations to apply for a new
charity identity on top of their legal status, and the law has given a 5-year extension for those
organizations to make the transition. Interviewees told me that not every organization was
enthusiastic about this new Charity identity because it did not guarantee substantial benefits to
organizations. Most NGOs waited for others to go first. Thus, the law took time to produce real
change in the field. I exited my fieldwork in Guangzhou at the end of December of 2016 and
came to Shanghai in June 2017, a year after the new law’s enactment. A year later, I still did not
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find a major change in the nonprofit sector. I had interviewed at an NGO working with the
elderly in Shanghai over three years before and after the law. When I visited the organization on
my third visit and asked what had changed since 2016, my interviewee threw the question
backed at me: “What has changed? Why didn’t the law change anything?” The new law signals
more to outsiders and attracted more attention from society. More players want to enter the
charity field.
I worked at the NGO Creative Space during my internship. EP invested a million dollars
on the design of the space, and the place served as a showcase for the organization. Government
officials, NGOs, and potential donors came to the place for a tour. I was responsible for
occasionally meeting visitors, particularly those that came to meet Ting. On June 30, 2017, we
received two guests from a financial institution who has expressed interest in philanthropy. The
male visitor said their company was interested in establishing a private foundation dedicated to
their clients. After the two-hour long meeting, we realized that the real intention of the visitors
was to consult with EP about creating a private shell philanthropic foundation like a shell
corporation for inheritance tax evasion. In exchange, EP would get a commission fee or other
benefits. Midway through the meeting, Ting asserted that EP had no intention to collaborate with
them if the two organizations could not agree on the same values and principles. “We could
compromise on some details, but not our integrity,” Ms. Ting said. After the visitors left the
office, she told me that she would never consider working with players who want to exploit
loopholes in the laws. Unscrupulous players were common now because the emergence of the
philanthropic and nonprofit sector attracted people to the field with suspect intentions.
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Conclusion
This chapter looks at how marketization affected the nonprofit sector in China from the
post-2008 era to 2017. The same trend that affected the US nonprofit sector a decade ago has
generated heated debate and study. Eikenberry and Klover (2004) argue that the marketization of
nonprofit sector potentially jeopardizes the distinct contribution of nonprofit organizations in
building a strong and vibrant civil society. The decrease in government grants, contract
competition between private and nonprofit organization, and new emerging donors forced
nonprofits to adopt commercialization to survive. The same Market Engagement Dilemma
played out in China. NGOs needed to choose whether they wanted to engage with for-profit
players and adopt their rules and norms.
I argue that the marketization of the nonprofit sector in China right after the state’s
repression of the sector in fact saved civil society from extinction in Guangzhou. When for-profit
players came to the field, organizations in the State Avoidance Autonomous field were
experiencing episodes of contention. The state suppressed many advocacy orientated NGOs and
cut off their international funding. At a crossroad, the emergence of for-profit players provided
new opportunities for those organizations to survive. Although organizations had to submit to
new pressure and different donor requirements, those organizations still found it better than
surrendering to the government or closing the organization. In the face of exogenous shocks,
Chen (2018) found that organizations are less inclined to organize vertically against the state,
and more likely to adjust their programs and missions, “recogniz[ing] horizontal relations with
other organizations.” Different from Chen’s findings (2018), my study shows that instead of
mobilizing collectively towards defending the incumbent organizations’ interests, both
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incumbent and challenger organization seek alliances with powerful new incumbents to reduce
uncertainty and fend off state intervention.
The marketization of the field also reshaped the incumbent and challenger relations. New
entrants challenged the status quo of the state. Using advances in technology, for-profit players
created a new level playing field or small “pocket” field that circumvented state intervention.
The online philanthropy platform became a temporary haven for organizations looking for
alternative funding and voices collectively supporting their peers, which they would not dare to
do in another domain.
Changing relations between incumbents and challengers affected small incumbents that
relied on the state’s domination of the field. For an instant, compared to grassroots NGOs in
Guangzhou, NGOs in the Shanghai Alliance Market Field, such as EP, initially had little
incentive for public fundraising, given secure funding from the local government. Thus, EP was
late to the public fundraising game. As the marketization of nonprofits deepened, however, EP
could no longer ignore their influence. For-profit players had emerged as its new competiton. EP
found itself unable to compete with new for-profit players who already had a massive user base
network on their private market platforms. The marketization of the field imposed new
challenges to the nonprofit field in Shanghai that relied on state alliance strategies.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
Introduction
Believers in civil society and democracy tend to perceive the exponential growth of
NGOs in China as an important indicator of the rise of Chinese civil society, a potentially
transformative force for the country’s democratization. Those believers placed their last hope in
NGOs, which they believed to be change agents. Indeed, the public sphere, especially online
activism, has expanded significantly over the past two decades. I argue, however, that it is
overly optimistic to equate the rise of the nonprofit sector in China with civil society. Whereas
the nonprofit sector refers to an organizational field populated by not-for-profit and nongovernmental organizations, civil society comprises a broader socio-spatial arena that includes
not only those public interest organizations independent of the state and business but also the
public sphere where citizens can freely express themselves. The subtle distinction helps to better
conceptualize the Chinese nonprofit sector and civil society. The nonprofit sector in China is
composed of a diminishing number of nonprofit organizations and institutions that are associated
with the core civic values promoted by civil society. I trace the emergence of two localized
nonprofit sectors and show the conflation of multiple concepts and realities among blind
optimists. I argue that the literature has overlooked the emergence of nonprofit sectors in cities
like Guangzhou, Beijing, Yunan, and Shanghai and ignored the distinct characteristics attached
to those cities. There is a heterogeneity of nonprofit sectors within the country. The nonprofit
sector in Shanghai, which I term the State Alliance Market field, is composed of mainly
government-contracted service delivery organizations, which have become the dominant model
across the country. A segment of the nonprofit sector in Guangzhou, which I call The State
Avoidance Autonomous field was an exceptional and rare case in China. The State Avoidance
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Autonomous field in Guangzhou was closest to the Western imagination of civil society and in
the early 2000s played a large role in promoting civil society in southern China and beyond. This
once robust and localized civil society, however, quickly declined and lost its discursive power
in the wake of crises including state suppression, co-optation, and marketization of the sector.
Scholars and practitioners such as Mark Sidel (2017) argue that the state had strategically
planned to mold the civil society into its own image as if it were a five-year plan to further
secure one-party domination. The marginalization of civil society since 2014 was a just a
continuation of that securitization plan, and a crew of public security intellectuals hired by the
central government came up with the big plan. The big plan was to repress flagship advocacy
NGOs and depoliticize the rest through co-optation. The state wanted more of a third sector that
works for the government and less civil society that challenged the legitimacy of the state.43
“There has never been a spring for civil society,” as one of my informants explained to me. The
state had never changed its attitude and approach to civil society.44
I agree that episodes of contention collectively felt by NGO actors related to the state’s
action; however, I disagree with the popular narrative that a strong and unified state player had
strategically planned the attack following a finite timeline and agenda right from the start. The
state became more liberal and relaxed its control of NGOs after the 2008 earthquake. It
participated in local experiments in reforming the dual registration system, increased government
funding and investment, and sought dialogue with the nonprofit world. For example, starting in
late 2008, CSC enjoyed more room to expand its activities and influence. Moving beyond its
host city in Guangzhou, CSC expanded its training programs to Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi,

43
44

Mark Sidel (2017). Presentation notes from ARNOVA conference.
Interview with Zhuang Ming, July 27, 2016 in Guangzhou

151

Yunan, and other provinces. The relationships between CSC and local governments also became
warmer, and partnerships have begun to form during those good years. CSC had successfully
cultivated its capacity to lobby political actors for more favorable NGO policies. In Shanghai,
more local governments outside of the municipality proactively sought partnerships with EP.
However, the political climate has changed since 2014 when the state again strengthened
its control over the sector. The institutional environment began to deteriorate and set back the
development of civil society. I argue the oscillation of state attitudes and approaches from liberal
to conservative has to do with the state’s perception of crises. The change of leadership at the
national level from the Hu-Wen administration to Xi Jinping has hastened a changing
environment. The pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong further accelerated the process.
Coupled with a lack of protection from local governments, some local NGOs closely connected
to Hong Kong found themselves the victims of the state’s ruthless attempt to stabilize society
and prevent spillover effects from Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movements. Episodes of
contention continued with the enactment of new Charity and Overseas NGO laws and the
marketization of the nonprofit sector.
Review of Findings
How do NGOs in an authoritarian state negotiate organizational dilemmas in responding
to crises? And, more generally, what do episodes of contention tell us about the role of the state
and market in shaping the emergence of civil societies in China? By tracing the ebb and flow of
organizational trajectories in two different cities over a period of a decade, this study examines
how policies form and change in China. This comparative study shows the inconsistency of
Chinese policy and state actions towards NGOs across regions and time. I argue that Chinese
civil society emerged in crises but also declined in crises. Crises such as 2008 earthquake can
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catalyze collective actions by local NGOs and governments to advance the development of the
new sector that was formerly regarded as suspicious in the eyes of the state. However, crises can
also produce a paralyzing and unintended effect on the nonprofit sector, such as Hong Kong’s
pro-democracy movements that posed one of the most significant challenges to the Chinese state
after the Tiananmen Square Movement in 1989. The state action and policy also fluctuated
according to the nature of the crises. While it is hard to trace the causal origins of the crises, I
argue that we could assess the new line of interactions among players on the ground before and
after the crisis to gauge the impact of the crisis on the crystallization of the new rules, norms, and
power relationships that structure the field. I also argue that crises are relational with respect to
the different intensity of the exogenous shock felt by different fields.
The state lies at the center of the crisis analysis because of the dependence of nonstate
fields on the State Strategic Action fields. The ontological assumptions that civil society operates
independently from the state is a romantic version of reality. The goal to achieve an autonomous
civil society in an authoritarian state is also unrealistic because of the myriad ties between the
state and the nonprofit fields. The relationship between nonprofit fields and the State Strategic
Action field is like an elastic string. The further that the nonprofit fields pull away from the State
Strategic Action field, the stronger the state desires to pull back. The stability of the nonprofit
fields in China relies on “the certifying support of allies in State Strategic Action fields”
(Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 75). Such certifying support from the state may derive from
informal or formal relationships with various levels of state actors; however, there was a limit to
how far the state can tolerate NGO deviance. Whether or not NGOs would be punished for their
advocacy work or other non-political activities depends on arbitrary state judgments in different
scenarios. The limits are constantly in flux, but the baseline always lays on the legitimacy of the
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one-party state. The prosperity of the nonprofit sector in the post-2008 era paradoxically invited
more suppression of the sector in late 2014.
The nonprofit field’s relationship with the state, although crucial, is but one dimension of
the field. To comprehend the complexity of the reality, I took a holistic view towards the interorganizational networks. The holistic relational approach allows me to reveal more nuances of
the field dynamic. Relationships among fields are interactive and fluid depending on situations,
the issues in dispute, and sometimes, more important, time. For example, during a turbulent
crisis, the close alliances between NGOs and their international donors could potentially
jeopardize their relationships with the state.
The emergence and transformation of the nonprofit sector in China provides a unique
opportunity to examine field formation. Existing research in this vein tends to rely either on
historical data or focus on democratic countries such as the United States. The past golden ten
years of Chinese civil society allowed me to take a close look as the sectors unfolded in a real
time. Many of my interviewees and the organizations at which I conducted ethnography were
key actors and had fully participated in the development of the nonprofit sector. Their
experiences and memories remained fresh when I conducted my fieldworks. In addition, this
research challenged many of the presumptions about civil society theory developed in the West,
in particular, the ontological recognition that the nonprofit sector is an autonomous third space in
society different from the private and public sectors (Barman 2016). Fligstein and McAdam’s
theory of the field helped to avoid presuming the emergence of Chinese civil society. The
concept of interdependence of fields and the embeddedness of the field environment portrays a
more realistic picture of the Chinese nonprofit sectors’ relationship with the state and the market,
free of moral judgement. By comparing the two nonprofit sectors in Guangzhou and Shanghai, I
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also tested two dominant ideal types of field structure proposed by Fligstein and McAdam
(2012): coalition versus hierarchical field. The State Avoidance Autonomous field in Guangzhou
resembled the coalition field while the State Alliance Market field in Shanghai constituted the
hierarchical field. I showed how the interaction between the incumbent organizations in the field
and the state actors collectively produced the structure of the field. The absence of the heavy
involvement of the local state, relatively diffused resource distribution, and civil society-oriented
incumbent organizations led to the cooperative emergence of a coalition field in Guangzhou; in
contrast, the heavy intervention of the local state, the absence of international donors, and
business-like incumbent organizations that submitted to the state’s coercion and encouraged
competition resulted in the rise of the hierarchical field in Shanghai. To give voice to the actors
and avoid the mechanical explanation of real-life situations, I used the strategic dilemma to show
the choices and freedom confronted by actors and their decisions. I argue that the reality is more
complicated and the boundary between the two fields constantly shifted depending on times and
spaces.
This dissertation engages extensively with Fligstein and McAdam’s theory of field. By
borrowing their theoretical framework, I examined the emergence, crisis, and settlement periods
of Chinese civil society as organizational fields over the past decade. I argue that crises are
fateful moments that crystalize new changes and orders. I also pay specially attention to the role
of incumbent nonprofit organizations, state actors, and for-profit actors in shaping the formation
of the fields. The embeddedness of the fields in an authoritarian state gives rise to what I called
the incumbent disadvantage, suggesting the potential competing relationship between the strong
state and incumbent nonprofit actors. Fligstein and McAdam (2012) proposed the concept of
incumbents to depict nonstate actors in the field, who enjoy the advantage of reproducing the
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status quo and resisting crises. In my study, I show the advantage of incumbents depends on their
relationship with state actors and the broader field environment. During crisis, the advantage of
incumbents could quickly transform into the disadvantages given the contingence of the
institutional environment. The institutional environment by and large depends on the Chinese
state’s willingness to either stabilize or destabilize the fields. The state is never a unified unit but
a complex strategic action field that comprises many different actors at different levels and
different branches of governments or quasi-government bodies. As previous research has shown,
the survival of grassroots NGOs depends critically on their ability to cultivate relationships with
local state actors (Spires 2012). The state tends to be viewed external to the Chinese nonprofit
fields. However, in contrast to such a romantic version of civil society, my dissertation shows
that the state is internal to the nonprofit fields. Some state actors behave like incumbents in the
field. For example, the Shanghai government distributes resources and sets up rules and norms.
Other state actors, such as the Ministry of State Security, act as internal governance unit that
ensure the compliance of nonprofit actors to the state’s regulation. The states are ubiquitous and
hard to differentiate whether the state is internal or external to the field. The heavy overlap
between the State Strategic Action fields and nonprofit fields also speaks to the nature of the
authoritarian state, so called “civil society,” “autonomous space,” or “third space” exist only at
the mercy of the state. Compared to the nonprofit sector, the private market in China enjoys more
autonomy with fewer state’s intervention. The marketization of the nonprofit sector led by a
group of new actors from the for-profit sector presented an alternative opportunity and space for
grassroots NGOs to survive. With increasing engagement with the state and market, I argue that
the nonprofit sectors become more fragmented. Small platforms, which I called “pocket fields”
emerged temporarily as a haven for grassroots organization to counterbalance the state’s
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repression. Meanwhile, competition and new rules and norms potentially disempower many
advocacy organizations that do not directly provide products and services.
To illustrate my point, I adopted a holistic relational approach to study the emergence of
Chinese civil societies in the cities of Guangzhou and Shanghai.
Table 6.2. Comparison of Two Cases’ Inter-Organizational Relationship
Quality

Civil Society Center

Excellence Promoter

Cities

Guangzhou

Shanghai

State Avoidance

State Alliance

Autonomous Field

Market Field

Relationship with Local State

Distant

Close

Relationship with For-profit
Sector

Distant

Close

Relationship with
International Foundations
(including Hong Kong and
Taiwan)

Close

Distant

Relationship with Peer NGOs

Close

Distant

Organizational Field

The aforementioned table is a simplification of the two organizational fields in
Guangzhou and Shanghai. I used the binary of close and distant to capture the relationships
NGOs and organizational fields have with the state, the for-profit sector, the international
community, and their peers; however, as my study unfolded, those relationships became
extremely fluid. The term relationship and the attributes of “close” versus “distant” might not be
completely accurate in describing the kind of interactions different actors have with each other.
Close relationships imply frequent interactions with the actors involved in information and
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knowledge sharing and collaboration, which can range in their degree of formality. The close
relationship tends to signal a formal relationship established between actors that are likely to
involve money and other sources of resource exchange. For example, EP formed intense
partnerships with different levels of state actors to implement nonprofit incubator programs. The
states had contracts with EP, paying the organization to manage the state-funded nonprofit
incubators on behalf of the state.
Distant relationships suggest less frequent interactions between actors in mutually
beneficial activities. For example, GCSC might also have frequent informal exchanges with local
officials who are supposed to supervise the activities of the organization. From the actor’s point
of view, however, GCSC might enter into such interactions with state actors unwillingly and
prefer to secure autonomy by distancing itself from state agencies. The formation, abeyance, and
discontinuance of those complex relationships has a consequential impact on organizational
structure and strategies. In addition, relationships with different actors are not unidirectional but
multidimensional. The relationships formed between state actors and NGOs interactively affect
NGO relationships with other actors in the field and lead to what I called a configurational
interactive effect. For example, close NGO relationships with international donors often
precluded potential partnerships with state actors.
Like any kind of human relationship, relationships among fields change over time. I
emphasize the importance of temporality in explaining the transformation of fields. The
sequence of events matters. In chapter 2, I gave an overview of the development of civil society
in contemporary China. In contemporary Chinese history, Chinese society experienced multiple
major crises that virtually destabilized all fields in China. The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to
1978 and the Tiananmen Square student protests significantly set back the development of the
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country not to mention the civic sphere. Civil society, the space between the state and the family,
was basically a vacuum where horizontal relationships and associations among individuals were
missing in such an unsettled society. It was not until late 1990s when international nonprofit
organizations began their activities in China that voluntary associations resurfaced in society.
Thus, the idea of nonprofit organizations as change agents and the concept of civil society
independent of the state were foreign to China. The nature of the nonprofit field set the basic
tone of how the state perceived these organizations. The state wanted no more challenges
especially after the tragedy of the student movements. In addition, most early generations of
grassroots NGOs received international funding reflecting strong ideological preferences and an
unspoken democracy agenda. From 1995 to early 2008, the state remained suspicious of those
“foreign hostile forces.” Both the nonprofit fields in Guangzhou and Shanghai remained
marginal with limited growth during this period. They represented the emergence of localized
civil society.
The growth of NGOs in Guangzhou came from a liberal governance at the provincial
level in early 2000s. In contrast, Shanghai’s nonprofits were nourished by the state to act as
society stabilizers in a context of rising social inequality. Thus, the nonprofit field in Shanghai
overlapped heavily with the State Strategic Action field while Guangzhou’s nonprofit field
remained distant from the state. Due to different approaches and relationships with the state, I
categorized the nonprofit field in Guangzhou as a State Avoidance Autonomous field and the one
in Shanghai as a State Alliance Market field. The categorization also encapsulated the initial
relationship with the for-profit sector and resource strategies in each respective city. Shanghai’s
nonprofit field was more pro-business and resource oriented while Guangzhou’s nonprofit field
emphasized ethical commitments to civil society values. I argue that the state in Shanghai had
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adopted a proactive approach to manage the nonprofits from the very beginning. The Shanghai
government provided resources, built alliances with major nonprofits such as EP, and established
rules and norms right up front. For NGOs seeking collaboration with the state, the government in
Shanghai forbade those organizations from taking international donations. As a result, the
nonprofit field in Shanghai depended on the State Strategic Action field.
The 2008 earthquake, right before the Olympic Games, posed enormous challenges to the
Chinese government and society. The disaster also triggered a widespread response from
ordinary citizens to engage in civic actions. Thousands of volunteers flooded into Sichuan for
disaster relief efforts and grassroots organizations emerged as leaders, coordinating volunteers
and restoring order. It became a pivotal moment in which the state reshaped their perception and
approach towards those grassroots organizations. Since then, the state piloted local reforms for
governing local NGOs. The state at both central and local levels developed greater incentives to
collaborate with nonprofit actors. The nonprofit sector and civil society more generally
flourished as never before. The growth of nonprofits was exponential. I categorize this period as
the emergence of an overarching nonprofit sector in China.
In the period of the emergence of the nonprofit sector, the dilemma of engaging state
actors became more apparent because the crisis of the 2008 earthquake provided more incentives
for nonprofits and the state to engage with each other. The state’s policy was conducive to the
growth of the sector. However, local NGOs, particularly those in the State Avoidance
Autonomous field, had to make a tradeoff between autonomy and the political risk in choosing
the degree of involvement with the state. In chapter 4, I detailed the State Avoidance Risk
Dilemma faced by CSC in the post-2008 era. I documented the decentralization strategies
adopted by CSC as a way to respond to the dilemma. Multiple factors led to the collective
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decision by CSC to decentralize the organization in the face of an attractive opportunity offered
by the state. Even though collaboration between CSC and the government had increased, such
newly formed relationships were unstable. I highlighted the leader’s social skills to read the
environment and foresee the contingency beneath the temporary prosperity of the sector. That the
Chinese state is unreliable is because Chinese policy fluctuates significantly during crises. The
emergence of the nonprofit sector relied on the mercy of the state. At the same time, due to the
nature of the field that CSC operated, CSC had a tendency to maintain a distance from the state
because the organization valued autonomy over resources. The organization also operated under
constraints set by international donors. To diversify political risk, CSC chose to decentralize the
organization into multiple smaller independent entities. To examine the collective experiences of
organizational strategies, I sampled other organizations and looked at the dissemination of such
practices into the State Avoidance Autonomous field and found several organizations faithfully
implemented similar strategies. The pre-existing relationship between the State Strategic Action
field and the State Avoidance Autonomous field prompt organizations to adopt such approach in
handling the State Avoidance Risk Dilemma. The mutually suspicious relationship persisted over
time despite the change of political climate. In contrast, the dependence of EP and the State
Alliance Market field brought in more government resources and legitimacy to the sector. EP
quickly grew into one of the biggest NGOs in China. EP successfully scaled up its operation and
influence over organizations across the country through partnerships with local state actors.
In chapter 3, I examine how a few years into the prosperity of the nonprofit sector, an
exogenous shock again shook the nonprofit sector in China, once again testing the newly formed
sector. In particular, those NGOs working at the contentious social issues such as labor and
LGBT rights felt the most. Many progressive NGOs managed to register and obtain legal status
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during the period from 2009-2013. However, the state changed its approach sharply in late 2014.
The state first shut down flagship advocacy NGOs, frequently interrupted NGO activities, and
starved NGOs of resources. The origins of the shock remain a question. I argue that change of
leadership at the national level, the pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong, and broader
trends of increasing social surveillance collectively led to episodes of contention. In particular,
the state strategically dismantled NGO and activist networks and alliances between mainland
China and Hong Kong. The State Avoidance Autonomous field in Guangzhou, which used to be
closely connected with Hong Kong, was destabilized. The State Alliance Market field in
Shanghai was not directly impacted. The state’s relentless attempt to control and mold the
nonprofit sector eventually consumed the limited autonomy that NGOs in Shanghai enjoyed.
Regardless of the orientation of their activities, NGOs in China, since late 2014, have been, in
general, under more regulation and scrutiny after the enactment of the new Charity and Overseas
NGO laws.
According to a proposition of the theory of fields, after a collective attribution of crisis
and opportunity, a “heightened interaction involving the use of innovative and previously
prohibited forms of collective action (e.g., innovative action)” are expected to follow as the
hallmark of a true crisis (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 21). The “prohibited forms of collective
action” likely implies protests, boycott, or other forms of group behaviors that defended group
interests from invasion by outside groups or state action. The absence of collective action,
however, does not mean the crisis is not there. Collective action itself might invite more
suppression and intensify the disability of the field. Crises do not necessary provide more
opportunities for “prohibited forms of collective action” in a context where the state has
disproportionate power in suppressing collective actions before they even grow. During the

162

crisis, the Chinese state was even more obsessed with stability than at any other time. The use of
a prohibited form of collective action in China to challenge the state actions during a crisis is no
different from throwing an egg against a rock and hoping the egg will crack the rock. In the
crises of 2014 to 2015, the state was the absolute incumbent, and NGOs under the radar of the
state were challengers with little power to resist. Those NGOs had to come up with other
innovative forms of action to survive. Instead of directly challenging the state’s abuse of power,
many NGOs chose to seek “right” alliances from within the state system because their priority
had shifted to survival, exemplified by my case study of GCSC in Guangzhou. Those NGOs
needed to re-establish their legitimacy to operate. Thus, many NGOs faced the Alliance
Dilemma that they had to calibrate their alliance network. In Guangzhou, in the aftermath of this
new line of interaction between NGOs and the state actor, the State Avoidance Autonomous field
gradually lost its discursive power in the broader nonprofit field as a result of state repression
and lack of collective action by NGOs during the crisis period.
State and NGO narratives about Chinese civil society have been repeated by scholars and
journalists many times. I add more nuance to this story. However, the new sector in China
included far more than just state and NGO actors. In chapter 5, I introduced the Market
Engagement Dilemma to look at another line of interaction between NGO actors and for-profit
action to provide a full account of the lived experience of grassroots NGOs. Since the
promulgation of new regulations on foundations, in 2004, domestic private corporations became
keener on establishing their own private corporate foundations and ran their own programs rather
than donating to GONGOs. In particular, behind some of the most influential private foundations
in the Chinese nonprofit sector were powerful IT actors. Tencent Holdings had taken the top spot
as the most active donor and innovator by launching the online philanthropic platform and
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creating 9.9 Charity Day. Alibaba, JD.com, Baidu, and many other private companies joined in
the footsteps of Tencent Holdings. I argue that the state facilitated the rise of this particular
group of new incumbents and accelerated the marketization movement in the Chinese nonprofit
sector. The selective repression of grassroots NGOs and broader secularization of the nonprofit
sector during those turbulent years in 2014 to early 2016 effectively channeled more NGOs
seeking alternative funding and space from the private sector. The destabilizing nonprofit field
also implied less resistance to the invasion of new entrants. For example, after the suspension of
the Non-profit Leadership camp, GCSC in Guangzhou opted for a diverse funding scheme that
included an active search for partnerships with businesses and involvement with online
fundraising platform organized by private corporate foundations. Those online fundraising
platforms proved a temporary haven for grassroots NGOs under the radar of the state because the
state was not yet attuned to the rise of those “pocket fields.”
In general, EP in Shanghai was well-funded by the government and international
corporations. Therefore, EP had less incentive to engage with domestic for-profit actors in the
early years compared to her counterparts whose resources were cut off by the state. However, EP
increased its efforts to experiment with social enterprises and created a national platform for
nonprofit organizations. EP’s move was partly due to the change of new laws and regulations, an
increasing scrutiny on governmental contract programs, and the leader’s own vision of the
organization. However, the entrance of powerful for-profit IT actors introduced new competitors,
with which EP found it impossible to compete. Social enterprise and business-like management
also created another set of internal challenges to EP.
My study shows that the Chinese nonprofit sector was highly stratified with many
different organizational field segments such as the State Avoidance Autonomous field and State
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Alliance Market field. The emergence of these subfields bore a unique institutional history.
Some of the subfields had a close relationship with the State Strategic Action field while some
were more distant. Regardless of how hard some of those organizations sought autonomy from
the state, virtually all the stability of those fields depended on the State Strategic Action field.
Most crises in Chinese nonprofit fields came from either direct or indirect state action. However,
some organizations were better equipped to manage the crises than others. I argue that the ability
of any NGO to survive or even take advantage of crises is highly correlated with the leader’s
social skill to read the environment, induce support from a wide network, and make the
organization more flexible, adaptable, and resilient in anticipating crises. The crises also tend to
have a differential impact on players in the field, which depend on the relationship between State
Strategic Action fields and the non-State Strategic Action field in which they are embedded.
NGOs in a nonprofit field like the State Alliance Market field were less affected by the
exogenous shock led by the state than those in the State Avoidance Autonomous field.
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Chapter 7 Methodology & Research Design
Extreme Case Studies
There is no hope for Shanghai’s nonprofit field. The state completely dominates that
place. Please do not be offended by my comments. I mean, we cannot find the future of
civil society there. Therefore, Guangzhou and Shanghai are the complete opposite, the
two extreme cases.
-Ms. G, Guangzhou (Interview July 27, 2016)
As commented by G, practitioners viewed the grassroots-driven, bottom-up model in
Guangzhou and the state-led top-down model as polar opposites in a spectrum of nonprofit
organizing in China. In this study, I explored the emergence and development of the two distinct
growth models of civil society in China. While Guangzhou’s model assembled the organic
growth of civil society in the Western context, Shanghai’s incubator model was a “civil society”
molded by the state. I put quotation marks on Shanghai’s civil society because practitioners that I
interviewed generally felt that the nonprofit sector in Shanghai lacked autonomy and diversity,
which displaced the inherent core qualities of civil society. The Shanghai practitioners
themselves also avoided using the term civil society to identify their work and purpose. Over the
past two or three years, the government has repressed certain types of NGOs such as advocacy
organizations while encouraging the growth of social service providers. In other words, the state
favors the Shanghai model over the Guangzhou incubator model. By comparing the two extreme
cases, my study sheds light on how different degrees of state involvement in two different cities
led to the different development of organizational fields. My study is situated at the crossroads of
major crises in the field. It provides a timely look at the recent development of the nonprofit
sector.
By using extreme case studies, we can better understand the nuances of our cases (Chen
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2017). The extreme case studies reveal the common organizing dilemmas and challenges of
pursuing organizational goals and uncommon/innovative approaches to problem-solving. The
extreme case studies also uncover unusual institutional environments in which the state, market,
or civil society are disabled, absent (e.g., in the face of a natural disaster), or simply different
from North American standards. Last but not least, extreme cases provide a deeper account of
power dynamics and the reproduction of the status quo (Goffman 1961; Marti and Fernandez
2013). My study of two extreme cases at “extreme” periods echoes all the important points that
Chen (2017) illustrates. My study shows two divergent paths taken by the two organizations at
the crossroads of political opportunities and institutional changes. Both local governments in
Guangzhou and Shanghai offered an olive branch to the two organizations, meaning the
government proactively sought contracts and collaboration with the NGOs in the post-2008 era.
However, CSC/GCSC chose to decline the offers while EP embraced the new opportunities. EP
became the biggest NGOs in China while CSC transformed itself into multiple smaller
organizations.
I adopted a multi-method approach to triangulate the development of these two
organizational fields. I conducted a comparative ethnographic study with two case studies:
GCSC and EP. I conducted 56 interviews with representatives of NGOs active in the fields. I
also surveyed 40 NGOs in Shanghai and 56 NGOs in Guangzhou as part of my internship work
to have a broader sense of the sector. On addition to ethnography, survey, and interviews, I
supplemented my study with archival research to understand the historical development of the
NGOs and the sectors. Using archival research, a survey, interviews, and ethnographic
observation, I triangulated how civil societies at the local level operate in China.
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Multi-sited Ethnography
I conducted a multi-sited ethnography to examine the two incubator models as a way to
compare the divergent paths. By asking the same guiding research question, I can compare and
analyze how leaders made organizational decisions at each site and what their rationales and
perspectives were. Such methodology allows me “to pursue the more open-ended and
speculative course of constructing subjects by simultaneously constructing the discontinuous
contexts in which they act and are acted upon” (Marcus 1995:98). With that said, a multi-sited
ethnography allows me to understand how power structures, the for-profit sector, public sphere,
and other macro factors from seemingly disconnected spaces ultimately affect a specific group of
organizations.
I chose the Guangzhou incubator organizations as my first site, and I spent six months
there, from June 2016 to January 2017. I spent three months in Shanghai, from June 2017 to
September 2017. In both places, I served as an intern for the organization along with other
interns who typically were college students. I was responsible for conducting interviews with
representatives from self-help groups and NGOs from the disability community in Guangzhou. I
also participated in planning fundraising events. I took meeting minutes for small and large
meetings. I was deeply involved in the activities of the organization. I allocated more time in
Guangzhou to get accustomed to the nonprofit sector with which I had no prior working
experience. To make up for my shorter stay in Shanghai, I supplemented data collection with
survey data and three rounds of interviews over three years.
I usually wrote memos and field notes at the end of the day. The memo and field notes
consisted of the date and the event, my observations, and conversations I participated in or
witnessed. When I had meetings and interviews, I always tried to record the conversation and
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transcribe it later. Sometimes in scenarios when I was unable to type my field notes, I spoke to a
recorder to record field notes. I always volunteered to do meeting minutes for small and big
discussions and meetings. They constituted a large part of my field notes. I did not want to
appear suspicious when I had casual conservation with my informants. I normally wrote down
the important lines and key words on my cellphone pretending I was texting. I would later
download field notes to Evernote, a software application. Documentation followed standard
memo writing procedures. These were brief documents used to highlight potential lines of
inquiry and emerging ideas that were grounded in the empirical data collected during fieldwork.
The data acquired during participant observation were analyzed continuously and served to
generate theories about how interactions among players shaped collective understandings of
inter-organizational relations.
My own identity as a Chinese female researcher who grew up in China but attained my
college and graduate degrees in North America made me both an insider and outsider during my
fieldwork. My ability to speak the local dialect gained me better access to the field in
Guangzhou. My ethnic and language background, gender, class, social capital, as well as my
sexual orientation become an important part of my fieldwork.
Access to the Field
Guangzhou Civil Society Center (GCSC)
A good friend of mine, Hu Ming, introduced me to Mr. Qu, the director of Guangzhou
Civil Society Center (GCSC) in May 2016. Mr. Qu became my gatekeeper at GCSC. I became
an intern for GCSC starting on June 19th, 2016. On my first day as an intern at GCSC, I had a
brief meeting with Wendy when she came back. She asked me my research topic and my motive.
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I told her I was interested in learning more about the Nonprofit Leadership camp and wondered
whether I could access the archival data and make connection with their networked
organizations. I also explained that I was still exploring a potential research interest. Wendy did
not respond directly at my initial request. Instead, Wendy said she would try her best to support
my research agenda. Later, Wendy assigned me to help the Tree Disability Project where I could
ease myself into the organization. Not until the last day of my work at the center after 6 months
did Wendy reveal that she was unwilling to give out that information at our first meeting because
she needed to protect their constituents. I was not aware that the state had abruptly intervened in
the Nonprofit Leadership Camp in 2016, and ever since the program has stopped running. The
organization was still recovering from the crisis. Wendy was extremely supportive, however, and
arranged for me to conduct interviews with grassroots organizations. This research task proved to
be an effective way for me to connect with grassroots organizations, and I was allowed to insert
my research questions at the end of an interview instrument that was being developed.
A week into my internship, on June 07, 2016, Wendy asked me to introduce myself
formally at the monthly meeting. I took time to make a PowerPoint where I laid out my
educational background and my hobbies. I even inserted a dancing clip to show them my hobby
as a swing dancer. I was hoping the introduction could get me closer to the team. I had known
most of the staff members at the center by then. I even had had lunch with Mr. Qin, the director,
one afternoon where I informally interviewed him about his opinion of the new Charity law.
However, I still felt like an outsider to the organization because most people knew very little
about me. Finally, after running through some organizational errands, it was my turn to speak up.
I was nervous and enthusiastic at the same time. I also disclosed my identity as a researcher to
ensure everyone was well informed about my research agenda. However, what surprised them
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the most was my dancing hobby. I danced Swing, which is a type of dancing that originated in
Harlem, New York. After the talk, I felt good about it since I received a lot of laughs from my
fellows during my introduction. However, the first comment I got from the crowd was Mr. Qin
who questioned my identity as a Chinese. “You are not a Chinese. Yes, you look like a Chinese
in appearance, but you have a completely different life experience than most of us,” Mr. Qu did
not look like he was joking about it. The comment about my identity and my knowledge about
China sounded like a challenge to my ability to conduct the research in China. I was an outsider
in his regard. My good feeling about building the trust with my colleagues quickly dissolved into
a concern that I would remain an outsider to the community for a while. I realized that my
experience also signaled privilege that could create distance between the team who worked in the
front-line with the most marginalized population of the society and myself. After the meeting, I
became more cautious about my speech, my cultural knowledge, and my lifestyle. I wanted to
blend-in rather than standout. My identity, however, also provided me a unique perspective to
observe team members’ work and utilize my educational background and social capital to draw
resources to the organization. I also earned trust and respect through my devotion to the
organization during the fundraising event.
The Guangzhou Civil Center has a friendly organizational culture. Staff members were
not only colleagues but also friends. The staff began to invite me to Karaoke and hot pot dinners
a week after my arrival. Although my colleagues still occasionally made fun of my
“foreignness,” as a representative of “foreign hostile forces,” I could sense that they have opened
up themselves to me as friends and colleagues. The contacts I accumulated at the organization
eased my entry into the nonprofit community in Guangzhou, especially those people who were
close to GCSC. Sometimes, my colleague would set up an appointment for me, and I would just
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go and meet my interviewees. Wendy and Bing Xia, the associate director, who were my direct
bosses at that time, did not assign me a lot of work, giving me ample time to devote to my own
research. I was never asked to stay late for work. I would never be able to complete the project
without their help and support.
I spent more than 6 months in the field, but I took a break for a few weeks in between. I
flew back to the US and met with my advisor and committee members to reflect on my
fieldwork. I also took a trip to Shanghai for a week in 2016 and conducted follow-up interviews
with NGOs in Shanghai.
Shanghai Excellence Promoter (EP)
I persistently “harassed” Ms. Ting through emails and WeChat messages until she set me
up with her secretary Li Wei to finalize my internship at EP. Since I met Ms. Ting in 2015
during an academic conference in Shanghai and continued to keep in contact with her, my entry
to EP was not difficult. Nonetheless, I needed to take on a more specific role and work at the EP
foundation branches, which was not what I anticipated. I originally applied to the nonprofit
incubator group, but I did not succeed in doing so because they did not accept interns for less
than six months. As a newcomer to an organization with more than 200 full-time staff, I did not
have the flexibility and freedom that I enjoyed at GSCS. Luckily, Ms. Ting and Li Wei Min who
was directly in charge of me gave me considerable autonomy where I learned to maneuver in the
system and access different branches of the organization. Ms. Ting also allowed me to participate
in the nonprofit incubator camp, a 5-day intensive program for NGO training.
Li Wei was my second gatekeeper in EP. I remember our first encounter when I arrived
at the headquarters of EP in Shanghai for the first day of work. I was early and sat in the corner
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reading while waiting for her. Wei gently patted my shoulder and woke me up from my reading.
“You must be Wenjuan. You are more beautiful than your pictures,” she said smiling. She was a
thin girl with a beautiful smile. I liked her instantly probably due to her compliment. But I had a
sense that she was a candid person. Li Wei was directly in charge of my internship at EP since
Ms. Ting was always busy. Ms. Ting constantly flew to different cities for talks and conferences
and she had no time to supervise me. We set up the work documents in the morning and headed
out for lunch at noon. She took me to a nice Cantonese restaurant, knowing that I am from the
region and probably craving for some hometown food. She was very sweet. On our way out, Li
Wei began to talk about her experience at EP. It was as though she had suddenly found someone
to share her views and hear her voice. She began to pour out all her feeling and troubles about
EP. Li Wei worked at EP for six months as the secretary of the EP foundation. I was very
fortunate to have Li Wei as my new gatekeeper to the organization and I acquired many insights
about the organization from her.
After Li Wei learned about my research interests, she said I could work at the NGO
Creative Space where the incubator program was hosted. The headquarters of EP was mainly
responsible for the administration for the organizations. The NGO Creative Space was a coworking office space for NGOs including social enterprises. Unlike other typical NGO offices in
Guangzhou – they tend to be hidden in residential area – the Space occupied the first floor and an
elevated basement of a large office building near the financial district. The interior design was
impressively modern. This site gave me perfect access to different branches of the organizations.
The open space here as well as in the coffee shop enabled social interaction to proceed casually.
Li Wei Min introduced me to several key staff members in different departments on my first day
at the office. Staff there all looked busy and professional. I usually found an empty seat at the
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office and began my new work day. Gradually, I got to know more and more people at the office
space and started to build friendships with many. My cultural capital became an important tool
for me to access this busy population. EP had an unusually high employee turnover rate (45%)
and the organization was constantly under-staffed. Therefore, some of my key informants who
worked there for a few years and occupied a managerial position had to take on many
responsibilities. They were busy people and often worked overtime. At the beginning, it was not
easy to talk to them as an intern from the EP foundation since our work did not much overlap.
I immersed myself in the organization by being deeply involved in its activities. This was
the only way I could get access to key players and issues. The advantage of conducting an
organizational ethnography was that you became a member of the organization by performing
your tasks. I did not make much progress in the first week of my entry to the organization.
However, in my first week, Ms. Ting assigned me a small research task to compare 13 online
philanthropic platforms that just recently received approval from the state because of my
previous online fundraising experience in Guangzhou. Ms. Ting wanted to help the business
development department to prepare for the for the biggest online philanthropy event – the 9.9
Charity Day in China. The staff from the business development department just got back from a
training section held by the Tencent Foundation. EP had not participated in those events over the
past two years but saw a need to play the game now. However, since EP was new to the game,
they did not know what other online fundraising platforms were available out there and what
were the pros and cons for the different platforms. Ms. Ting assigned me to research on this
particular topic. Since I have prior knowledge and experience of online philanthropy, I finished
the task in a week and handed in my document to Ms. Ting. Then I was invited to the meeting
where the departments of fundraising, large clients, and social innovation, and the director Mr.
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Yang Gang all attended.
It was my first meeting at EP on June 28, 2017, and I still vividly remember it. In fact, I
was a bit nervous when I entered the meeting room downstairs at the basement level. When I
walked into the meeting room, I didn’t recognize a face beside Li Wei. I saw Mr. Yang already
sitting at the right side of the table and there was an empty seat beside him. Li Wei gave me a
sign and suggested I grab that seat. I didn’t say hi to him since many other people were also
present and everyone looked serious. More people crowded in. At the end, we probably had more
than 10 people at the meeting. I knew that four of them were directors of different departments
from EP, and the rest were their core team members: Chan Jin from the client department, Nang
Ming from the incubator department, Qing Liang from the product development department, and
Mr. Xiang Li from the business development department. As the director of EP, Mr. Mr. Yang
seemed approachable; he always had a smile on his face. When we were waiting for others, he
also had a friendly small chat with other colleagues and commented humorously on Qing Liang’s
new style. The meeting started, and the vice manager of business development department first
introduced the 9.9 Charity Event to all of us and told us about her interpretation of the rules. Mr.
Yang seemed really excited about this project. He said we could utilize this opportunity and
make it part of our incubator services. We could provide online fundraising training and the
follow-up services. We can sell this service next year. Mr. Xiang Lin was also very excited,
saying we are planning to support 100 grassroots NGOs. Everyone looked stunned by such a big
task. Then Mr. Yang said, well, we probably don’t need 100 at this time. I think 50 is good
enough. Without too much of an objection, the team decided that they would target 50 NGOs and
most of those NGOs would come from different incubators programs that EP has in various
cities. To me, I am still shocked by the amount of work that had to be done in such a short
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timeframe, especially since we seemed to have no prior experience in such matters.
At the end of the meeting, surprisingly, Mr. Yang asked, who is Wenjuan? I was like,
what happened? But I quickly responded. He said, “Good job on the research. I circulated it, and
everyone should look at it.” Mr. Yang’s compliment earned me a smooth access to the
organization. After Mr. Yang left the meeting, Mr. Xiang stopped me and asked me to stay. He
said he would like to have my help on this project, and asked Li Wei’s permission to “be on
loan.” I joined Mr. Xiang’s business development group. The business development group was
an unusual unit in a nonprofit organization because the majority of NGOs were small in China.
Rarely did an organization employ 4-5 full-time staff on fundraising. However, fundraising itself
was such an important component of the nonprofit organizational activities. Without adequate
resources, NGOs can hardly carry out activities and expand their services to reach out to more
people. The business development unit brought in resources, fostered partnerships with the
private sector, and supported other departments to raise funding. By joining this group, I
received unique access to many EP partners.
I received a Wechat invitation from Mr. Yang the evening after our first encounter. I was
thrilled. Finally, I was getting to know this founding father of EP. We had a meeting at 8AM the
next morning at the coffee shop of the NGO Creative Space. We had a nice conversation. I told
him my intention to study EP. Mr. Yang asked, “why didn’t you ask to speak to me”? I smiled
and said, I was thinking about slowly approaching you. However, when I asked him some
questions about how he started EP. He didn’t seem to like the question. Mr. Yang said many
people asked him the same question, and he often attribute it to some sort of coincident. Then
Mr. Yang redirected the conversation on recycling. He said that JD.com Foundation approached
him (or vice versa) and the corporate foundation wanted to build a platform on recycling. I
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offered some of my observations from the US on recycling industry and the comparison between
China and US. He seemed quite satisfied with my answer. Later that day, I made a note of our
meeting and sent it to Mr. Yang. Then he told me that he was about to have a meeting with the
director of JD Foundation. Mr. Yang hoped I could come up with a rough plan for the meeting.
Since then, I worked with Mr. Yang closely on similar matters.
I was very lucky to work closely with Mr. Yang, and the research job opened up
important meetings that would not otherwise have been accessible for someone who had worked
there for months. I first attended a phone conference meeting with JD.com Foundation and Mr.
Yang. Later I also accompanied him and Ting to visit the Impact Hub, a co-working space, in
which they were planning to invest. I also presented at an executive meeting where Ting and
Yang tried to recruit a businessperson, Mr. Song, to the Foundation board. I learned how Ms.
Ting worked with Mr. Yang as a team. As a vice-director of EP she has worked for almost 10
years at the organization. The two shared a tacit understanding about how to pitch to donors
outside of the nonprofit sector. Ting was extremely open about her partnership with Mr. Yang.
While I did not have many face-to-face interactions with him, I learned a great deal of his
managerial style from her. I was also invited to accompany Mr. Yang and two other full-time
staff members to the headquarters of Alibaba in Hangzhou. I made a second visit with my
colleagues to the headquarters as a consultant representing EP.
The relationship I had with Mr. Yang and Ms. Ting, who were the executives of the
organization, was different from the relationship I had with the colleagues I worked with on a
daily basis. With my colleagues, my educational background and class became valuable cultural
capital that granted me access to this busy population. I felt I had to downplay these aspects at
GCSC in Guangzhou. I organized swing dance Friday nights and invited my colleagues to attend,
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a bike tour at an island near the city, and so on. Gradually, we forged friendships, and we could
talk about everything from work to our lives. The countless conversations I had with them on the
dance floor, in subways, and at lunch and dinner made me know more about how they make
meaning of their work and what they have been working on at the organization. During the threemonth period, I held more than 10 recorded meetings and interviews with my colleagues.
My relationship with Ting deepened over time when I began to work closely with her on
a community building project. She was the most important informant of my project. I stayed at
EP for three months. I then visited the place three more times. I supplemented my shorter stay in
EP with those interviews I collected over the course of three years.
Interviews
Besides the ethnographic studies of the two incubators, I also conducted 28 interviews
with representative incubatees, strategic partnership organizations, and government officials to
gain a broad view of the local nonprofit sector. Fei Xiaotong, a famous Chinese anthropologist
and sociologist, describes Chinese society in a vivid metaphor: "in Chinese society, the most
important relationship—kinship—is similar to the concentric circles formed when a stone is
thrown into a lake” (P63). Fligstein and McAdam (2011) also use a similar metaphor to describe
changes in an organizational field. I use the metaphor to conceptualize my sampling strategies
where I took the two organizations as the center of the circle. Then I looked for different
organizations that were closer to the center and further away from the center. The rationale of
choosing incubators as my key study subject was because such organizations tended to be
situated at the center of particular organizational fields.
Interviews with Incubatees and Strategic Partnership Organizations
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Many incubatees and strategic partnership organizations in Guangzhou were located
within walking distance of Y University. According to my informants, at least 10 grassroots
organizations have offices close to the campus. Several organizations even have offices inside
the campus, for example, Red Letter for Children, NGOCN, Disability Connected, GCSC, and so
on. In the early 2000s, many of those independent groups had yet to be registered and operated
rather informally without a fixed office space, not to mention a decent place for meetings and
activities. Therefore, CSC’s 200 sq. meter office space became the place to go for the community
in those years. CSC space either was free to many start-up organizations or was leased out.
“CSC’s office became the symbol and entailed a sentimental meaning for the community,” said
by Zhou Runan (Interview 2017). Even though the 807 Office no longer existed, many
organizations voluntarily chose to stay in that area. Practitioners used the Chinese term huddles
(抱团取暖) to describe their organizational behaviors by huddling together as a tight bundle to
carry forward, like what Emperor penguins do to get through the winter. It was a widelypracticed strategy to cope with the uncertainty of the institutional environment.
On the other hand, EP incubatees and strategic partnership organizations were located
within government designated incubator parks. The first and flagship of the state-led incubator
program was located in a tranquil residential area on X Road, an expensive district of the city.
Leigh-Anne Russell, the project director of the program that oversaw the early development of
incubator parks, revealed multiple benefits of keeping all social organizations in one place, and
obviously one of the benefits is “for the government to keep all social organizations in one place
to keep them under watch”, as reported in the local newspaper City Weekend. I visited the
Shanghai Incubator Park. The incubator park model assembled a perfect version of the readily
observed organizational field that Fligstein and McAdam (2012) describe. The park, situated at
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the urban core of Shanghai, was originally Shanghai Municipal Orphanage but was renovated by
the Shanghai local government. Instead of developing this place into another commercial district
along the lines of Xintiandi, an affluent car-free shopping district, the local government had built
a hub for nonprofit organizations (City Weekend 2013). The Incubator Park brought together
NGOs in one physical space and provided support for those organizations to scale up their
operations. With over 23,000 sq. meters space, the park is now home to a total of 26 NGOs.
Although the government invested in the infrastructure, EP ran the park as the internal
governance unit. The park became the new landmark for the nonprofit sector in Shanghai.
Subsequently, the cities of Chengdu and Suzhou also constructed their own local Incubator Park
under different names. The model quickly disseminated across the countries and now hundreds
of such incubator parks sprang up over the past few years. I interviewed three deputy directors
from EP, and five representatives from nonprofit organizations at the park, in 2015 and 2016. I
repeated the third round of interviews in 2017. After gaining familiarity over the multiple visits,
my interviewees were more open to me. I even became friends with some of them, and they
invited me on different occasions to dinner. I also visited the Incubator Park in Suzhou. Suzhou
was the first place that copied the Shanghai model.
Interview with Government Officials and Funders
The biggest limitation of my study is that I have limited interview data with government
officials. While my observations and interviews allow me to understand how actors viewed the
state, this study design does not collect as much in-depth data on how the state viewed these
studied actors. I did not pursue formal interviews and chose to rely upon informal conversations
in the field instead because I did not feel safe and also did not want to put the organizations I was
studying at risk. However, although I did not have a number of interviews with various levels of
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government officials in both cities, I had one important interview with a former high official of
the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Shanghai, Madam Li. She served at the Ministry of Civil
Affairs/Shanghai Civil Affairs Bureau for more than 30 years, and she was one of the key
players who introduced government contracts to nonprofits in Shanghai. The interview with
Madam Li did not come easily because she emigrated after retiring from the government and
rarely came back. Luckily, the day before my departure to Shanghai, Ms. Ting managed to set up
a meeting with her. I was very thankful.
I also gained some perspectives from government officials through participation in the
training camp. However, most of those conversations were not lengthy taped interviews, rather
causal exchanges at dinner tables or in small talk in the hallway. Although such conversations
might lack depth, they would not have happened if I had just approached them and asked for
interviews. I also found that government officials were more open when they saw you as a friend
rather than a researcher. I did disclose my identity as a PhD student abroad. Rather than running
away from me, I found many government officials wanted to talk to me because some of them
wanted advice on studying abroad, either for their own kids or their families’ kids. However, I
also ran into problem when a male government official asked to have a long night conversation.
As a female graduate student, I was cautious about the power dynamic with my potential
interviewees. I declined the offer. Luckily, I had one taped interview with a former government
official who now works fulltime in the nonprofit sector.
Due to the loose connection with the government officials and the State Avoidance
Autonomous field, I did not have a chance to approach government officials while I was working
at GCSC. Officials from the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) rarely visited the organizations.
The state security officials known as pandas never surfaced unless there was an order from high
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levels of government. When I interviewed Professor Zhao Shu in January 2017, he said, “You
might soon become a target now that you are interviewing me. They are watching.” “They”
referred to the secret police from the Ministry of State Security (MoSS). Forming a good
relationship with those government officials provided a safety net for many leaders of NGOs. In
fact, Ms. Ting from EP told me that in the early years at EP she used be watched. However, as
EP gradually become the partner of the Shanghai government, the government loosen the control
on EP. My interview with an anonymous professor from a G city university said, “The Ministry
of Civil Affairs and the national security polices work hand in hand. They will exchange
information and share the black list.”45
Survey Methods
I conducted a survey of 40 NGOs in Shanghai and 56 NGOs in Guangzhou to get a broad
sense of how those organizations operated and their perceptions of the NGO-government
relationship. The survey was part of the larger survey that a Chinese NGO was piloting to assess
the overall institutional environment in 10 different cities in China after the enactment of China’s
first Charity Law in the fall of 2017. I had been involved in the project as a research consultant
for the group for over two years as a volunteer. I had permission to use the data as the initial
designer of the survey. The survey was not a random sample.
Limitations
This study aimed to understand how NGOs responded to crises on the ground. I focused
on the experience of CSC, EP, and GCSC which was the successor of CSC. I tried my best to
interview most relevant actors of those organizations including current and former staff
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Interview with G professor on Nov. 16, 2017
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members, their donors, and the state actors with whom they frequently interacted. However, I did
not manage to interview the state actors in Guangzhou due to the relatively distant relationship
they had with GCSC. I came to the field right after episodes of contention. I also interviewed and
surveyed the community of connected organizations and sought to understand the shared
experiences beyond the small community. However, due to a small snowball convenience
sample, my finding may not be generalizable to the experience of NGOs in Beijing or other parts
of the country that have different local politics.
In addition, nonprofit organizations are alien concepts to many Chinese. Thus, Chinese
nonprofits operate in a different cultural environment where the majority of Chinese citizens do
not recognize the existence of the organizations. Consequentially, Chinese nonprofits not only
needed to gain legitimacy from the state, but also from the public, which proved to be another set
of challenges. I did not have a chance to explore this line of interaction between the public with
the nonprofit sector, which I hope I can do in my future research.
Final Note
This dissertation also taught me something valuable and priceless. I learned to become a
“hopeless” optimist. By “hopeless,” I mean a sincere and wholehearted believer of love and a
better future. I have met so many similar people during the course of my field research. Some
people left me with great impressions and taught me life-long lessons. The director of the
Southern Migrant Center, Zheng Yi was one of them. After four months in custody, Zheng
finally got out and reunited with his family. His experience in jail was brutal. However, when I
met with him, Zheng Yi was always cheerful, wise, caring, and had a great sense of humor. His
eyes radiated light, and his voice was warm and full of energy. One could not tell what he had
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experienced. Much later, I found out that Zheng had entered into a period of depression after his
release. Despite all the obstacles, Zheng continued to work on the frontline of labor rights. His
courage and optimism deeply inspired me. Zheng’s story is not unique, and I saw many of the
grassroots organizations I studied are still faithfully pushing for incremental social change in
China. The crises over the past few years indeed set back the development of Chinese civil
society, but I still believe that every cloud has a silver lining.
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Xian Shu

Staff

Ethnograp
hy

Labor

Nonenterprise

Zheng Yi

Representati
ve

20161117

Culture

Unregister
ed

Ji Che

Representati
ve

20160804

Disability

Unregister
ed
Nonenterprise

Chong Ming

Representati
ve
Representati
ve

20160706

Disability

Nonenterprise

Jia Bao

Representati
ve

20160714

Migrant
children,
education
Education

Nonenterprise

Zhou Tianzi

Director

20160706

Foundatio
n

Fan Jian

Director

20160923

Capacity
Training

Nonenterprise

Genshu

Director

20160727

Poverty
Reduction

Chen Ni

20170726
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Appendix IV. Comparison of Shanghai and Guangzhou
Geography

Shanghai
Population (2014)

Guangzhou
Population (2014)

• Municipality: 24,256,800

• Sub-provincial city:
13,080,500

• Density: 3,800/km2
• Density: 1,800/km2
Area (2014)
Area (2014)

• 6,340.5 km2

• 7,434.4 km2
Government
• Type:

GDP
Economy
Model
Policies

Registered Civil Society
Organizations

• Type: Sub-provincial city

• CPC Secretary: Han Zheng

• CPC Secretary: Ren Xuefeng

• Mayor: Yang Xiong
- Total: US$383.55 billion

• Mayor: Chen Jianhua
- Total: US$271.84 billion

- Per capita: US$15,880
- Per capita: US$18,123
Financial center + heavy
Commerce + manufacture
industries
A Government Management
A Relative Self-Regulated
Model
Model
•
A contract-based model •
Reformed CSO
where government contracts
Registration Policy by
out social services to
eliminating the need for a
supervisory agency
NGOs
(Hasmath, 2015)
•
Huge investment
(35millions RMB)
(Hasmath, 2015)
•
Minfei : 8255
•
Total: 5526[1]
•

Major Area

Municipality

Shehui tuanti: 3909

•
Foundations: 199
Education and Social Service

•

Foundations:302

Education and N/A

201

Appendix V. Maps

Shanghai:

Guangzhou:
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